“The Trial Court Had Exhausted Its Jurisdiction” — Ubani SAN Says Lokoja Court Was Wrong To Set Aside NDC Judgment, Argues Doctrine Of Functus Officio Barred The Ruling

*Dismantles Legal Foundation of Lokoja Ruling Using Supreme Court Authorities

Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN, has published a detailed legal opinion arguing that the Federal High Court sitting in Lokoja was wrong to set aside its earlier December 2025 judgment directing INEC to register the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) as a political party, contending that the court was functus officio and had exhausted its jurisdiction, that the non-joinder of the Peace Movement Party (PMP) did not automatically render the original proceedings a nullity, and that the ruling threatens to create a dangerous precedent that undermines electoral certainty and democratic participation.

In a legal commentary titled “Why the Lokoja Court May Have Been Wrong to Set Aside the NDC Judgment of 2025,” Ubani systematically examined the doctrinal, procedural, constitutional, and democratic dimensions of the ruling, concluding that “substantial legal grounds” exist for challenging the decision and that “compelling constitutional and democratic considerations suggest that the court ought to have exercised greater restraint.”

Ubani identified the doctrine of functus officio as “the first and perhaps most fundamental issue” raised by the ruling.

“The law is settled that once a court has delivered a final judgment on the merits of a matter, it becomes functus officio and lacks jurisdiction to revisit the substance of that judgment except in very limited circumstances, such as correcting clerical mistakes, accidental slips, or where the judgment is shown to be a nullity,” Ubani stated.

He cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250, in which the apex court “emphatically held that a court cannot sit on appeal over its own final decision. Once judgment has been entered, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter is exhausted.”

Ubani posed the decisive question: “Was the December 2025 judgment directing INEC to register the NDC a final judgment on the merits? If it was, then the court could only revisit it if the judgment was shown to be a nullity. Mere disagreement with the decision or dissatisfaction by an affected third party cannot automatically revive the court’s jurisdiction. The proper avenue in such circumstances is ordinarily an appeal.”

Ubani challenged the central premise of those who supported the ruling, namely that the PMP’s non-joinder rendered the original proceedings a nullity.

“Nigerian procedural law has long rejected the proposition that every instance of non-joinder automatically renders proceedings a nullity,” Ubani stated.

He cited Order 13 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, which embodies the principle that no cause or matter shall be defeated merely by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. He further cited two Supreme Court authorities: Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480, in which the Supreme Court held that non-joinder does not necessarily invalidate proceedings where the court is otherwise able to effectively determine the issues before it; and Peenok Investments Ltd v. Hotel Presidential Ltd (1982) 12 SC 1, in which the Supreme Court emphasised that the court’s focus should be on whether the issues can be effectively and completely determined between the parties before it.

“The relevant inquiry is not simply whether PMP ought to have been joined. The real question is whether the absence of PMP deprived the court of jurisdiction or made it impossible for the court to adjudicate upon the dispute between NDC and INEC,” Ubani stated.

“If the primary issue before the court was whether INEC unlawfully refused registration of NDC, then it is arguable that the dispute could be resolved without necessarily making PMP a party,” he added.

Ubani drew a critical distinction between a judgment that is wrong and one that is a nullity, arguing that even if the court erred in not joining the PMP, that error does not automatically make the judgment void.

“An erroneous judgment remains binding and enforceable until set aside on appeal. A null judgment, on the other hand, is void ab initio because the court lacked jurisdiction or because there was a fundamental defect that rendered the proceedings incompetent,” Ubani stated.

He cited First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. TSA Industries Ltd (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 247, in which the Supreme Court “reaffirmed that a final judgment remains valid and binding unless overturned by a competent appellate court.”

“Consequently, even if one assumes that the Lokoja Court erred in failing to join PMP, such an error would not automatically transform the judgment into a nullity. At best, it may constitute a ground of appeal,” Ubani concluded on this point.

Ubani acknowledged that fair hearing is “undoubtedly a cardinal constitutional principle” but argued that it must be balanced against the equally important principle of the finality of litigation.

“The administration of justice would descend into uncertainty if every person who later claims to be affected by a judgment could return to the same court and invite it to reopen concluded proceedings,” Ubani warned.

“The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against such an approach because it undermines public confidence in judicial decisions and erodes the certainty that final judgments are intended to provide. Indeed, the law’s insistence on appeals as the proper corrective mechanism is itself designed to preserve both fairness and finality,” he stated.

Ubani argued that even if the PMP had a legitimate grievance, its remedy was to seek intervention through the appellate process rather than by inviting the trial court to set aside its own final judgment.

“The Supreme Court has recognised that a person directly affected by a judgment may, in exceptional circumstances, apply to have it set aside. However, such relief is ordinarily reserved for situations where the judgment is shown to be fundamentally defective or void,” Ubani stated.

He cited Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250 and Alor v. Ngene (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 163 as authorities demonstrating that “such intervention remains exceptional and not routine.”

“The burden rested heavily on the applicant to establish not merely prejudice, but a jurisdictional defect sufficient to render the earlier judgment a nullity,” Ubani stated.

Ubani’s most extensive argument addressed the practical and democratic consequences of setting aside a judgment that had been acted upon for six months.

“At the time the judgment was set aside, the NDC had already acquired legal recognition pursuant to the court’s earlier judgment and INEC’s consequent compliance therewith. The party had reportedly undertaken nationwide membership registration, submitted its membership register to INEC, established party structures across the country, conducted congresses and primaries, and produced candidates for forthcoming off-cycle elections as well as preparations for the 2027 general elections,” Ubani stated.

“These developments were neither speculative nor contingent. They represented accrued rights and legitimate expectations arising from a subsisting judgment of a competent court and actions taken in reliance upon that judgment,” he added.

Ubani argued that the court was obligated to consider these consequences: “The court ought to have considered the far-reaching consequences of its decision on thousands of party members, aspirants, candidates, supporters, and stakeholders who had acted in good faith on the strength of the earlier judgment. The law does not operate in a vacuum. Judicial decisions, particularly in electoral matters, must take account of their practical effect on democratic institutions and political stability.”

He described the outcome as creating “uncertainty and instability in the electoral process” and warned that it “risks disenfranchising not only the party but also the citizens who have chosen to associate with it and contest elections under its platform.”

Ubani drew a pointed contrast between the interests of the NDC, a fully operational political party with candidates and structures, and the PMP, an unregistered association with no democratic presence.

“It is noteworthy that the applicant seeking the setting aside of the judgment had not acquired a comparable legal status or democratic stake in the process. Yet the court appeared prepared to sacrifice the accrued interests of an already registered political party and its supporters in favour of a party that INEC is yet to register,” Ubani stated.

“Whether this outcome accords with substantial justice is a legitimate question,” he added.

Ubani warned that if the ruling is allowed to stand, its precedential effect could be devastating for Nigerian democracy.

“If allowed to stand as a precedent, it may create a dangerous situation where political parties, candidates, and voters can no longer confidently rely on final judicial pronouncements. Such uncertainty is inimical to democratic development and may discourage political participation by emerging political groups seeking lawful access to the electoral space,” Ubani stated.

He invoked the Supreme Court’s insistence that “the law should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats substantial justice or produces manifest absurdity,” arguing that “electoral jurisprudence, in particular, should encourage certainty, predictability, and confidence in democratic institutions.”

Ubani’s conclusion was measured but unmistakable in its criticism.

“With tremendous respect to the learned trial Judge, the decision appears to have paid insufficient attention to the broader democratic consequences of setting aside a judgment that had already produced extensive legal, political, and electoral consequences. Courts must remain vigilant not only in protecting procedural fairness but also in safeguarding the stability, certainty, and integrity of the democratic process,” Ubani stated.

“In a constitutional democracy that is still evolving, judicial decisions should strengthen democratic institutions and public confidence in the electoral system. Any decision capable of unsettling an entire political party, its candidates, and its supporters after substantial reliance has been placed on a subsisting judgment must be approached with the utmost caution. Failure to do so risks creating uncertainty that is not only legally problematic but potentially injurious to the health of Nigeria’s democracy,” he warned.

Ubani concluded by summarising the competing positions and identifying where the matter must ultimately be resolved.

“The debate surrounding the Lokoja Court’s decision is far from settled. While concerns about fair hearing and procedural justice are legitimate, it is respectfully submitted that the opposing view overstates the legal consequences of non-joinder and understates the significance of the doctrine of functus officio,” Ubani stated.

“The more compelling legal position appears to be that if the earlier judgment was indeed a final judgment on the merits, which I believe it is, the trial court had exhausted its jurisdiction and could not ordinarily reopen the matter except upon proof of a fundamental nullity, which in the present circumstance does not exist,” he stated.

“Whether the failure to join PMP reached the threshold of a jurisdictional defect capable of nullifying the earlier judgment remains a question that will ultimately require authoritative determination by the Court of Appeal or, eventually, the Supreme Court,” Ubani concluded.

“Until then, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that the Lokoja Court was right to set aside its own final judgment. There are substantial legal grounds for the contrary view. More importantly, there are compelling constitutional and democratic considerations which suggest that the court ought to have exercised greater restraint before making a decision capable of unsettling accrued rights, legitimate expectations, and the political aspirations of thousands of Nigerians who had acted in reliance on a subsisting judgment of a competent court.”

“The law must protect fair hearing, but it must also protect certainty, stability, and democratic participation. A balance that sacrifices the latter at the altar of an expansive interpretation of non-joinder risks creating a precedent that may ultimately weaken rather than strengthen Nigeria’s constitutional democracy,” the Senior Advocate concluded.

The opinion was authored by Dr M.O. Ubani, SAN, Legal Practitioner and Policy Analyst.

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