(An Appraisal Of Jibrin Okutepa SAN’s Position On Imo State’s Objection To Compulsory Shortlisting)
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By Sylvester Udemezue
A news report on 05 November 2026 had it that the National Judicial Council had directed the Imo State Judicial Service Commission to include Justice Ijeoma Agugua, the State’s Acting Chief Judge and most senior High Court judge, in the shortlist for appointment as substantive Chief Judge. The report concerned the Council’s decision at its meeting of 03 November, announced in a statement on 4 November, following a petition challenging her exclusion. Then a news report of 07 November 2026, credited learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Mr Jibrin Okutepa as defending NJC’s intervention. Learned Silk Okutepa’s argument was that inclusion of the most senior judge on the nomination list would permit a fair assessment, and that excluding the most senior judge without a lawful and reasonable explanation would undermine the integrity of the process. Mr Okutepa however distinguished shortlisting from appointment and acknowledged that seniority does not confer an automatic entitlement to the substantive office. While rejecting NJC’s position, the Imo State Attorney-General Paul Obinatu argued that the Imo State Judicial Services Commission (imo State JSC) has its own constitutional responsibility to assess suitable nominees. The Imo State AG concluded that the NJC’s power to recommend from the submitted list does not authorise the NJC to dictate a particular addition to that list.[1] These opposing positions form the background to this respectful rejoinder. In my opinion, the precise question in issue is whether the NJC has established a lawful basis for insisting that the most senior judge in Imo State must be included in the nomination list, as distinct from scrutinising the fairness of the selection process.
It is respectfully submitted that a Governor of a State in Nigeria is under no constitutional obligation, merely because of seniority, to appoint the most senior High Court judge as the substantive Chief Judge of the State. The Governor must, however, act through the constitutionally prescribed process, including the indispensable recommendation of the National Judicial Council and confirmation by the State House of Assembly. These propositions belong together. The first prevents seniority from becoming an unwritten rule of automatic succession; the second prevents constitutional discretion from becoming executive licence.[2] This in my view, is the starting point for this respectful rejoinder to the NJC’s intervention in the Imo Chief Judge selection and to Mr Jibrin Okutepa, SAN’s defence of NJC’s stance. In my view, with due respect to both the NJC and to Mr Okutepa, SAN, the Imo Attorney-General is right to question any asserted power to compel the State Judicial Service Commission to shortlist a particular judge solely because that judge is the most senior. The NJC has an added obligation to identify the lawful basis for that command. Seniority, institutional stature and an appeal to fairness cannot dispense with that requirement, duty incumbent on the NJC, because the NJC is not a law unto itself. It must however be added that my constitutional objection does not determine whether the Imo JSC actually conducted a fair comparative assessment. Each affected institution must justify its own exercise of power to show that it has complied with mandatory provisions of the Constitution, which is the Supreme law of the land. Neither party acquires additional authority from the possibility that the other has acted improperly.
My position predates the present dispute. In my article, “Office of state chief judge not exclusive inheritance of most senior judge”, published in The Nation on 15 December 2020, I disputed the conversion of judicial seniority into a constitutional entitlement.[3] I developed the argument with Vivien Chioma Anukanti in a learned scholarly article titled, “The Convention-Constitution Standoff: Resolving the Most-Senior-Judge Conundrum in Appointment of Substantive Chief Judges for States in Nigeria” published in the University of Calabar Law Journal (2021).[4] My work with Titilola Hameed, subsequently published in the Redeemer’s University Law Journal under the title, “Circumscribing Powers of Stakeholders as a Panacea to Recurring Tension in the Process of Appointing Chief Judges for States in Nigeria”, examined the separate but connected limits of the powers of all institutions involved in the appointment of a State Chief Judge in Nigeria.[5] Those publications addressed disputes in Gombe, Cross River and Rivers States. The present controversy illustrates the continuing importance of their central concern: ensuring that each participant exercises its own constitutional function without absorbing the functions of another. The arguments must nevertheless be applied to the present facts in Imo State, and to any applicable later rules.
The Constitution distinguishes temporary succession from substantive selection
Section 271(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides:
“The appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to confirmation of such appointment by the House of Assembly of the State.”[6]
By contrast, section 271(4) expressly requires the Governor, in the circumstances stated there, to appoint the most senior judge of the High Court to perform the Chief Judge’s functions temporarily as Acting Chief Judge. Section 271(5) regulates the duration and continuation of that acting arrangement. The provisions deal with different institutional needs: immediate continuity in judicial leadership and the selection of a substantive officeholder.[7] Section 271(3) prescribes the minimum professional qualification for appointment as the substantive Chief Judge; it does not prescribe primacy on the seniority list, contrary to the impression the NJC is trying to create. The express seniority requirement in subsection (4) with respect to the appointment of an Acting Chief Judge must be obeyed, no doubt. However, it cannot simply be transported into subsection (1), which establishes a different process (the process of appointing a substantive CJ) without prescribing automatic succession by the most senior judge. In our paper with Anukanti, we explained that “the Constitution does not intend that the most senior judge should automatically become, or be appointed, the substantive CJ”.[8] That distinction also answers an argument based on the incumbent’s acting service. Appointment to act demonstrates an entitlement under the temporary succession provision; it does not dispense with the separate substantive selection process. Equally, a previous breach of the acting succession rule cannot establish the legal answer to every later dispute about substantive shortlisting. My support for Imo’s present constitutional objection accordingly supplies no defence of bypassing the most senior High Court judge when section 271(4) expressly requires that the most senior judge’s appointment as the acting chief judge. The constitutional distinction must be maintained in both directions.
Four institutions have distinct responsibilities
Paragraph 6(a)(i) of Part II of the Third Schedule gives the State Judicial Service Commission responsibility for advising the NJC on suitable persons for nomination as Chief Judge. Paragraph 21(c) of Part I empowers the NJC to recommend persons to Governors from the list submitted by the State JSC. Section 271(1) then assigns appointment to the Governor and confirmation to the House of Assembly.[9] This constitutional sequence matters. The State JSC makes a genuine assessment of suitability. The NJC independently evaluates the persons submitted by the State JSC and decides whether to recommend and whom to recommend. The Governor’s appointment depends on the requisite recommendation. The State House of Assembly exercises its confirmation function. None of those stages should become a ceremony performed after another institution has conclusively decided everything. In our paper with Anukanti, we expressly recognised the limit on gubernatorial choice: “The Governor cannot go outside the list”.[10] The point was that gubernatorial discretion operates within the constitutionally required nomination and recommendation process. It was never a licence to appoint anyone the Governor prefers, without an NJC recommendation. Likewise, our paper with Hameed expressly states: “The NJC is not a mere rubber-stamp in the process of appointment of judicial officers in Nigeria”.[11] Its power of independent assessment necessarily includes declining to recommend unsuitable nominees. The constitutional objection is therefore directed at a different proposition: that the power to assess and reject the submitted candidates necessarily carries a power to dictate the addition of a part articular judge to the originating shortlist. That further proposition by the NJC requires its own justification.
Compulsory consideration still requires a lawful foundation
Mr Okutepa is correct that shortlisting does not amount to appointment. But it does not follow that a compulsory shortlisting direction raises no constitutional question. The Constitution allocates responsibility at intermediate stages as well as at the final stage. An institution cannot intrude upon another’s function before the substantive appointment is made. Our earlier scholarship addressed precisely this issue. Our paper with Anukanti considered the Gombe controversy, in which the NJC (by a directive similar to the one it issued in the case of Imo State) sought the inclusion of Justice Beatrice Iliya, rather than merely a claim to automatic appointment. At pages 19-20 of the paper, we disputed and condemned the rejection of a list on the sole ground that the most senior judge’s name had been omitted. The paper with Hameed returned to compulsory inclusion in its conclusion at pages 104-105.[12] The continuing force of that argument is that a power to select from names submitted is not, without more, a power to prescribe which particular names must be submitted. Otherwise, the State Commission’s assessment risks becoming an exercise in endorsing an assessment already made elsewhere by the NJC. Nevertheless, constitutional silence must not be overstated. The absence of an express seniority condition in section 271(1) does not invalidate every procedural protection adopted under lawful authority. An NJC intervention to enforce a valid selection rule, remedy demonstrated discrimination or secure genuine consideration is analytically different from one asserting personal entitlement through seniority alone. The necessary inquiry is therefore whether this direction enforces an identifiable lawful requirement or substitutes the NJC’s preference for the State JSC’s comparative judgment. Describing inclusion as fair does not answer that inquiry. Describing the JSC as independent does not answer it either.
Fair consideration and a place on the final shortlist are different
There is a further distinction missing from much of the public discussion. An eligible candidate’s opportunity to express interest and receive a fair assessment is different from a guaranteed place on the final shortlist. A shortlisting process necessarily selects some eligible candidates and leaves others out. A judge may possess the constitutional qualification for office, have an honourable record and deserve serious consideration, yet not emerge from a properly conducted comparative assessment. That outcome need not imply misconduct or unfitness to continue serving as a judge. Comparative suitability for leadership is a different question from disciplinary guilt. A process requiring proof of misconduct before any senior candidate could be left off a shortlist would convert a comparative selection process into disciplinary proceedings. The Constitution does not equate the two.[13] Conversely, a State JSC cannot deliberately deny a candidate access to the process, disregard relevant criteria or manufacture objections to secure a predetermined result. Such conduct would require correction. The point is that the defect must be established. It cannot be inferred conclusively from seniority and omission alone. Mr Okutepa’s contention that arbitrary exclusion lacks legal support is unobjectionable as a general proposition. However, the difficulty lies in the next step. Mr Okutepa’s description of this exclusion as “whimsical” assumes the very factual issue that needs examination. What assessment occurred? Which criteria were applied? What reasons were recorded? Were the competing candidates assessed consistently? The publicly available explanation does not provide the answers. A press release is not the complete administrative record: its silence does not prove that reasons or findings do not exist elsewhere. It does mean that a categorical public conclusion of arbitrariness has not been demonstrated by those published materials.[14] His demand for a provision specifically authorising exclusion also puts the matter too narrowly. A constitutional power to identify suitable nominees necessarily involves selection. The State JSC needs authority to exercise that selection function, which paragraph 6(a) supplies; it does not need a separately enacted list of every eligible person it may omit. Its discretion remains reviewable for unlawful purpose, irrelevant considerations, unfairness and other legally established defects.[15] The State JSC must therefore justify its process, while NJC and Mr Okutepa who are proponents of a binding inclusion command must identify the enabling legal authority for that remedy. These are concurrent responsibilities, not competing excuses.
Convention and morality cannot amend the Constitution
There is a separate question whether seniority should, as a matter of professional tradition or moral expectation, ordinarily guide succession. That may be a legitimate policy preference. It is not a substitute for identifying what the Constitution actually requires. Our paper with Anukanti examined this distinction between the law as it is and the law as one might wish it to be, particularly at pages 17-18.[16] The starting point is the law, constitutionally made, and applied through lawful interpretation. An administrative body such as the NJC cannot turn its view of the most desirable outcome into an additional constitutional condition. A convention may guide the exercise of discretion within the law; it cannot enlarge the institution’s legal powers or rewrite the allocation of power or functions. Where a valid legal rule imposes a duty of fairness, that duty must be obeyed as law. An appeal to fairness without an identified or identifiable legal foundation is a different proposition. Accordingly, describing compulsory seniority as decent, traditional or morally preferable cannot be seen as a valid answer to the Attorney-General’s objection. Any answer to be valid or tenable in the circumstances must identify a lawful power and explain why it authorises the particular direction. The issue is legal competence, not the strength of anyone’s sympathy for a particular candidate. Good intentions do not confer legal jurisdiction. The supremacy of the Constitution binds institutions, including the NJC, even when they sincerely believe a different arrangement would produce a better result.
The NJC’s own policy supports merit and fair access
The National Judicial Policy reinforces this distinction. Paragraphs 2.1.1-2.1.2 favour transparent selection based on merit, skill and integrity. Paragraph 2.1.4 protects the opportunity of qualified and suitable persons to declare interest and envisages assessment. Paragraph 2.1.5 expressly rejects comparative junior status as an obstacle to appointing deserving candidates of high integrity and excellence.[17] These provisions do not make seniority irrelevant. Experience and demonstrated institutional knowledge may weigh heavily in a lawful assessment. They do, however, resist treating the seniority ladder as a conclusive substitute for selection. The procedural text published on the NJC’s website similarly provides, in Rule 3(4), for a provisional shortlist on merit. Rule 3(5) provides for consideration and approval by the relevant State, while Rule 3(6) includes seniority among several considerations.[18] That structure recognises professional judgment, rather than a single determining factor.
There is an essential current qualification. Imo State’s own public notice dated 05 June 2026 expressly invokes paragraph 5.4 of the 2023 Revised Guidelines for the appointment of the State Chief Judge, Grand Kadi and President of the Customary Court of Appeal. The constitutional debate cannot safely proceed as though only the earlier general procedural text exists.[19]Any reliance on the 2023 instrument to compel the inclusion of a particular judge (candidate) should therefore identify its actual operative wording and explain its application. The reference to paragraph 5.4 in a publication notice does not, by itself, disclose a compulsory seniority rule. Nor does the November press release identify such a provision. Neither the existence nor the absence of a relevant requirement should be assumed without examining the applicable text. If a valid, applicable rule requires inclusion, its legal effect must be addressed directly. If the argument rests instead on an unwritten professional convention, the convention cannot be treated as though it were an express constitutional command.
The NJC has oversight powers, but its oversight powers have limits.
The strongest argument for the NJC is that an independent recommending institution must be able to scrutinise the process that produced the nominees. Otherwise, a State JSC could frustrate the NJC through a deliberately manipulated list. I humbly accept that concern, and I agree that the NJC need not close its eyes to credible evidence of procedural illegality or unfair exclusion. Section 160 and paragraph 21(i) of Part I of the Third Schedule also require attention: in it, the Constitution provides for procedural regulation and gives the NJC responsibilities concerning broad judicial policy and administration. An argument that ignores these powers would be incomplete. However, their exercise remains subject to constitutional and legal conditions and the more specific allocation of nomination and recommendation functions.[20] There is a material difference between prescribing lawful general criteria and commanding a named candidate’s inclusion merely because that candidate is the most senior. The latter requires a demonstrated connection to a specific lawful requirement or a properly established defect. With due respect to NJC, a broad concern for judicial independence cannot, by itself, settle the permissible form of intervention. The NJC may seek the assessment record, identify a breach of the applicable rules, decline to act on a defective process and request lawful reconsideration. Whether it may go further and compel the inclusion of a named person depends on the authority invoked and the defect established. The mere existence of a power to withhold recommendation does not conclusively answer that separate question. The central argument of our paper with Hameed was that all decisions and directives of the NJC’s must rest on legally cognisable reasons.[21] Such reasons will enable the parties, the public and, where necessary, a court to distinguish an exercise of constitutional judgment from an assertion of institutional preference. The NJC’s November public release makes this issue particularly clear. It recognises the State JSC’s advisory responsibility and explains the NJC’s role by reference to assessing persons presented to it. It then moves to requiring an additional name. The missing legal explanation concerns that move: why does the power described establish the particular power exercised?[22] The release also describes the action both as a direction to the State JSC and as an instruction to the NJC’s Secretariat to formally request the inclusion of the name of the most senior judge in the originating list. There is a huge difference between a consultative request and a binding command. If the intention of the NJC in asking for the inclusion of the most senior judge is a request for reconsideration, there is room for institutional dialogue. But if its insistence on inclusion of the most senior judge is compulsory regardless of a lawful comparative assessment, the constitutional objection by Imo State remains valid.[23]
Section 202 should be used accurately
The Attorney-General also relies on section 202. Its language protects the named State bodies when exercising appointment or disciplinary powers. The State JSC’s role concerning the process of appointing a substantive Chief Judge is expressed separately as advice to the NJC. Whether section 202’s protection extends to that advisory stage requires interpretation; it should not be presented as an unlimited textual immunity covering every activity of a State JSC. The stronger foundation for the Attorney-General’s objection is the allocation of functions in the Third Schedule of the Constitution, read with section 271 of the Constitution. Section 202 supports the importance of institutional independence, but it does not eliminate the need to analyse those functions precisely.[24] The same discipline applies to section 158 and the NJC. Independence protects the lawful exercise of assigned powers. It does not confer immunity from constitutional limits or judicial scrutiny.[25] In Elelu-Habeeb v Attorney-General of the Federation, the Supreme Court explained the shared constitutional responsibilities and the checks they impose upon gubernatorial power. Our paper with Hameed paper relied on that explanation. The decision arose from removal of a Chief Judge; it should not be misrepresented as a direct ruling on the present compulsory shortlisting question.[26] The proper lesson is that an indispensable role must be respected within the constitutional arrangement. It does not follow that any one participant may enlarge that role in the name of protecting the arrangement.
Imo must disclose a defensible process
Supporting the Attorney-General’s constitutional objection does not mean endorsing every act of the State Government or the State JSC. Allegations of political exclusion, discrimination, retaliation or manipulation, if established, would be serious. They cannot be justified by invoking discretion. The State JSC should make its assessment and reasons available to the proper reviewing authorities, with appropriate protection for confidential material. The concern here, though, is whether there is any rule of law requiring such publication or submission by a State JSC. On its part, the NJC has an obligation to identify the rule or constitutional basis for its demanded inclusion of the name of the most senior judge. The non-inclusion of the most senior judge does not necessarily mean that the most senior judge is unsuitable, nor does it establish that the alternative nominees are unsuitable or that the JSC’s omission to include the most senior judge was necessarily arbitrary. My legal and constitutional argument here should not be confused with an assessment of judicial records that have not been made publicly available. Consistency also matters. In our article with Hameed, we compared the Gombe dispute with the appointment of Justice Simeon Chibuzor Amadi in Rivers State in 2021, despite the fact that he was not the most senior judge. We examined reports that the most senior judge had not appeared on the submitted list. That historical comparison calls for principled explanations when institutional practice differs.[27]
A lawful route out of the impasse
The immediate solution is an exchange of legal reasons and assessment records. The State JSC should demonstrate a genuine application of the operative criteria. The NJC should identify any defect, specify the legal basis for the remedy sought, and consider the JSC’s response. A demonstrated wrong should be corrected through a lawful process, without treating seniority alone as proof of either entitlement or wrongdoing. If the institutions remain divided over whether the applicable Constitution and guidelines permit a binding candidate-specific inclusion order, the proper course is authoritative judicial determination. The dispute should be presented on the actual instrument, correspondence and selection record. Neither a press statement nor an institutional standoff is an adequate substitute. Meanwhile, the acting arrangement must remain within section 271(4)-(5). Prolonged disagreement must not become an excuse for unlawful temporary appointments or for leaving the administration of justice hostage to an unresolved substantive-CJ selection dispute.[28] If the NJC wishes the most senior High Court judge automatically to succeed a Chief Judge who retires, resigns, dies or is removed, it should initiate proposals for constitutional amendment and pursue them through the institutions and procedure prescribed by section 9 of the Constitution. The NJC cannot by itself amend the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Until a relevant amendment is validly made, all institutions must respect the existing constitutional arrangement.[29] Carefully framed safeguards may protect fair consideration under existing law; they do not establish an automatic right to the substantive office. Reform is a legitimate constitutional project. Treating the desired reform as though it were already the existing law is not. I therefore support the core of Imo State’s position: the NJC’s recommending function does not, by itself, authorise it to dictate a particular name for inclusion on the State JSC’s shortlist. A command founded solely on seniority or convention cannot be justified by importing the Acting-CJ succession rule of law into the substantive-CJ selection process. Mr Okutepa, learned senior advocate, rightly demands fairness; yet, his endorsement of this particular NJC intervention nevertheless moves beyond what the published reasons establish. Justice Agugua deserves lawful and fair treatment. So do the other eligible candidates. The State JSC must exercise its judgment honestly, and the NJC must exercise its own within the constitutional boundaries of its powers. Public confidence in judicial appointments depends upon both obligations being fulfilled. Respect for seniority cannot dispense with the legal foundation of a command, just as respect for State discretion cannot excuse an unfair selection.
Respectfully,
Sylvester Udemezue (udems)
Proctor, The Reality Ministry of Truth Law and Justice (TRM) 08021365545, udems@therealityministry.ngo, sylvester@udemsyl.com
Endnotes
[1] National Judicial Council, ‘NJC recommends 28 candidates for judicial appointments …’ (4 November 2026) <https://www.njc.gov.ng/index.php/86/news-details> accessed 7 November 2026; Oladipo Abiola, ‘Imo Chief Judge: NJC Insists Acting CJ Ijeoma Agugua Must Be Shortlisted’ Naija News (5 November 2026) <https://www.naijanews.com/2026/11/05/imo-chief-judge-njc-insists-acting-cj-ijeoma-agugua-must-be-shortlisted/> accessed 7 November 2026; Olugbenga Ige, ‘NJC can’t dictate Imo chief judge nominee — AG’ Punch (6 November 2026) <https://punchng.com/njc-cant-dictate-imo-chief-judge-nominee-ag/> accessed 7 November 2026; Unini Chioma, ‘“Whimsical Exclusion Of Most Senior Judge Has No Support In Law” — Okutepa, SAN, Backs NJC On Imo Chief Judge Appointment’ (TheNigeriaLawyer, 7 November 2026) <https://thenigerialawyer.com/whimsical-exclusion-of-most-senior-judge-has-no-support-in-law-okutepa-san-backs-njc-on-imo-chief-judge-appointment/> accessed 7 November 2026. See also ‘Imo State Rejects NJC Directive on Chief Judge Appointment’ (Headtopics, 7 November 2026) <https://ng.headtopics.com/news/imo-state-rejects-njc-directive-on-chief-judge-appointment-89645931> accessed 7 November 2026. Headtopics is an aggregation; the Attorney-General’s objection is corroborated by the Punch report. The article does not adopt the aggregation’s conflation of acting and substantive seniority rules.
[2] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (‘CFRN’), s 271(1), (3)-(5) <https://justice.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Nigerian-Constitution.pdf>.
[3] Sylvester Udemezue, ‘Office of state chief judge not exclusive inheritance of most senior judge’ The Nation (15 December 2020) <https://thenationonlineng.net/office-of-state-chief-judge-not-exclusive-inheritance-of-most-senior-judge/> accessed 7 November 2026.
[4] Sylvester C Udemezue and Vivien Chioma Anukanti, ‘The Convention-Constitution Standoff: Resolving the Most-Senior-Judge Conundrum in Appointment of Substantive Chief Judges for States in Nigeria’ (24 June 2021) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873567> accessed 7 November 2026. Pinpoints below refer to the 26-page SSRN manuscript.
[5] Sylvester C Udemezue and Titilola Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers of Stakeholders as a Panacea to Recurring Tension in the Process of Appointing Chief Judges for States in Nigeria’ (2022) 5(III) RUNLJ 84 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370225303_Circumscribing_Powers_of_Stakeholders_as_a_Panacea_to_Recurring_Tension_in_the_Process_of_Appointing_Chief_Judges_for_States_in_Nigeria> accessed 7 November 2026. See also the earlier manuscript, ‘Legitimate Confines of Powers of the National Judicial Council in Appointment of Substantive Chief Judges for States in Nigeria: Gombe State as a Case Study’ (24 June 2021) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889087> accessed 7 November 2026. Pinpoints to ‘Circumscribing Powers’ refer to the printed journal pages; the earlier manuscript contains 25 pages.
[6] CFRN, s 271(1).
[7] CFRN, s 271(3)-(5).
[8] Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 11-12.
[9] CFRN, Third Schedule, pt II, para 6(a)(i); pt I, para 21(c); s 271(1).
[10] Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 19.
[11] Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 86; earlier manuscript 3.
[12] Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 18-20; Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 104-05; earlier manuscript 23-24.
[13] CFRN, s 271(1), (3); Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 24-25. The distinction between comparative selection and disciplinary guilt is the present author’s analysis.
[14] Chioma (n 1); National Judicial Council (n 1). The discussion evaluates the published explanations rather than purporting to determine the contents of undisclosed institutional records.
[15] CFRN, Third Schedule, pt II, para 6(a); Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 24-25; Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 93-97.
[16] CFRN, s 1(1), (3); Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 17-18, 21-26. The argument distinguishes moral preferences from duties recognised by valid law; it does not deny the legal force of fairness where the applicable law requires it.
[17] National Judicial Council, National Judicial Policy, paras 2.1.1-2.1.6 <https://www.njc.gov.ng/index.php/national-judicial-policy> accessed 7 November 2026.
[18] National Judicial Council, ‘Procedural Rules’, rr 3(4)-(6), 4-6 <https://www.njc.gov.ng/index.php/procedural-rules> accessed 7 November 2026. This citation identifies the general text published on the Council’s website, rather than representing that page as the complete 2023 Chief Judge-specific instrument.
[19] Imo State Judicial Service Commission, ‘Shortlisted Candidates for Appointment as Chief Judge, High Court of Imo State’ (public notice, 5 June 2026), citing para 5.4 of the 2023 Revised Guidelines <https://thenigerialawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Imo-JSC-Shortlists-Two-Judges-For-Chief-Judge.pdf> accessed 7 November 2026. It does not reproduce the full guidelines or establish the complete selection criteria.
[20] CFRN, s 160(1)-(2); Third Schedule, pt I, para 21(c), (i); pt II, para 6(a). The distinction between procedural regulation and displacement of another constitutional body’s assessment is the present author’s submission.
[21] Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 93-97; earlier manuscript 11-15.
[22] National Judicial Council (n 1), paragraphs concerning Imo State. The identified gap is in the published legal explanation; it is not a finding that no further reasons exist in the underlying record.
[23] National Judicial Council (n 1).
[24] CFRN, s 202; Third Schedule, pt II, para 6(a), (c). The scope of s 202 at the advisory stage is presented as an interpretative issue, not as a settled holding on this dispute.
[25] CFRN, ss 1(1), (3), 6(6)(b), 158(1); Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 94-97.
[26] Elelu-Habeeb v Attorney-General of the Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt 1318) 423 (SC); (2012) LPELR-15515(SC) <https://lawcarenigeria.com/hon-justice-raliat-elelu-habeeb-anor-v-the-hon-attorney-general-of-the-federation-ors-2012/> accessed 7 November 2026, especially the discussions of shared constitutional responsibility by Mohammed JSC and Ariwoola JSC. See also Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 86, 88-89.
[27] Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 99-104; earlier manuscript 18-23. This is a comparison made in the earlier article from its contemporaneous sources, not a finding that the selection records in the different States were identical.
[28] CFRN, s 271(4)-(5).
[29] CFRN, ss 1(1), (3), 9; Udemezue and Anukanti (n 4) 23-26; Udemezue and Hameed, ‘Circumscribing Powers’ (n 5) 104-06.
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