Speed, Proof And Discipline: The Novel Features Of The Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions, 2026

By Ismail Jibril Esq

DL, LLB, BL, LLM, (PhD- in-view)

(Dispute Resolution Specialist)

Abstract

On 26 June 2026 the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court issued the Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions, 2026, effective from 29 June 2026, repealing the 2022 Directions. This article examines the provisions of the new practice direction that departed   from established practice or respond to recent legislative and judicial developments. The silent provisions includes among others; the proviso permitting viva voce proof of fraud, forgery and highly contentious facts; the duty to join all relevant parties in a pre-suit challenging the conduct of primary elections; alignment of pre-election suit proceeding with sections 29(5)–(7), 83(5)–(6) and 88(1)–(4) of the Electoral Act, 2026; compressed timetable and expanding the juridical day and court registry active days to weekends and public holidays in line with the Supreme Court’s strict computation of time has prescribed in the section 285(9) of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria (as amended); the deferral of jurisdictional rulings; the regulation of adjournments and absent parties; and the new powers over use technology in court proceedings and power of the chief judge to transfer. It argues that the Directions are broadly coherent with section 285 of the Constitution, but identifies three pressure points: the scope of the viva voce proviso, the hierarchy between the practice directions, the Rules and statute, and the tension between expedition and fair hearing.

Keywords: pre-election matters; Federal High Court; practice directions; Electoral Act 2026; section 285 of the Constitution; originating summons; Nigeria

1.0 Introduction   

Pre-election litigation in Nigeria is conducted against a constitutional timeframe. The Fourth Alteration to the 1999 constitution prescribed time framework for filing, hearing and determination of the pre-election litigation, from trial to appellant court thus; a pre-election matter must be filed within 14 days of the occurrence of event, decision or action complained of; the trial court must deliver its written judgment within 180 days of filing; an appeal must be filed within 14 days of judgment; and the appeal must be disposed of within 60 days.[1]The procedure by which the Federal High Court receives, manages and decides pre-election matters is set by the Chief Judge of the court, who issues practice directions to ensure that the object of the law and intention of the draft men on the conduct of pre-election proceedings comes to reality.

On 26 June 2026 the Chief Judge, Hon Justice John Terhemba Tsoho, issued the Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions, 2026 (the Directions), under sections 254 and 285(9), (10) and (14) of the Constitution and sections 29(5) and 88(2) of the Electoral Act, 2026. Its took effect on Monday, 29 June 2026 and repealed the 2022 Practice Directions.[2] The practice Direction is fifteen paragraphs that responded to several provisions of the Electoral Act, 2026[3] and also provided answers to the flaws the Supreme Court’s decisions have exposed in the ways pre-election suits are commenced and proved in Nigeria.

This article examines the novel areas in the practice direction and changes the instrument introduced to the practical conduct of a pre-election suit at the Federal High Court in Nigeria.

2.0 The Synopsis on Section 285 and the Electoral Act, 2026

Section 285(14) of the Constitution defines a pre-election matter with reference to three kinds of causes of action:

1. complaints by aspirants that a political party has not complied with the law in selecting or nominating candidates;
2. challenges by aspirants to the actions of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in the nomination process, the election timetable, voter registration and other preparatory activities; and
3. challenges by political parties to INEC’s decisions affecting their candidates.[4]

Any action on the above causes of action qualifies as pre-election matter and must be filed in the Federal High Court and heard within the purview of the provisions of practice direction of 2026. The action must be filed within 14 days.[5]

The Supreme Court treats the fourteen-day period in section 285(9) as a limitation provision, the breach of which rob the court of jurisdiction. In Garba v APC[6] and Zailani v Gumau,[7] decided within a fortnight of each other in 2019, suits filed outside the period were held statute-barred.[8] The two decisions did not count the days identically: in Zailani the day on which the event occurred was included, and a suit filed fifteen days after it was out of time, whereas Garba excluded the day of the event.[9]

The two decisions in 2022 settled when time begins to run in a  pre-election matters.[10] The earlier authority on the issue had treated the cause of action of an aspirant who claimed to have won a primary, but whose rival’s name was forwarded to INEC, as accruing when the rival’s name was submitted or when the aspirant learnt of the substitution.[11] However, in Karshi v Gwagwa, a unanimous five-member panel of the supreme court held otherwise, when its allowed the appeal of the APC and its candidate in the Abuja Municipal Area Council chairmanship contest, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that the rival aspirant’s suit was statute-barred, and awarded ₦5 million costs against him. In reviewing the earlier line, the Court made clear that the claimant’s knowledge of the event, decision or action complained of is irrelevant to the computation of time.[12]

Abdullahi v Loko applied the same rule on facts that show how unforgiving it is. Loko won the APC primary for the Abaji Area Council chairmanship (150 votes to 123), but the party forwarded Abdullahi’s name to INEC under cover of a letter dated 25 May 2021. Loko learnt of this on 31 May and filed his originating summons on 9 June 2021. The FCT High Court and the Court of Appeal found for him, reasoning that time ran from the date he came to know of the substitution. The Supreme Court (Jauro JSC delivering the lead judgment, the other four members of the panel agreeing) allowed the appeal. It held that the lower courts had placed a premium on knowledge rather than on the date of the event, decision or action complained of; that the Court had moved away from the Lere line and now follows Bello v Yusuf[13];  and that the event was the 25 May letter, as Loko’s own solicitors’ protest letter showed. Sixteen days had passed by 9 June. The suit was statute-barred, the courts below had no jurisdiction, their decisions were set aside, and the suit was struck out, with each party bearing its own costs.[14] Two members of the panel counted the fourteen days from 25 May to 7 June 2021, both dates inclusive,[15] which is consistent with the inclusive count in Zailani and not with the exclusive count attributed to Garba. The lead judgment added that section 285(9) does not allow for a continuous act, and that limitation is a matter of ‘calculation of raw figures’ in which the court has no discretion.[16]

The Court of Appeal has applied the same approach.[17]

The Electoral Act, 2026 adds a statutory layer to the novel issues on pre-election matters. It restricts party primaries to direct primaries or consensus;[18] gives an aspirant the standing to challenge false information in a candidate’s affidavit;[19] bars courts from entertaining suits on the internal affairs of political parties, subject to sanctions;[20] and gives an aspirant a statutory route to the Federal High Court for non-compliance in the selection of a candidate.[21] The Practice Directions of the Hon. Chief Judge of the Federal High Court are designed to operate at the intersection of these provisions of the Electoral Act and the constitutional clock embedded in section 285 of the 1999 constitution (as amended).

3.0 The Novel Areas in the Federal High Court Pre-Election Practice Direction, 2026

3.1 Proving contentious facts: the proviso to paragraph 7(1) of the Practice Direction

Paragraph 7(1) retains the originating summons as the mode of commencement of every pre-election matter, using Forms 3, 4 and 5 of Appendix 6 to the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019 with necessary variations. The novelty is the proviso. Where a party alleges fraud, forgery or highly contentious facts, the parties must, in addition to or in lieu of affidavits, set out the particulars of the alleged facts, and those facts are to be examined by calling witnesses viva voce or receiving documents in evidence. Paragraph 7(2) adds that the parties and the court may summon any person to attend, produce documents, or be examined or cross-examined at the hearing.[22]

The background is All Progressives Congress v Sheriff, the Yobe North senatorial dispute. A majority of the Supreme Court, with Nweze JSC delivering the lead judgment and Jauro and Agim JSC dissenting, held that because the plaintiff alleged that the party had fraudulently substituted its candidate’s name, the suit ought to have been begun by writ of summons and not by originating summons. The judgments of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal were set aside.[23] Nweze JSC accepted that not every apparent conflict in affidavits requires oral evidence, but cautioned that contentious allegations of fraud are better determined on pleadings and evidence than on affidavits alone.[24] The Court had earlier observed in Sani v Kogi State House of Assembly that not every matter begun by originating summons must be free of factual dispute.[25]

The proviso can be read as the Chief Judge’s answer to Sheriff case (supra). It preserves the speed of the originating summons, with no pleadings and no change of originating process, while allowing oral and documentary proof where the dispute demands it. Claims under section 29(5) of the Electoral Act, 2026 are the obvious beneficiaries, because the cause of action is the falsity of a sworn statement or the forgery of a document. Daura v Yahaya illustrates the type of cause of action: the plaintiff began his suit by originating summons and allegeit false depositions and forged documents in the candidate’s filings.[26]

It is apt to state that, from the proviso to rule 7(1) of the Practice Direction raises two major issues;

• The first is definitional: the proviso mentioned ‘highly contentious facts’, which the Practice Directions did not define, so the court will presumably have to decide based on the processes before it; what facts are ‘highly contentious’ such issues may have to be dealt with as a preliminary matter.
• The second issue in the proviso concerns hierarchy of the legal instruments referred; The Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019 as prescribed in the Practice Direction applies only to issues ‘not provided for’ in the Practice Directions.[27] Some commentators on the 2022 Practice Directions suggested that the instrument should be strictly applied notwithstanding the Rules, which prompted the argument that Sheriff case should have been decided based on the Practice Directions rather than the Rules.[28] However, in my humble view, the 2026 Practice Directions made the Civil Procedural Rules residual, because the proviso to paragraph 7(1) provide specifically for fraud and forgery. The argument that the Rules require a writ in such cases has been settled and does not operate in those circumstances.

3.2 Joinder in a suit challenging primary elections

Paragraph 5(2) requires a party challenging the conduct or outcome of a primary election to join as respondents ‘all the relevant parties’ so that the court can determine the dispute effectively. The language is mandatory, but the principle is familiar. A necessary party is one whose presence is required to enable the court to settle all the questions in the matter effectually and completely, and the test in Green v Green has been applied in election disputes.[29] In Azubuike v PDP the Supreme Court ruled that, where an office won by a political party is challenged in a suit, that party is a necessary party in the suit.[30]

What is novel is the background and the setting of the above provision of the Practice Direction. Under section 88(3) of the Electoral Act, 2026, where a court finds that a party failed to comply with the Act in conducting its primaries, the party’s candidate is excluded from the election for the position in issue. A remedy that affects the party, the candidate, INEC and possibly other aspirants or rival claimants to the same nomination. A plaintiff who omits one of them risks an objection to competence of his suit, and cannot assume the omission can be cured later because by the time it is noticed, the fourteen-day period of filing ordained in section 285(9) would have run out. Although the Practice Directions permit amendment of the originating summons; that can only be done with leave of court and within seven days of service of the respondent’s reply.[31] However, whether computation of time on joinder would relate back to the date of filing is not addressed by the Practice Directions and may likely be contested. The prudent course is to join the political party, the candidate whose nomination is attacked, INEC and any person claiming the same nomination by a rival process at the outset.

3.3 Alignment of paragraphs 4(1) and 5(1) with the Electoral Act, 2026

Paragraph 4(1) applies the Practice Directions to every pre-election matter brought under the Constitution and the Electoral Act, 2026. Paragraph 5(1) directs the court to pay particular attention to sections 29(5)(7), 83(5)(6) and 88(1)(4) of the Act and to section 285(14)(c) of the Constitution.[32] The provisions of the constitution and the Electoral Act mentioned in the Practice Direction raises the following issues;

False-affidavit suits. Each candidate’s particulars must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit    stating that the constitutional requirements for the office have been met. An aspirant who participated in the primaries and has reasonable grounds to believe that any information in that affidavit, or a document submitted with it, is false may sue in the Federal High Court, in the Federal Capital Territory or where the cause of action arose, for a declaration of falsity. If the court finds falsity in relation to constitutional eligibility, it must disqualify the candidate and the sponsoring political party; and if the election has already been held, it must direct INEC to conduct a rerun among the other contestants, excluding the disqualified candidate and party.[33] From the foregoing two issue arose. The sanction on false affidavit touches the party and the candidate, which raises the stakes of the party as the sponsor and reinforces the need to join it.    The rerun remedy departs from the approach for which Saleh v Abah is usually cited, under which the runner-up in the primary replaces a disqualified candidate.[34]

Timing of false-affidavit suits. Limitation is where such claims most often fail. In Tofowomo v. Ajayi the plaintiff, a sitting senator who had lost the PDP primary for Ondo South Senatorial District by 78 votes to 74, sued on 5 July 2022 under section 29(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022, alleging that the winner had presented false or forged academic documents to INEC. The Federal High Court, Akure and the Court of Appeal both held the suit statute-barred, reckoning time from 9 or 13 June 2022, the dates of documents on the record. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment of Agim JSC, dismissed the further appeal. It held that the cause of action accrued on the date the candidate’s form was submitted to INEC, not on the date the plaintiff became aware of it, and ordered costs of ₦500,000 against him.[35] The appellant’s principal contention was that Karshi and Abdullahi had not displaced earlier authority on accrual in suits of this kind; the appeal failed.[36] The Court of Appeal had earlier reasoned in the same way in Shittu v INEC, where time ran from the day INEC received the candidate’s Form EC9 and a suit filed nine days late failed.[37] If the same reasoning applies to section 29(5) of the 2026 Act, as it appears likely to, an aspirant has fourteen days from the date the candidate’s particulars reach INEC, a date that may be known at first only to the party and the Commission. An aspirant who suspects false information should establish that date at once and file protectively.

Locus Standing. Sections 29(5) and 88(2) are both framed around the aspirant. Decisions under the defunct Electoral Act confined locus standing to an aspirant who participated in the primary, and confine a political party’s route under section 285(14)(c) to challenging the actions of INEC.[38] Under the 2026 Act only members whose names are on the register submitted to INEC may vote or be voted for in primaries,[39] so the party register will determine who qualifies as an aspirant as well as the integrity of the primary.

Internal affairs, costs and the bar on halting elections. Section 83(5) provides that no court shall excercise jurisdiction over any suit pertaining to the internal affairs of a political party. Section 83(6) adds that where such a suit is nonetheless brought, no interim or interlocutory injunction may be granted, the court must suspend its ruling to the stage of final judgment while giving accelerated hearing, and costs of not less than ₦10 million must be imposed on the counsel who filed the action and not less than ₦10 million on the plaintiff or applicant, in addition to INEC’s costs if it is joined.[40] The non-justiciability of internal affairs is not new. The Supreme Court held in Shinkafi v Yari, following Onuoha v Okafor and Dalhatu v Turaki, that the nomination and sponsorship of candidates fall within a party’s internal affairs save where the statute permits a complaint.[41] What section 83(6) adds is a sanction, and one that falls personally on counsel. A claim framed as a challenge to a primary must therefore be pleaded within section 88(2), by identifying the specific provision of the Act or the party’s guidelines that was breached in the selection or nomination process, and not as a domestic grievance.[42] Commentary reads section 83(5) as a general provision aimed at purely internal matters and section 88(2) as a specific statutory exception;[43] that reading is consistent with the approach in Ufomba, where the Supreme Court separated complaints within the statutory gateway from non-justiciable internal disputes. How section 83(5) sits with the vesting of judicial power over civil rights and obligations in section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution is a separate question that the Practice Directions do not and could not resolve.[44]

Finally, section 88(4) provides that nothing in that section empowers the courts to stop primaries or general elections pending the determination of a suit. This presupposes that a candidate may proceed through the electoral process while a challenge is pending.[45] The rerun remedy in section 29(7) and the instruction in paragraph 11(2) that the court continue to accord priority to pre-election matters until judgment are the principal answers. Speed is therefore the only available protection, which explains much of what follows.

3.4 The compressed timetable and the weekend registry

The Practice Directions front-loading and service the of processes. An originating summons must be accompanied by an affidavit, copies of exhibits, a written address and an affidavit of non-multiplicity of action on the same subject matter. A respondent must file a memorandum of appearance within seven days of service and, within ten days of service, a counter-affidavit and written address, which may include any preliminary objection; the applicant has three days to reply. The written address must be concise, double-spaced in twelve-point font, numbered consecutively, and not more than fifteen pages. Once the exchange of processes closes, the court must set the matter down for hearing within seven days.[46] On those periods the exchange should close within about thirteen days of service, leaving most of the 180 days prescribed in section 285(10) for hearing and judgment.

Interlocutory applications follow the same discipline. They must be on notice, state the rule relied on and the grounds, and be supported by an affidavit and written address; the respondent has five days to respond and the applicant three days to reply; and a notice of application may not be served on the date fixed for hearing. An application for extension of time must be by motion on notice supported by an affidavit setting out good, substantial, cogent and verifiable reasons.[47] However, the application for extension of time cannot enlarge the constitutional period; section 285(9) is a limitation provision, the expiry of the period extinguishes the right of action, as held in Garba, Zailani and Abdullahi ,[48] the provision of paragraph 12(4) must be confined to the constitutional period.

Paragraph 6 requires the Registry in every Judicial Division to open on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays between 10 am and 2 pm exclusively for the filing of pre-election matters. The practical consequence is that a claimant can no longer easily argue that the last day of the fourteen-day period fell on a day when the registry could not receive the process. Section 15(3) of the Interpretation Act treats an act due on a holiday as duly done if done on the next day that is not a holiday;[49] with the registry open, a claimant who relies on that provision does so at his own risk. The risk is sharper after Abdullahi v Loko, in which the fourteen days were counted inclusively of the day of the event and the Court rejected any notion of a continuing act.[50] Counsel should therefore treat the day of the event as day one and day fourteen as the last day, whatever day of the week it is.[51]

3.5 Deferral of jurisdictional rulings

Paragraph 12(3) applies section 285(8) of the Constitution: rulings on preliminary objections and other interlocutory issues touching the court’s jurisdiction are suspended and delivered at the stage of final judgment. The Court of Appeal has applied the same logic to appeals. Interlocutory appeals in pre-election matters must await the final judgment and be filed within 14 days of it, and trial courts are expected to hear the objection together with the substantive suit.[52] Paragraph 7(5) accordingly allows a preliminary objection to be raised within the counter-affidavit and written address, with no separate motion needed.

Limitation is the commonest jurisdictional objection in this field, and paragraphs 7(5) and 12(3) together determine how it is run: the objection is raised in the counter-affidavit and written address, and the ruling comes only with the final judgment. What the court will look at when it decides is therefore important. Earlier authority confined the court to the originating summons and the supporting affidavit. In Abdullahi v Loko the Supreme Court ruled that the approach has changed: where a limitation objection is considered together with the merits of a suit, cogent facts in the counter-affidavit are also material, and the court will evaluate the affidavit evidence and exhibits attached to find the date of the event.[53] In that case the claimant’s own solicitors’ protest letter fixed the date against him, and in Tofowomo the courts below relied on documents exhibited to the plaintiff’s own affidavit.[54] A claimant should therefore read every exhibit for the earliest date it supplies, and a respondent should put the limitation evidence in the counter-affidavit.

The proviso to paragraph 12(3) is new in form: where the objection relates to service of the originating processes, the court must satisfy itself that the parties have been properly served before proceeding to determine the substantive suit. The rationale is that service is part of the due process on which competence depends, and an order made against a party who should have been served but was not is a nullity.[55] The proviso therefore creates a narrow exception to the deferral rule: objections to service are to be resolved first, not postponed. Paragraph 8(4) leaves applications for substituted service to the Rules of Court.

3.6 Absent parties, adjournments and counsel: paragraphs 8 and 11

Where a party is absent on the hearing date, the court must, suo motu or on the oral application of counsel for the party present, order that the address of the absent party be deemed adopted if it is satisfied that the parties had notice of the proceedings. No more than two adjournments may be granted to any party, and none may be entertained on a day fixed for hearing; a party who changes counsel is likewise limited to two adjournments for that purpose. Counsel must be present and ready at all times, and where ill health or another unavoidable incident intervenes, counsel must ensure that another counsel with requisite knowledge of the issues is present or apply for a virtual hearing where practicable, with the consent of the parties.[56]

These provisions both give effect to and limit the right to fair hearing in section 36(1) of the Constitution. In Ude the Supreme Court held that a party who willfully absents himself after notice cannot complain of a breach of fair hearing, while affirming that where a court adjourns beyond a date known to the parties it has a duty to notify them of the subsequent date.[57] The condition in paragraph 11(3), that the court be satisfied that the parties had notice, tracks that balance. Paragraph 8(2) and (3) supply the mechanism: the court may use electronic mail and other electronic means to inform counsel of urgent court and case events, with at least 48 hours’ notice before the scheduled date, and parties are expected to give the Registrar functioning telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for themselves and their counsel.[58] A litigant who furnishes an address and fails to monitor it will find it difficult to invoke Ude in his favour.

3.7 Technology, transfer and settlement

Paragraph 10 empowers a judge handling a pre-election matter to leverage technology in the conduct of proceedings, including virtual hearings. The constitutional objection has always been section 36(3) and (4), which requires proceedings and decisions to be held in public. In 2020 the Attorneys-General of Lagos and Ekiti States asked the Supreme Court to determine the question; the suits were withdrawn or struck out, with the panel led by Rhodes-Vivour JSC observing that virtual sittings were not unconstitutional ‘as of today’.[59] That is an observation in a matter not decided, and not binding authority, but it supports the Practice Directions. Note the asymmetry: paragraph 10 confers the power on the judge without a consent requirement, whereas paragraph 11(8) requires the consent of the parties when it is counsel who seeks a virtual hearing. Counsel resisting a virtual hearing should expect the court to rely on paragraph 10.

Paragraph 9 empowers the Chief Judge to nominate judges to sit in any Judicial Division for pre-election matters and to transfer such matters between Divisions. Assignment is administrative, and on the usual understanding jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal High Court rather than on a division, so a transfer to a properly constituted bench should not affect competence.[60] The Practice Direction is silent on notice to the parties of a transfer. Given the seven-day hearing date in paragraph 11(1) and the bar on adjournments on hearing days, counsel should keep their contact details on record current. A transfer may also overtake a plaintiff’s choice of venue under section 29(5), which permits suit in the Federal Capital Territory or where the cause of action arose.

Lastly, paragraph 3(d) lists, among the objectives of the Practice Directions, ensuring that the possibility of amicable settlement is explored before the parties go into hearing. The Practice Directions provide no mechanism for this. A consent withdrawal is always possible, but the statutory consequences of a finding under sections 29(6) and 88(3), which the court ‘shall’ apply, are not matters that parties can sensibly bargain over.[61]

4. Findings and Recommendations

 (a)  The introduction of the viva voce proviso: The proviso solves the Sheriff problem of process but creates a problem of classification. Almost every pre-election dispute can be described as involving contentious facts, and respondents have an obvious interest in characterising a claim as one of fraud in order to prolong hearing, while claimants have an interest in the opposite. The risk is satellite litigation within a 180-day window. Courts will need to apply the threshold firmly and early, and counsel should file particulars with the originating summons rather than wait to be told.

(b) The hierarchy of legal instrument on pre-election litigation: The Practice Directions are made under section 254 of the Constitution and are subordinate to it and to the Electoral Act, 2026. Where the Practice Directions conflict with either, they yield. Paragraph 12(4), which allows extension of time, cannot touch section 285(9). Paragraph 11(3) cannot dispense with notice, because fair hearing under section 36(1) requires it. And the proviso to paragraph 7(1) operates within, and not above, the Rules where the Rules are not displaced by paragraph 4(2). Appellate courts will have to decide where these boundaries lie, and the first reported decisions under the Directions will be important.

Third, expedition and fair hearing. The combination of two adjournments, no adjournment on hearing days, deemed adoption of addresses, electronic notice on 48 hours’ notice and personal costs on counsel under section 83(6) is demanding. Each element is defensible. Together they leave little room for ordinary professional mishap, and the Supreme Court’s insistence in Ude that the court must still ensure notice suggests that the courts will continue to examine closely any case in which a party was heard in his absence.

5. Practical key point for pre-election litigation Counsels.
6. The fourteen-day period from the date of the event, decision or action complained of, not from the date you learnt of it. Count the day of the event as day one, treat weekends and public holidays as filing days, and in a substitution or false-information claim establish early the date on which the name or form was submitted to INEC.
7. Decide at the outset whether the facts are highly contentious. Where fraud or forgery is alleged, plead the particulars with the originating summons and identify witnesses and documents.
8. Join the political party, the candidate, INEC and any rival claimant to the nomination. Do not assume an omission can be cured after day fourteen.
9. Frame challenges to primaries within section 88(2) of the Electoral Act, 2026 by pleading specific breaches of the Act or the party’s guidelines, and weigh the section 83(6) costs exposure before filing.
10. File the full set required by paragraph 7(3): affidavit, exhibits, written address (not more than fifteen pages, twelve-point, double spaced) and affidavit of non-multiplicity.
11. For respondents: enter appearance within seven days; file the counter-affidavit and written address, including any preliminary objection and the evidence of the date of the event, within ten days; and expect jurisdictional rulings only at judgment, save for objections to service.
12. Furnish working telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for the party and counsel, monitor them, and arrange a substitute counsel with knowledge of the case.
13. Apply for extension of time only for steps governed by the Practice Directions or the Rules, and support the application with an affidavit giving good, substantial, cogent and verifiable reasons.
14. Conclusion

The Federal High court of Nigeria 2026 Practice Directions is an attempt to make the Election timetable workable in the first general election cycle under the Electoral Act, 2026. Its most significant contribution to election jurisprudence is the import of the proviso to para  on viva voce proof, which responds to the difficulty exposed in Sheriff without surrendering the originating summons. Their most demanding features are the compressed timetable and the discipline imposed on adjournments and absent parties. Underlying all of it is the Supreme Court’s strict approach to section 285(9) in Karshi, Abdullahi and Tofowomo, under which the date of the event, and not the claimant’s knowledge, starts the clock; the Directions build on that approach and do not soften it. Their principal risks lie in the undefined threshold of ‘highly contentious facts’, the uncertain relationship between the Directions, the Rules and the statute, and the strain placed on fair hearing. Whether the instrument achieves its stated purposes of fair, impartial and expeditious determination will depend less on its text than on how consistently trial judges apply it and how the appellate courts respond in the months ahead.

[1]Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (Constitution), s 285(9)–(12).

[2]Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions 2026 (the Directions), preamble and paras 1 and 15.

[3]Electoral Act 2026 (EA 2026).

[4]Constitution, s 285(14). The Supreme Court has summarised the three limbs in All Progressives Congress v Moses (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt 1796) 278 (Augie JSC); see also All Progressives Congress v Umar (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt 1675) 564.

[5] Sec. 285(9) of 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

[6]  (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt 1708) 345 (SC) delivered on 5 July 2019.

[7] (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt 1709) 452 (SC) delivered on 21 June 2019.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Bizibrains Okpeh, ‘The Supreme Court’s Decision in Zailani v Gumau & 2 Ors: Does Time Run or Fly in the Pre-Election Matter?’ (LawPavilion Blog) <https://lawpavilion.com/blog/zailani-v-gumau-2-ors-does-time-run-or-fly-in-pre-election-matter> accessed 6 October 2026 (arguing that the Interpretation Act, s 15(2), supports excluding the day of the event).

[10]Karshi v Gwagwa (2022) LPELR-57544(SC) (SC.1166/2021, 10 February 2022; also reported as (2022) LCN/5057(SC)); Abdullahi v Loko (2022) LPELR-57578(SC) (SC/CV/41/2022, 16 March 2022; also reported as (2022) LCN/4992(SC)).

[11]Mohammed Sani Musa v David Umar (2020) 11 NWLR (Pt 1735); Saki v All Progressives Congress (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt 1706) 515; All Progressives Congress v Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt 1705) 254, as described in Karshi and Abdullahi (n 7).

[12]Karshi (n 7); the reasoning is summarised in Abdullahi (n 7).

[13] (2019) LPELR-47918(SC)

[14]Abdullahi (n 7) (Jauro JSC; Ariwoola, Augie, Abba Aji and Garba JJSC concurring); Bello v Yusuf (2019) LPELR-47918(SC), as applied there.

[15]Abdullahi (n 7) (Garba JSC and Abba Aji JSC).

[16]Abdullahi (n 7) (Jauro JSC), citing among other cases Nwoko v Waoboshi (2019) LPELR-49202(SC).

[17]YPP v APGA & Ors (2023) LPELR-59804(CA) (knowledge of the event immaterial).

[18]Section 84(2) Electoral Act 2026.

[19]  Section 29(5)(7) ibid.

[20]  Section 83(5)(6) ibid.

[21]  Section 88(2)(4) ibid.

[22]Practice Directions, para 7(1) and proviso, and para 7(2).

[23]All Progressives Congress v Sheriff (2023) LPELR-59953(SC) (6 February 2023). The case is also discussed in Oluwaseye Thompson Adeboye, ‘The Originating Summons Conundrum: Procedural Efficiency Versus Substantive Justice in Nigerian Pre-Election Litigation’ (Omaplex Law Firm, 20 October 2025) <https://omaplex.com.ng/the-originating-summons-conundrum-procedural-efficiency-versus-substantive-justice-in-nigerian-pre-election-litigation/> accessed 6 October 2026 (Adeboye).

[24]Adeboye (n 16), quoting the lead judgment.

[25]Sani v Kogi State House of Assembly (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt 1661) 172, as discussed in Adeboye (n 16).

[26]Daura v Yahaya (2023) LPELR-59952(CA), decided under s 29(5) of the Electoral Act 2022, the predecessor of the corresponding provision in EA 2026.

[27]D irections, para 4(2).

[28]Adeboye (n 16), arguing that para 2(2) of the 2022 Directions prevailed over the Rules.

[29]Green v Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 61) 480; Peenok Investments Ltd v Hotel Presidential Ltd (1982) 12 SC 1.

[30]Azubuike v Peoples Democratic Party (2014) LPELR-22258(SC).

[31]Practice Directions, para 7(8); EA 2026, s 88(3).

[32]Practice Directions, paras 4(1) and 5(1).

[33]EA 2026, s 29(2) and (5)–(7).

[34]Saleh v Abah (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt 1578) 100. The proposition attributed to the case is taken from its treatment in later litigation and should be verified against the report.

[35]Tofowomo v Ajayi (2023) LPELR-61379(SC) (SC/CV/1526/2022) (Agim JSC), affirming CA/AK/228/2022 (Court of Appeal, Akure, 29 November 2022) and FHC/AK/CS/83/2022 (Federal High Court, Akure, 17 October 2022). The date of the Supreme Court’s judgment (27 January 2023)

[36]The issues for determination are set out in the lead judgment as reproduced in ‘Senator Nicholas Tofowomo v Hon Alfred Agboola Ajayi & Ors’

[37]Shittu v INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-59826(CA) (23 February 2023).

[38]Edevie v Orohwedor (2022) LPELR-58931(SC) (right of action under s 29(5) of the Electoral Act 2022 reserved for aspirants at the primary won by the affected candidate); Lau v Peoples Democratic Party [2017] LPELR-42800(SC); Ufomba v Independent National Electoral Commission (2017) LPELR-42079(SC)

[39]EA 2026, s 77(4)(7).

[40]EA 2026, s 83(5)(6).

[41]Shinkafi   v Yari (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt 1511) 340; Onuoha v Okafor (1983) NSCC 494; Dalhatu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 310.

[42]EA 2026, s 88(2).

[43]‘What The Electoral Act, 2026 Says About Primary Elections’ (TheNigeriaLawyer) <https://thenigerialawyer.com/what-the-electoral-act-2026-says-about-primary-elections/> accessed 6 October 2026.

[44]Constitution, s 6(6)(b).

[45]‘Electoral Act 2026: Progress, gaps and the legal landscape for 2027’ (The Cable) <https://www.thecable.ng/electoral-act-2026-progress-gaps-and-the-legal-landscape-for-2027/> accessed 6 October 2026; EA 2026, s 88(4).

[46]Directions, paras 7(3)(8) and 11(1).

[47]Practice Directions, paras 8(1), 12(1), 12(2) and 12(4).

[48]Garba and Zailani (n 5); Abdullahi (n 7).

[49]Interpretation Act, s 15(2)(3); see Okpeh (n 6).

[50]Abdullahi (n 7); see also the footnotes above to that case.

[51]Directions, para 6.

[52]Tukur v Magaji (2022) LPELR-58847(CA), applying s 285(11) of the Constitution and para 6(2) of the Election Judicial Proceedings Practice Directions 2022; see also Ojo v All Progressives Congress (2022) LPELR-58723(CA) on s 285(8).

[53]Abdullahi (n 7), citing Wali v All Progressives Congress (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt 1749) 82 and APC v Lere (n 8).

[54]Abdullahi (n 7) (Exhibit Loko 6); Tofowomo (n 28) (Exhibit FEE2, as reported in the lead judgment issues cited at n 29).

[55]Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Attorney-General of Rivers State v Ude [2006] NGSC 95 (Supreme Court of Nigeria, 13 July 2006).

[56]Directions, para 11(3)–(8).

[57]Ude (n 48).

[58] Practice Directions, para 8(2)–(3).

[59]Attorney-General of Lagos State v Attorney-General of the Federation (SC/CV/260/2020) and Attorney-General of Ekiti State v Attorney-General of the Federation (SC/CV/261/2020), both unreported (Supreme Court of Nigeria, July 2020); see ‘Supreme court rules: Virtual court proceedings not unconstitutional’ (TheCable) <https://www.thecable.ng/?p=459181> accessed 6 October 2026; ‘Supreme Court validates virtual court sitting’ (BusinessDay) <https://businessday.ng/politics/article/supreme-court-validates-virtual-court-sitting/> accessed 6 October 2026; Constitution, s 36(3)–(4).

[60]Practice Directions, para 9; and on the conditions for competence, Madukolu (n 48).

[61]Practice Directions, para 3(d); EA 2026, ss 29(6) and 88(3).

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