*Questions Whether Former Legislators Had Standing to Sue, Says “Mere Civic Concern Does Not Translate into Locus Standi”
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Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN, has questioned whether the Federal High Court judgment ordering the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to deregister the African Democratic Congress (ADC), Action Alliance (AA), Action People’s Party (APP), Accord Party, and Zenith Labour Party (ZLP) has gone beyond the position established by the Supreme Court on INEC’s deregistration powers, warning that the ruling raises fundamental unresolved questions about locus standi, the nature of INEC’s constitutional duty, and whether courts can compel a constitutionally independent body to exercise its discretion in a particular direction at the instance of third-party litigants.
In a detailed legal analysis titled “Deregistration of Political Parties: Has the Court Gone Beyond the Supreme Court’s Position?”, Ubani argued that while the Supreme Court has affirmed INEC’s constitutional competence to deregister non-performing political parties, the apex court did not convert that competence into “an automatically enforceable duty at the instance of any interested person regardless of standing or prior administrative determination.”
The analysis invites appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to clarify what Ubani identified as three interrelated constitutional questions that the Federal High Court’s judgment has brought into sharp focus but which remain far from settled.
Ubani opened by observing that Nigeria “appears to be a country of one day, two troubles,” noting that before citizens recover from one national challenge, another quickly takes its place, “creating a cycle of uncertainty that continually tests the resilience of the people and the institutions of government.”
The judgment by Justice Peter Lifu of the Federal High Court, Abuja, delivered on Monday, June 15, 2026, in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/2637/2026 brought by the Incorporated Trustees of the National Forum of Former Legislators, ordered INEC to deregister the five parties for allegedly failing to meet the performance benchmarks prescribed by Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
Ubani provided a careful distinction between what the Supreme Court decided in National Unity Party (NUP) & Anor v. INEC and what it did not decide.
In those cases arising from INEC’s 2020 deregistration exercise, the apex court upheld the constitutionality of Section 225A and affirmed INEC’s authority to deregister political parties that failed to satisfy constitutionally prescribed performance thresholds.
“However, the critical question before the Supreme Court in those cases was principally whether INEC possessed the constitutional competence to deregister political parties. The Court answered that question in the affirmative,” Ubani stated.
He then identified the crucial gap: “What was not definitively pronounced upon was whether, upon the satisfaction of the constitutional conditions, INEC’s power becomes strictly mandatory in a manner that can be compelled by third parties through judicial process, or whether some evaluative administrative discretion still subsists in determining compliance.”
This distinction, Ubani argued, is fundamental to understanding whether the Federal High Court’s judgment represents a faithful application of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or an impermissible expansion of it.
Ubani addressed the interpretation of the word “shall” in Section 225A, which provides that INEC “shall” deregister a political party that fails to meet prescribed thresholds.
“Ordinarily, the word ‘shall’ connotes a mandatory obligation,” Ubani acknowledged. “Yet, even where mandatory language is employed, the antecedent question remains whether the factual and evaluative preconditions for its operation have been conclusively established, and if so, by whom and through what procedural mechanism.”
He argued that while Section 225A “appears imperative in form, its application is not entirely mechanical. It presupposes a prior institutional determination by INEC as to whether the constitutional thresholds have been met.”
“The constitutional design therefore places INEC not merely as a passive executor of constitutional directives, but as the primary evaluator of compliance,” Ubani stated.
This led Ubani to the core of his critique: “Consequently, there is a legitimate concern whether a court can, at the instance of private litigants, compel INEC to exercise what is constitutionally framed as an institutional responsibility, particularly where the Commission has not itself made a definitive administrative determination of non-compliance in respect of the affected parties.”
He pointed out that “there are, indeed, conflicting reports suggesting that some of the parties affected by the judgment may not even be in breach of the constitutional requirements being relied upon,” a reference to the ZLP’s 15 chairmanship victories in Abia State local government elections and the APP’s participation in various electoral activities under subsisting court orders.
Ubani invoked the traditional principles of judicial review: “Judicial review traditionally serves to police illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, or abuse of power. It does not ordinarily permit courts to substitute their own judgment for that of a constitutionally designated administrative body entrusted with the responsibility of making the primary determination.”
Ubani raised equally fundamental concerns about whether the plaintiffs, the Incorporated Trustees of the National Forum of Former Legislators, had the legal standing to bring the action.
“The threshold question is whether the claimants demonstrated a sufficient legal interest or suffered any injury capable of activating the jurisdiction of the court,” Ubani stated.
He cited the settled authorities on locus standi, including Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Thomas v. Olufosoye, AG Kaduna State v. Hassan, and more recent decisions involving Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Chief Gani Fawehinmi, noting that “a claimant must ordinarily demonstrate that his civil rights and obligations have been, or are in imminent danger of being, adversely affected.”
He then posed the decisive question: “What legally cognisable injury did former legislators suffer by INEC’s alleged failure to deregister political parties that purportedly failed to satisfy constitutional thresholds? Mere civic concern, institutional interest, political dissatisfaction, or a desire to ensure constitutional compliance does not, without more, automatically translate into standing under the traditional doctrine of locus standi.”
Ubani noted that the action was not instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, nor was it anchored upon any constitutional or statutory provision expressly enlarging the scope of standing. “Consequently, outside recognised constitutional exceptions, the restrictive approach to locus standi remains the prevailing position in Nigerian jurisprudence. This jurisdictional issue ought to have received rigorous judicial consideration before the substantive questions were addressed,” he stated.
Ubani addressed the broader constitutional relationship between the judiciary and INEC, cautioning against a framework in which courts can direct how constitutionally independent bodies exercise their assigned functions.
“INEC is a constitutionally established independent body vested with specific electoral responsibilities. While its actions and omissions are undoubtedly subject to judicial scrutiny, courts have traditionally exercised caution in directing the manner in which constitutionally assigned discretion is exercised, except where there is clear evidence of illegality, refusal to act, bad faith, or abuse of power,” Ubani stated.
He argued that the Federal High Court’s judgment “appears to proceed on the assumption that once the constitutional conditions under Section 225A are alleged to have been met, INEC is under an immediate and judicially enforceable obligation to deregister the affected parties at the instance of third-party litigants.”
“Such an approach arguably risks collapsing the distinction between constitutional power, administrative determination, and judicial compulsion,” Ubani warned.
Ubani concluded by identifying three interrelated questions that appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, may need to resolve.
First, whether Section 225A imposes a self-executing mandatory duty or one that is activated upon institutional evaluation and determination by INEC. If the duty is self-executing, any citizen could theoretically ask a court to compel deregistration based on publicly available electoral data. If it requires INEC’s prior institutional determination, the court’s role would be limited to reviewing INEC’s exercise of that function rather than substituting its own assessment.
Second, whether the claimants possessed the requisite locus standi to institute the action. If the Incorporated Trustees of the National Forum of Former Legislators did not suffer a legally cognisable injury from INEC’s failure to deregister the parties, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and the judgment would be a nullity regardless of its merits.
Third, whether the remedy granted constitutes an impermissible judicial substitution of administrative discretion under the guise of constitutional enforcement. If INEC has not made its own determination that the parties are non-compliant, a court order directing deregistration effectively replaces INEC’s institutional judgment with the court’s own assessment, a substitution that judicial review doctrine does not ordinarily permit.
Ubani closed with a warning that carried implications beyond the immediate case: “The political space is becoming increasingly restrictive through judicial interventions of this nature, and the appellate courts may once again be called upon to define the proper constitutional boundaries between electoral regulation, administrative discretion, and judicial oversight.”
He invited “further intellectual intervention on this very important issue,” signalling that the legal community should treat the judgment not as a settled matter but as an opening chapter in a constitutional debate that will likely reach the Supreme Court.
Ubani’s analysis, coming from one of the most respected legal practitioners and policy analysts in Nigeria, adds significant weight to the growing chorus of concern about the judgment and its implications. The questions he raises about standing, the nature of INEC’s constitutional duty, and the limits of judicial compulsion over independent constitutional bodies are fundamental to the structure of Nigeria’s electoral governance and are unlikely to be resolved without appellate intervention.
The affected parties are expected to appeal the judgment. The Court of Appeal, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will need to determine whether the Federal High Court’s judgment represents a legitimate enforcement of Section 225A or, as Ubani suggests, an expansion of both “constitutional meaning and judicial authority” that goes beyond what the Supreme Court intended when it affirmed INEC’s deregistration powers.
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