By Hameed Ajibola Jimoh, Esq. 

  1. ABSTRACT

Some Nigerians have come to believe that Nigeria cannot be better. This pessimism is understandable, having regard to the country’s persistent institutional, political, economic and security challenges. Yet, Nigeria’s history does not justify the conclusion that her future is irredeemably condemned. This article offers a contrary view: that Nigeria’s tomorrow will be substantially determined by how Nigeria is operated today. It examines Nigeria’s journey from the pre-colonial and colonial periods, through the military era, to the present democratic dispensation. It considers democracy through the three principal constitutional organs—the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary—and examines the importance of credible elections, institutional independence, merit in the civil and public service, competence and good character in public appointments, and integrity in judicial appointments. It further reflects on the reasons some Nigerians regard the military era as preferable to democracy and considers the implications of the recent alleged attempt to overthrow the present democratic government. The article argues that Nigeria’s fundamental difficulty lies not merely in the absence of laws, but in institutional weaknesses and failures of implementation. It concludes that Nigeria can become better if Nigerians deliberately build institutions that are stronger than individuals, parties and temporary administrations.

Keywords: Nigeria; Democracy; Constitutionalism; Institution; Governance; Rule of Law; Military Rule; Electoral Integrity.

  1. BACKGROUND

Nigeria is a nation whose history has been marked by remarkable transitions, contradictions, challenges and possibilities. From the political and social structures of the pre-colonial societies, through the colonial experience, independence and the subsequent military interventions, Nigeria has travelled a long and difficult constitutional and political journey. Since 1999, the country has remained under constitutional democratic governance, with the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary operating as the principal organs through which governmental authority is exercised.

Yet, notwithstanding this long journey, there is a growing sentiment among some Nigerians that Nigeria cannot become better. For some, the persistent problems of insecurity, corruption, poverty, unemployment, infrastructural deficits, poor governance, institutional weakness and lack of accountability have become sufficient grounds for concluding that the Nigerian project has failed or is incapable of succeeding. Some have consequently developed nostalgia for the military era, believing that the decisiveness associated with military administration produced a better Nigeria than the present democratic dispensation.

This pessimistic view, however, raises a fundamental question: Is Nigeria truly incapable of becoming better, or are the difficulties confronting her substantially products of the manner in which her institutions are operated?

It is against this background that this article examines Nigeria yesterday, Nigeria today and what becomes of her tomorrow. The article proceeds on the premise that Nigeria’s history should not be viewed merely as a record of past events, but as a source of lessons for the present and the future. Nigeria’s present democratic experience must equally be assessed not merely by the existence of elections or the periodic transfer of political power, but by the quality, independence, competence, integrity and accountability of the institutions through which the State is governed.

The central concern, therefore, is institutional. Nigeria may have less of a problem of absence of laws than of weaknesses in the institutions responsible for making, administering, interpreting and enforcing those laws. The credibility of the electoral process, the quality of legislative and executive leadership, merit and character in the civil and public service, and competence, integrity and independence in judicial appointments are all essential to the strength of the Nigerian State.

The recent alleged attempt to overthrow the present democratic government further demonstrates the continuing relevance of Nigeria’s institutional history. It raises not only questions concerning the constitutional order but also the deeper question whether the weaknesses of democracy should lead to its abandonment or, instead, to a more determined effort to repair and strengthen its institutions.

This article is, therefore, an expression of a contrary conviction: Nigeria can become better. Her future is not predetermined by the failures of yesterday, nor is it automatically secured by the mere existence of democracy today. What Nigeria becomes tomorrow will substantially depend upon what Nigerians do with Nigeria today.

  1. INTRODUCTION

Every nation has a yesterday. Every nation has a today. But the most consequential question for every nation is not merely what it was yesterday or what it is today; it is what it becomes tomorrow. Nigeria is no exception.

Indeed, the Nigerian question has, for decades, been approached from several perspectives—political, economic, ethnic, religious, constitutional, security, developmental and even psychological. Yet, beneath many of these debates lies a more fundamental question: how is Nigeria operated as a State?

For, in the final analysis, the strength or weakness of a nation is not determined merely by the elegance of its Constitution, the number of laws contained in its statute books, the quantity of its natural resources, or even the abundance of its human capital. A nation becomes strong when its institutions are sufficiently strong to convert laws into governance, policies into development, rights into realities, and public authority into public service. This is where Nigeria’s past becomes relevant to her present, and where her present becomes decisive to her future.

Nigeria’s yesterday may broadly be examined through three historical stages: the pre-colonial era, the colonial experience and the military era. Nigeria’s today, however, is principally the era of constitutional democracy. It is an era in which the Nigerian State is expected to function through constitutional institutions and processes rather than through the command structure of military rule.

The future of Nigeria, in my considered opinion, will therefore not be determined simply by whether she remains democratic. It will be determined by how her democracy is practised, how her institutions are constituted, how public officers are selected, how power is exercised, how accountability is enforced and how faithfully the Constitution is obeyed. That is the central thesis of this discourse.

  1. NIGERIA YESTERDAY: BEFORE THE PRESENT

Nigeria did not begin with colonialism. Before the advent of British colonial administration, the geographical territory now known as Nigeria contained organised societies with their own systems of governance, justice, commerce, diplomacy, security and social administration. The Sokoto Caliphate, the Kanem-Bornu tradition, the Oyo political system, the Benin Kingdom, the Igbo republican communities and numerous other indigenous political arrangements demonstrated that governance was not foreign to the peoples who inhabited this land.

The forms differed. The institutions differed. The conception of authority differed. But the fundamental human need for order, justice, leadership and social organisation was present. Colonialism subsequently imposed a different political architecture upon these societies.

The colonial State was principally designed to serve colonial administrative purposes. Its structure, therefore, cannot simply be equated with the democratic constitutional State contemplated by modern Nigeria. Yet colonial rule left behind administrative structures, legal traditions and institutional arrangements which later became part of the inheritance of the independent Nigerian State.

Independence brought with it the enormous promise of self-government. But the story of post-independence Nigeria was soon interrupted by political instability, military interventions, civil war and prolonged periods of military rule. From 1966, through subsequent coups and counter-coups, and until the restoration of democratic government in 1999, Nigeria experienced a political reality in which the military repeatedly assumed the political control of the State.

The military era became part of Nigeria’s yesterday. And that yesterday matters because nations that forget their institutional history often repeat its consequences.

  1. NIGERIA TODAY: THE DEMOCRATIC ERA

Nigeria today is principally a constitutional democracy. Nigeria today is a constitutional democracy.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), is expressly supreme. Section 1(1) declares its supremacy, while section 1(3) renders any law inconsistent with its provisions void to the extent of the inconsistency. More fundamentally, section 1(2) provides that Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This is not a mere ornamental declaration. It is the constitutional foundation of the present Nigerian Republic.

Section 14(1) further declares that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice, while section 14(2)(a) declares that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government, through the Constitution, derives all its powers and authority. Section 14(2)(c) correspondingly requires that participation by the people in their government be ensured in accordance with the Constitution.

The constitutional architecture is therefore clear. The people are the repository of sovereignty; government derives its authority from them; and that authority must be exercised within the constitutional order. But democracy should not be understood merely as the periodic conduct of elections. Democracy is not exhausted by voting.  An election is the doorway through which political authority enters a constitutional system. What happens after the election is equally important.

A country may conduct elections and yet suffer institutional weakness. A country may have a Legislature and yet have a weak legislative institution. A country may have an Executive and yet suffer from poor administration. A country may have courts and judges and yet experience difficulties concerning access to justice, judicial independence, judicial appointments or public confidence.

The proper question is therefore not simply: ‘Is Nigeria a democracy?’; the more consequential question is: ‘How well is Nigeria’s democracy operating?’ That distinction, in my humble view, is critical.

Nigeria’s democratic locomotive may be conceived as having three principal wheels: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.

In my humble opinion therefore, if the locomotive is to move properly, all three wheels must perform their constitutional functions effectively.

  1. THE THREE WHEELS OF THE NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC LOCOMOTIVE
  2. THE LEGISLATURE

The Legislature is one of the principal organs through which the sovereignty of the people is expressed in a constitutional democracy.

Members of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly derive their mandates through elections. Their legitimacy is therefore closely connected with the credibility of the electoral process through which they emerge.

The quality of legislation is inevitably affected by the quality of representation. If persons of competence, integrity, patriotism and independence are elected, the Legislature has a greater prospect of becoming a genuine institution of representation and law-making.

But where electoral processes are compromised, the consequences extend beyond election day. A defective electoral process can produce defective representation. Defective representation can produce weak institutions. Weak institutions can produce weak laws, weak oversight and weak accountability. Thus, the electoral process is not merely about determining who wins an election. It is one of the mechanisms through which the institutional quality of the State is determined.

  1. THE EXECUTIVE

The Executive is the organ of government principally responsible for the administration of the State and implementation of governmental policy.

At the federal level, the President is elected by the people through the constitutional electoral process. Governors are similarly elected at State level.

Again, therefore, the question of electoral credibility cannot be separated from the quality of governance. But winning an election is only the beginning.

The elected government must subsequently govern according to the Constitution, the law and the principles of accountability. Public office must be understood as a trust rather than an entitlement.

The Executive should therefore be judged not merely by the political sophistication with which it acquires or retains power but by the quality of the institutions it builds, the policies it implements, the resources it manages and the accountability it accepts. A government may be powerful without being institutionally strong. The Executive must therefore govern within the Constitution and the law.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of constitutional boundaries between governmental institutions. In Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors v Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (2003) LPELR-610(SC); (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 809) 124 SC., the Court considered questions concerning the constitutional allocation and exercise of governmental powers, reflecting the fundamental importance of constitutional limits in the federal arrangement. The doctrine of separation of powers is not an invitation to institutional warfare; it is a constitutional mechanism for preventing the concentration and abuse of governmental power.

Similarly, in Attorney-General of the Federation v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 187 (SC), the Supreme Court emphasised the supremacy of law in the exercise of governmental power.

The question, therefore, should not merely be: Who occupies the Executive office? The more enduring question is: What institutions does that administration inherit, what institutions does it strengthen, and what institutions does it leave behind? A government may be politically powerful without being institutionally strong.

Indeed, one of the greatest dangers to constitutional democracy occurs when political power becomes stronger than the institutions established to regulate it.

  1. THE JUDICIARY

The Judiciary occupies a peculiar position. Unlike elected members of the Legislature and the elected heads of the Executive, judges in Nigeria under the Nigerian law, are not ordinarily chosen by popular vote. Judicial authority is vested through the constitutional and statutory processes of judicial appointment. That distinction carries enormous consequences.

The Judiciary is expected to stand as an independent constitutional institution capable of deciding disputes between citizen and citizen, citizen and government, and, where necessary, institution against institution. It interprets the Constitution. It interprets statutes. It protects rights. It determines legal disputes. It may restrain unlawful governmental action. It may invalidate acts done contrary to the Constitution or law. The Judiciary therefore cannot afford to be treated as merely another department of government.

The quality of judicial appointment is consequently a matter of national importance. A judge must possess more than legal knowledge. Judicial office requires competence, integrity, independence of mind, courage, patience, temperament and good character.

Competence without character is insufficient. Character without competence is equally insufficient. The judicial office demands both. The process of judicial appointment must therefore continuously pursue persons who can be trusted not merely to know the law but to administer justice without fear, favour, affection or ill will.

Judicial independence is constitutionally important. Section 17(2)(e) of the Constitution identifies the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts of law and tribunals as part of the social order which the State is directed to foster.

The constitutional protection of judicial independence is further reinforced by section 158(1), which protects the National Judicial Council and other specified bodies from being subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person in the exercise of their constitutional functions.

In Elelu-Habeeb & Anor v Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt 1318) 423 (SC), the Supreme Court gave substantial judicial consideration to the constitutional position of the National Judicial Council, the discipline and removal of judicial officers, and the protection of judicial independence. The Court recognised the constitutional role of the NJC as an essential component of the architecture protecting the Judiciary from improper interference. The principle is profound.

A judge must not be selected merely because he or she is available. A judge must not be elevated merely because he or she has connections. A judge must not be appointed merely because someone powerful has expressed a preference. The judicial office requires competence, integrity, independence of mind, courage, temperament and good character.

Competence without character is insufficient. Character without competence is equally insufficient. Judicial office requires both.

  1. THE FOURTH INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Although the Legislature and Executive are constituted through elections, the electoral process itself deserves separate consideration in this article because it is the bridge between the people and those who exercise political power in their name.

Nigeria requires an electoral institution that is independent in reality and not merely in name. The credibility of elections depends upon more than the existence of an electoral commission. It depends upon the institutional environment within which that commission operates.

The Independent National Electoral Commission is constitutionally established under section 153(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Constitution also contains safeguards concerning the autonomy of specified constitutional bodies, while the Electoral Act provides the statutory framework governing elections. INEC itself identifies the organisation, undertaking and supervision of elections as among its constitutional functions.

The current electoral statute is the Electoral Act, 2026, which repealed the Electoral Act, 2022, and regulates the conduct of Federal, State and Federal Capital Territory Area Council elections.

The credibility of an election, however, depends upon more than the words of a statute; it depends upon the institutional environment in which the statute is implemented.

The electoral body must be sufficiently independent to discharge its constitutional and statutory responsibilities without improper interference. Election management must inspire confidence. Electoral disputes must be resolved through competent and timely judicial processes. Political parties must respect democratic internal processes. Security agencies must protect voters and electoral personnel rather than become instruments of political intimidation.

Most importantly, the electorate must recognise that the ballot is not merchandise. When votes are sold, institutions are weakened. When voters are intimidated, institutions are weakened. When electoral processes are manipulated, institutions are weakened. When persons are elected not because of competence or character but because of money, influence, inducement or political machinery, the consequences are eventually borne by the entire society. The road from a compromised election to poor governance may therefore be longer than a single election cycle, but it is real.

The Supreme Court, in Dingyadi & Anor v Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 347 (SC), underscored the constitutional importance of democratic governance and the role of the courts in ensuring that constitutional and electoral processes are properly understood and applied. The Court has repeatedly described the courts as custodians of the Constitution and has insisted that democratic governance must be predicated upon the rule of law.

The road from a compromised election to poor governance may be longer than a single election cycle, but it is real.

  1. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: NIGERIA MAY NOT HAVE A SHORTAGE OF LAW

There is a temptation whenever Nigeria encounters a national problem to respond with another law, another regulation, another committee, another agency or another policy. But Nigeria’s central difficulty may not always be the absence of legal rules.

The more difficult question is whether existing rules are being faithfully implemented. There is therefore a distinction between a legal challenge and an institutional challenge. A legal challenge asks: What does the law provide? An institutional challenge asks: Why is the law not producing the result it was designed to produce? The distinction is profound.

Nigeria may have laws against corruption, yet corruption persists. Nigeria may have electoral laws, yet elections may continue to generate serious controversy. Nigeria may have public-service rules, yet patronage can influence appointments. Nigeria may have constitutional safeguards for fundamental rights, yet citizens may still experience violations. Nigeria may have judicial institutions, yet delay in the administration of justice can remain a national concern.

The problem, therefore, is not always that Nigeria does not know what the law says. Sometimes the problem is that institutions are not sufficiently strong, independent, professional or accountable to ensure that the law prevails in practice.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Military Governor of Lagos State & Ors v Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621 (SC) remains a powerful Nigerian judicial statement on the supremacy of law over executive force. The case arose from an attempt by the Lagos State Government to act contrary to the subsisting judicial process. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the matter remains emblematic of the principle that government itself is subject to law.

The lesson is timeless: A State governed by law is not a State in which only citizens obey the law. It is a State in which government itself is subject to law.

  1. THE ‘WHO KNOWS WHO?’ CULTURE

One of the greatest threats to institutional development in Nigeria is the culture of patronage.

A society begins to decline institutionally when the question asked about a public appointment is no longer: ‘Who is the most qualified person?’ but: ‘Who knows whom?’ That question may appear harmless. It is not.

When employment and public appointments are determined primarily by connections, competence is displaced by patronage. When competence is displaced by patronage, institutional capacity declines. When institutional capacity declines, the public suffers.

The civil and public services are the machinery through which government policies are translated into administrative reality. They therefore require men and women of competence, professionalism, integrity and good character. A State cannot build enduring institutions on the foundation of personal connections.

The person appointed to an office should be able to answer, first and foremost: What qualification do I possess for this responsibility? What competence do I bring? What character do I possess? What public value can I add?

The same principle should govern public corporations, agencies, boards and other institutions of State.

Merit is not merely an employment principle. Merit is an instrument of nation-building.

One of the greatest threats to institutional development is the culture of patronage.

Therefore, it worths emphasising that where competence is displaced by connection, institutional capacity declines. Where merit is displaced by patronage, mediocrity becomes institutionalised. Where personal loyalty becomes more important than professional competence, public institutions may cease to serve the public and begin to serve private networks.

The Constitution itself recognises the importance of fairness in the composition of public institutions. Section 14(3) provides the constitutional principle of reflecting the federal character of Nigeria in the composition of the Government of the Federation and its agencies, while section 153 establishes, among others, the Federal Civil Service Commission.

Federal character, however, should not become a constitutional disguise for mediocrity. Representation and merit must operate together.

A Nigerian institution should be representative without becoming incompetent; and merit-based without becoming exclusionary. The ideal should therefore be: competence + merit + character + fairness + professionalism. The same principle should apply across the public service.

The civil and public services constitute the administrative machinery through which government policies are converted into practical governance. They require men and women who understand that public employment is not simply employment; it is public trust.

As stated earlier, a person appointed into public office should therefore be able to answer: What qualification do I possess for this responsibility? What competence do I bring? What character do I possess? What public value can I create?

If those questions cannot be satisfactorily answered, the appointment should trouble the conscience of the appointing authority.

  1. THE JUDICIARY AND THE SANCTITY OF CHARACTER

The same principle emphasized above applies, perhaps with even greater force, to judicial appointments.

The judge occupies an office in which the liberty, property, reputation and rights of citizens may depend upon a single decision. The judge may determine whether a person remains in custody or regains liberty. The judge may determine ownership of land worth millions or billions of naira. The judge may determine whether governmental action is lawful. The judge may determine the validity of an election. The judge may determine the constitutional boundary between institutions of State. That is why judicial appointment cannot be reduced to seniority alone.

Seniority is relevant. Experience is relevant. Legal knowledge is indispensable. But character is indispensable too. A judicial officer must be one whose personal qualities give the public confidence that the judicial oath means something.

The Judiciary is ultimately sustained not merely by buildings, robes, precedents and procedure. It is sustained by the character of the men and women who administer justice.

Section 256(2) of the Constitution provides that the appointment of a Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council. Section 256(3) prescribes, among other requirements, that the person must be qualified to practise as a legal practitioner in Nigeria for not less than ten years.

Similarly, section 271(2) provides that the appointment of a Judge of the High Court of a State shall be made by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, while section 271(3) prescribes the minimum ten-year qualification for such judicial office.

The constitutional requirement of legal qualification and years of practice is, however, only the threshold.

A nation should ask a larger question: What kind of person should be entrusted with the power to determine the liberty, property, rights and obligations of its citizens?

The National Judicial Council itself identifies screening and interviews of candidates for judicial appointment as part of its appointment processes, with the stated objective of competition and transparency in the selection mechanism. That is institution-building.

The appointment of a judge is not merely the filling of a vacancy. It is the appointment of one of the custodians of the Constitution.

  1. INSTITUTIONS MUST BE BIGGER THAN INDIVIDUALS

This, perhaps, is one of Nigeria’s greatest institutional challenges.

Nigeria must move from personality-driven governance to institution-driven governance. Institutions should not be designed around individuals. The Legislature should not become the legislature of a political godfather. The Executive should not become the personal machinery of an individual. The Judiciary should not become beholden to the government of the day. The civil service should not become an employment agency for political associates. The electoral commission should not become the instrument of political incumbents. The Constitution should not be interpreted according to the convenience of whoever happens to possess political power. The office must survive the office-holder. The institution must survive the administration. The law must survive the political party. The Constitution must survive political ambition. That is the essence of constitutionalism.

In Inakoju & Ors v Adeleke & Ors (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1025) 427 (SC), the Supreme Court’s treatment of constitutional requirements governing the removal of a Governor demonstrated that constitutional power is not synonymous with arbitrary power. Constitutional procedures are not technical inconveniences to be ignored by those who possess political strength; they are safeguards against the abuse of that strength. That principle transcends impeachment. 1It applies to the Nigerian State itself.

  1. WHY SOME NIGERIANS SAY THE MILITARY ERA WAS BETTER

It is fashionable among some Nigerians to say that the military era was better. That sentiment should not simply be mocked. It deserves to be examined.

Why would citizens of a country that suffered repeated military interventions look back at military rule with nostalgia? The answer may partly lie in the contrast between visible decisiveness and democratic institutional complexity.

Military governments could issue directives and implement them rapidly. There were fewer institutional actors to negotiate with. There was no election to contest in the conventional democratic sense. Political opposition was restricted. Government could act with speed because power was concentrated.

To a citizen frustrated by democratic delays, insecurity, corruption, unemployment, poor infrastructure or administrative inefficiency, such decisiveness may appear attractive. But constitutional government was never designed merely to produce speed.

The rule of law imposes restraints precisely because power without restraint can become dangerous. Democracy may be slower. Constitutional procedures may be cumbersome. Judicial review may delay governmental action. Legislative scrutiny may produce disagreement. Public debate may expose governmental weaknesses. But these are not necessarily defects. They are often the price of restrained government.

The proper response to the weaknesses of democracy should therefore not be to romanticise unconstitutional seizure of power. Rather, the challenge should be: How do we make constitutional democracy work better?

  1. THE COUP QUESTION: WHAT WOULD HAVE BECOME OF NIGERIA?

This question has acquired contemporary relevance. In the year 2025, Nigerian authorities arrested military personnel over alleged acts of indiscipline and breaches of service regulations. In January 2026, the Defence Headquarters stated that its investigation had identified officers against whom allegations of plotting to overthrow the government had been established sufficiently to warrant trial.

The matter subsequently moved into formal judicial and military processes. In April 2026, the Federal Government filed a 13-count charge against six defendants in the Federal High Court in Abuja over an alleged plot to overthrow President Bola Tinubu’s government, including allegations of treason, terrorism, failure to disclose information and money laundering. By September 2026, the Minister of Defence had stated publicly that suspects connected with the alleged plot were before the courts and facing trial.

The legal proceedings must, of course, be allowed to take their course. Allegations are not convictions, and every accused person is entitled to the protections of due process and fair hearing. But the larger constitutional question remains. What would Nigeria have become if the alleged attempt had succeeded?

That question is not merely about President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. It is about the constitutional order itself. The answer is constitutionally straightforward.

Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the Constitution.

A military seizure of governmental power would therefore not merely amount to a change of political personnel. It would constitute an interruption of the constitutional order. Nigeria has experienced such interruptions before.

The history of military intervention in Nigeria is therefore not merely an academic subject. It is a warning. But there is another warning which democracy itself must hear: When democratic institutions become sufficiently weak, citizens may begin to romanticise unconstitutional alternatives. That is dangerous.

The answer to the weaknesses of democracy cannot simply be the abandonment of democracy. The answer should be the repair of democracy through stronger institutions.

A successful military overthrow would have meant the interruption of the democratic process and the substitution of constitutional succession by force. Nigeria has been there before. The consequences of military interventions in Nigerian political history should therefore not be treated as ancient history. The lesson should instead be clear: When constitutional institutions become weak, citizens may become susceptible to the illusion that unconstitutional alternatives offer easier solutions.

That is why strengthening democracy is not merely a political project. It is a national security project.

A democracy that delivers justice, accountability, security, opportunity and competent governance is less likely to produce citizens who desire its abandonment.

  1. DEMOCRACY MUST NOT ONLY BE DEFENDED; IT MUST BE DESERVED

There is, however, another side to the argument. It is insufficient for democrats to tell Nigerians: ‘You must support democracy because military rule is unconstitutional.’ That proposition is legally correct but politically incomplete.

The ordinary citizen wants to know what democracy has done for him. The trader wants security. The farmer wants protection. The worker wants a living wage and dignified employment. The young person wants opportunity. The entrepreneur wants electricity, infrastructure and an environment in which business can survive. The victim of injustice wants justice. The citizen who is arrested wants lawful treatment. The taxpayer wants accountability. The electorate wants its vote to matter.

A democracy that merely changes political office-holders without strengthening institutions risks becoming an electoral ritual rather than a constitutional achievement.

This is why the Constitution does not treat democracy as merely a system of selecting rulers. Section 14 places democracy within the broader constitutional conception of government deriving its authority from the people and being directed towards their welfare and participation.

The people must therefore experience democracy not merely at polling units but in their daily encounters with government. Therefore, democracy must ultimately justify itself through good governance under law.

A democracy that merely changes political office holders without strengthening institutions risks becoming an electoral ritual rather than a constitutional achievement.

  1. THE NATION WE BUILD THROUGH OUR APPOINTMENTS

There is an aspect of nation-building that is often overlooked. Nations are built not only by Presidents. They are built by appointment. The person appointed to head an agency matters. The permanent secretary matters. The police officer matters. The military officer matters. The electoral officer matters. The civil servant matters. The prosecutor matters. The judge matters. The legislator matters. The administrator matters. Every appointment is therefore, in some measure, an investment in the institution.

If we appoint competence, we strengthen competence. If we appoint integrity, we strengthen integrity. If we appoint mediocrity because of connection, we institutionalise mediocrity. If we appoint persons whose principal qualification is political loyalty, we create institutions that may become loyal to individuals rather than to the Constitution. And this is where Nigeria must confront herself honestly.

Institutions must be bigger than individuals. The office must survive the office-holder. The institution must survive the administration. The law must survive the political party. The Constitution must survive political ambition. That is the essence of constitutionalism.

  1. NIGERIA’S TOMORROW IS BEING DECIDED TODAY

Nigeria’s tomorrow is uncertain. No serious person can tell the Nigerian people precisely what the country will look like in ten, twenty or fifty years. But uncertainty should not be mistaken for helplessness.

The future is influenced by present choices. If Nigeria chooses credible elections, she strengthens representative government. If Nigeria chooses merit in public appointments, she strengthens administrative capacity. If Nigeria chooses integrity in judicial appointments, she strengthens the rule of law. If Nigeria chooses accountability over impunity, she strengthens public trust. If Nigeria chooses competence over patronage, she strengthens the State. If Nigeria chooses constitutionalism over force, she strengthens democracy. If Nigeria chooses justice over sectional advantage, she strengthens national unity. If Nigeria chooses truth over propaganda, she strengthens citizenship.

And if Nigerians continue to reward mediocrity, patronage, corruption and political impunity, the consequences will also become part of tomorrow’s inheritance.

  1. THE REAL NIGERIAN LOCOMOTIVE

Perhaps the three wheels of the Nigerian democratic locomotive require a fourth element—not as another constitutional arm of government, but as the force that determines whether the wheels move in the right direction. That force is the Nigerian people themselves.

The electorate is not merely an audience. Citizens are participants in the constitutional order. The voter who sells his vote participates in weakening the system. The public officer who takes a bribe participates in weakening the system. The person who recommends an incompetent candidate merely because of friendship participates in weakening the system.

The professional who refuses to compromise principle strengthens the system. The judge who decides according to law strengthens the system. The civil servant who performs his duty honestly strengthens the system. The journalist who insists upon truth strengthens the system. The lawyer who defends constitutionalism strengthens the system. The citizen who demands accountability strengthens the system.

Thus, the Nigerian State is not operated by government alone. It is operated by the collective conduct of its institutions and its people.

  1. WHAT THEN BECOMES OF NIGERIA TOMORROW?

The answer cannot be found exclusively in Aso Rock. It cannot be found exclusively in the National Assembly. It cannot be found exclusively in the Judiciary. It cannot be found exclusively in political parties. It cannot be found exclusively in the military. Nor can it be found exclusively in the private sector. The answer lies in the cumulative strength of Nigeria’s institutions and the quality of the people entrusted with them.

Nigeria’s future will depend upon whether we can move from personality-driven governance to institution-driven governance.

It will depend upon whether public office becomes a responsibility rather than a prize. It will depend upon whether merit becomes more valuable than connection. It will depend upon whether character becomes a criterion for leadership. It will depend upon whether elections become credible enough to confer genuine legitimacy. It will depend upon whether the Legislature can legislate independently and responsibly. It will depend upon whether the Executive can govern competently and constitutionally. It will depend upon whether the Judiciary can remain independent, courageous and trusted. It will depend upon whether the civil and public services can recover and maintain professional excellence. It will depend upon whether Nigerians reject the dangerous proposition that national failure is inevitable.

  1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE WE MUST BUILD

The Nigeria contemplated by the Constitution is not a State in which government is above the citizen. It is a State in which government and citizen are both subject to law. Section 1 establishes constitutional supremacy. Section 4 distributes legislative power. Section 5 vests executive power. Section 6 vests judicial power. Section 14 locates sovereignty in the people and establishes democracy and social justice as foundational principles. Section 17 recognises the importance of the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts. Section 153 establishes important constitutional bodies, including INEC and the NJC. Section 158 protects specified constitutional bodies from external direction or control in the exercise of their constitutional functions. The Third Schedule defines important institutional responsibilities, including those of the Independent National Electoral Commission and National Judicial Council.

These provisions demonstrate something important: Nigeria’s constitutional problem is not simply a problem of constitutional text. It is also a problem of constitutional culture.

A Constitution may provide separation of powers, but political actors must respect it. A Constitution may establish independent institutions, but those institutions must be allowed to operate independently. A Constitution may guarantee rights, but citizens and institutions must insist that those rights be respected. A Constitution may provide procedures, but political actors must follow them. Thus, constitutionalism is not merely about possessing a Constitution. It is about living under one.

  1. RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Nigerian problem is not incapable of solution. What is required is a deliberate commitment to strengthening the institutions through which the Nigerian State is governed. The following recommendations are accordingly made.

 

  1. STRENGTHEN THE INDEPENDENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The independence of the electoral institution must exist in substance and not merely in name. The process of appointing persons responsible for the administration of elections should inspire public confidence and should be sufficiently insulated from partisan political influence.

Electoral administration must be transparent, professional, technologically reliable and accountable. The integrity of the electoral register, accreditation of voters, transmission and collation of results, handling of electoral materials and resolution of electoral complaints should continuously be improved.

The objective should not merely be to conduct elections, but to ensure that the person declared elected is reasonably capable of being accepted by the electorate as having obtained a genuine mandate.

 

  1. MAKE ELECTORAL CREDIBILITY A NATIONAL PRIORITY

Political parties, candidates, electoral officials, security agencies and the electorate must all recognise that democracy begins with the integrity of the ballot.

Vote buying, voter intimidation, manipulation of electoral processes, violence and other practices capable of undermining the free expression of the will of the people must be confronted institutionally.

A democracy cannot continuously produce strong institutions from weak electoral foundations.

  • STRENGTHEN THE LEGISLATURE AS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTION

The Legislature must be encouraged and institutionally enabled to perform its constitutional functions of legislation, representation and oversight without becoming subordinate to the Executive.

Legislative oversight should be directed towards accountability and good governance rather than political retaliation or personal interests.

Members of legislative bodies should also regard their mandates as a public trust and not merely as political opportunities.

  1. PROMOTE MERIT, COMPETENCE AND CHARACTER IN PUBLIC APPOINTMENTS

Nigeria must deliberately move away from the culture in which political connection, personal loyalty, friendship or patronage becomes more important than competence.

Appointments into the civil service, public service, government agencies, boards and other public institutions should, subject to the Constitution and applicable laws, be substantially guided by qualification, competence, experience, integrity and good character.

Federal character and other constitutionally recognised principles should not be interpreted or applied in a manner that sacrifices competence and institutional effectiveness.

Nigeria needs diversity without sacrificing merit, and merit without sacrificing fairness.

 

  1. PROFESSIONALISE THE CIVIL AND PUBLIC SERVICE

The civil and public service must be treated as a permanent institution of the Nigerian State rather than as an extension of whichever political administration happens to be in power.

Recruitment and promotion should reward competence, diligence, professionalism and integrity. Political transitions should not unnecessarily destroy institutional memory or professional capacity.

A government may change every four years; the administrative machinery of the State must nevertheless retain the competence necessary to continue serving Nigeria.

 

  1. STRENGTHEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

The Judiciary must remain sufficiently independent to discharge its constitutional responsibility without fear, favour or improper influence.

Judicial independence should not be understood as a privilege for judges. It is a right of the citizen, because an independent Judiciary is ultimately a protection for every person who may one day stand before the court against a more powerful individual, corporation, institution or government.

Adequate funding, appropriate working conditions, technological improvement, security and administrative support should therefore be provided for the Judiciary while preserving its institutional independence.

  • MAKE MERIT AND GOOD CHARACTER CENTRAL TO JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

Judicial appointment should be treated as one of the most important institutional decisions in the Nigerian State.

Legal knowledge and years of practice are indispensable, but they should not constitute the entirety of the assessment. Candidates should also be assessed with seriousness for integrity, temperament, independence of mind, courage, diligence, sound judgment and good character.

The objective should be to appoint judges who are not merely legally competent, but who can be trusted to administer justice impartially and fearlessly.

  • REDUCE DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

The strength of the Judiciary is diminished where justice takes so long to arrive that the successful litigant no longer meaningfully benefits from the judgment.

Nigeria should therefore continue to pursue reforms directed at reducing unnecessary adjournments, procedural abuse, avoidable interlocutory disputes and administrative delays.

Court processes should increasingly employ reliable technology, effective case management and appropriate alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, without compromising fair hearing.

Justice must not only be done; it must also be accessible within a reasonable time.

  1. STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

Government must itself remain subject to the Constitution and the law.

The principle stated by the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Lagos State & Ors v Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (supra) should continue to resonate in the Nigerian constitutional order: governmental power cannot lawfully be exercised as though government were above the law.

Constitutional limitations should therefore be treated as substantive safeguards rather than inconvenient technicalities.

  1. BUILD INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE STRONGER THAN INDIVIDUALS

Nigeria’s long-term institutional development requires a movement away from personality-driven governance towards institution-driven governance.

No President, Governor, legislator, judge, civil servant, political party or public official should become greater than the institution which he or she temporarily occupies. The test of successful leadership should therefore include not merely what an office-holder achieves personally, but what institutions he or she leaves behind.

A good administration should leave behind stronger institutions than it inherited.

  1. DISTINGUISH DEMOCRATIC IMPERFECTION FROM DEMOCRATIC FAILURE

The frustrations associated with democratic governance should not automatically lead to the conclusion that democracy itself has failed.

Democracy must certainly be criticised where it fails to deliver good governance. But the proper response to defective democratic practice should ordinarily be institutional reform rather than unconstitutional seizure of power.

Nigeria’s experience of military intervention should serve as a historical warning that constitutional democracy, despite its imperfections, provides a lawful framework through which governmental authority can be contested, transferred and restrained.

The alleged recent attempt to overthrow the democratic government should consequently strengthen, rather than weaken, the national commitment to constitutional governance.

  • MAKE ACCOUNTABILITY A NORMAL FEATURE OF GOVERNANCE

Public accountability should not depend upon the political convenience of the government in power.

Institutions responsible for investigating corruption, prosecuting offences, auditing public expenditure and enforcing accountability should be sufficiently professional, competent and independent to perform their functions according to law. Accountability should apply to the powerful as well as to the powerless.

The legitimacy of government is strengthened when citizens see that public office does not confer immunity from lawful scrutiny.

  • DEVELOP A NATIONAL CULTURE OF MERIT AND CHARACTER

Institutional reform cannot succeed through legislation alone. Nigeria must cultivate a national culture in which competence is respected, integrity is rewarded and public service is regarded as an honour accompanied by responsibility.

The question asked when recommending a person for public office should progressively change from:

‘Who does he know?’ to: ‘What can he contribute, and can he be trusted with the office?’

That cultural transformation may ultimately be more important than any single statute.

  • EDUCATE CITIZENS ON THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Citizens must understand that democracy is not merely the right to vote. Citizens have responsibilities to participate responsibly in public affairs, obey the law, demand accountability, reject violence, resist electoral manipulation and hold public officials to account.

Civic education should therefore be strengthened at schools, universities, professional institutions and community levels.

A constitutional democracy cannot be sustained indefinitely by institutions populated by citizens who have little understanding of the constitutional order.

  1. DEVELOP INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND CONTINUITY

Every administration should not have to reinvent Nigeria. Government institutions should preserve records, policies, professional knowledge and institutional experience so that changes in political leadership do not automatically result in the destruction of valuable governmental capacity.

Continuity does not mean preserving bad policies. It means preserving institutional knowledge while allowing legitimate governments to introduce lawful reforms.

  • STRENGTHEN NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Nigeria’s security institutions must remain professional and loyal to the Constitution and the Nigerian State.

The military and other security agencies have vital constitutional and national responsibilities, but those responsibilities must operate within the framework of constitutional democracy.

The solution to dissatisfaction with civilian government cannot be the substitution of constitutional government by force.

At the same time, civilian governments must recognise that democratic legitimacy is strengthened when citizens enjoy security, justice and competent governance.

  • JUDGE DEMOCRACY BY THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS IT LEAVES BEHIND

Finally, Nigeria must change the manner in which democratic success is measured.

The success of an administration should not be measured only by the number of projects commissioned, political appointments made, laws enacted or elections won.

A more enduring measure is: Are the institutions stronger than they were before? Are elections more credible? Is the civil service more professional? Is the Judiciary more independent and efficient? Is legislative oversight stronger? Is public accountability more effective? Are citizens more confident in the State? Are constitutional limitations more respected?

If the answer to these questions is affirmative, Nigeria would be moving in the right direction. The most important recommendation, therefore, is that Nigeria must deliberately cultivate strong institutions over strong individuals.

Individuals will come and go. Governments will change. Political parties will rise and fall. Presidents, Governors, legislators, ministers, judges and civil servants will occupy their offices for limited periods. Institutions, however, should endure.

Nigeria must therefore build a political and constitutional culture in which the person who occupies an office understands that he is a temporary custodian of a permanent institution.

The ultimate objective should be a Nigeria in which the Constitution is stronger than political ambition, the law is stronger than personal influence, merit is stronger than connection, integrity is stronger than patronage, and institutions are stronger than individuals.

If Nigeria succeeds in building such a State, the pessimistic assertion that Nigeria cannot be better will gradually lose its force. For Nigeria’s tomorrow is not predetermined. It will be the consequence of what Nigerians choose to build, preserve and defend today.

  1. CONCLUSION: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

Nigeria yesterday is history. We cannot return to the pre-colonial period. We cannot undo colonialism. We cannot erase military rule from our national memory. We cannot pretend that the political crises, coups, civil war, corruption, institutional weaknesses and democratic disappointments of the past never occurred.

But history is not merely a record of what happened. History is also a teacher of what should not happen again. Nigeria today is our responsibility.

This democratic era is the constitutional vehicle through which we presently travel. Its three principal wheels—the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary—must function effectively and independently within the constitutional order. The electoral system that produces political leadership must be credible. Public and civil service appointments must be based substantially on merit, competence and character. Judicial appointments must preserve the integrity and independence of the Bench.

And Nigeria tomorrow? That remains a question. But it is not a question to which Nigerians are completely powerless to respond.

Tomorrow is being written today. Every election writes a sentence. Every appointment writes a sentence. Every judicial decision writes a sentence. Every act of corruption writes a sentence. Every act of integrity writes a sentence. Every abuse of power writes a sentence. Every defence of constitutionalism writes a sentence. Every citizen who refuses to sell his vote writes a sentence. Every public officer who chooses duty over personal gain writes a sentence. Every institution that chooses principle over patronage writes a sentence. Together, these sentences will become the story of Nigeria’s tomorrow.

Therefore, perhaps the most important question for Nigeria is not: ‘What will become of Nigeria?’ The more fundamental question is: ‘What are we doing to Nigeria today?’

For the Nigeria that our children and grandchildren inherit will not be determined by the Nigeria we merely remember. It will be determined by the Nigeria we choose to build.

And so, between Nigeria’s yesterday and Nigeria’s tomorrow stands Nigeria today—not as a passive bridge between two periods of history, but as the decisive moment in which a nation determines whether its institutions will remain weak, become captured, or rise above individuals, parties, governments and temporary political interests. Nigeria’s tomorrow is therefore not merely waiting for us. Nigeria’s tomorrow is being made by us.

What becomes of her tomorrow depends, in no small measure, on how faithfully we operate her today.

FIGPCM, CGArb. (Certified Global Arbitrator), MiADRN, MiCMN), LPC (Licensed Peace and Conflict Resolution and Management Specialist), PC-WCM (Certified Specialist in ‘Workplace Conflict Management’), ACArb (Chartered Arbitrator), FIMC, CMC (Certified Management Consultant), CMS (Certified Management Specialist (with distinction in time Management), London), Notary Public for Nigeria and LLM (in view) E-mail hameed_ajibola@yahoo.com, Phone No.: 08168292549.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
  2. Electoral Act, 2026.
  3. Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors v Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) LPELR-610(SC); (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 809) 124.
  4. Dingyadi & Anor v Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 347.
  5. Elelu-Habeeb & Anor v Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt 1318) 423.
  6. Inakoju & Ors v Adeleke & Ors (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1025) 423.
  7. Military Governor of Lagos State & Ors v Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621.
  8. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/852204-nigerian-military-finally-confirms-coup -plot-to-overthrow-tinubus-government.
  9. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/907360-coup-plot-real-suspects-now-on-trial-says-defence-minister.
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