By Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, SAN
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(Constitutional Principles and Institutional Safeguards for State Policing in Nigeria)
VIII. Electoral Integrity and Political Neutrality
State Police will inevitably play important roles during elections. Given the heightened political tensions that often accompany electoral periods, the National Policing Bill should establish safeguards to protect electoral integrity and prevent partisan abuse.
These should include:
- Operational independence during elections;
- Transparent deployment procedures;
- Restrictions on political directives;
- Mandatory coordination with INEC and other security agencies; and
- Independent monitoring of election-related policing activities.
Additional measures should include documented deployment decisions, public reporting on election security operations and sanctions for officers or political actors who misuse policing powers for partisan purposes.
State Police must never become instruments for intimidating voters, harassing opposition parties or restricting lawful political activity. Their role is to protect the electoral process, safeguard voters and maintain public order impartially. Democratic legitimacy requires political neutrality.
IX. Fiscal Sustainability, Weapons Management and State Readiness Certification
No policing institution can function effectively without sustainable financing. States seeking to establish police services should demonstrate the capacity to:
- Pay salaries;
- Maintain infrastructure;
- Provide training;
- Procure equipment; and
- Sustain operations.
Security institutions should be established on the basis of demonstrated fiscal capacity rather than political aspiration.
The National Policing Bill should also establish:
- National firearms standards;
- Digital weapons tracking systems;
- Armoury inspection protocols;
- Mandatory firearms certification; and
- Ammunition accountability systems.
Given existing concerns regarding the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, strict weapons management standards are essential.
The Bill should further establish a State Readiness Certification Framework. Before commencing operations, a state should demonstrate minimum capacity in fiscal sustainability, human resource management, training infrastructure, independent complaints mechanisms, legislative oversight, digital records management, armoury controls and diversity safeguards. Institutional readiness should precede operational authority.
X. Managing the Transition
The transition from a unitary policing structure to a dual policing system should be gradual, sequenced and carefully managed. Even well-designed reforms can fail if implementation is rushed or poorly coordinated.
The National Policing Bill should provide for:
- Pilot implementation phases;
- Transitional funding arrangements;
- Personnel transfer frameworks;
- Asset transfer mechanisms;
- Interoperable information systems; and
- Independent implementation reviews.
A national transition oversight mechanism should monitor implementation, identify emerging challenges and recommend corrective actions. The movement of personnel, assets and operational responsibilities must be carefully coordinated to avoid service disruptions, duplication and security gaps. A phased approach will allow lessons from early implementation to inform broader rollout.
Conclusion: Beyond State Police
The State Police debate is often presented as a choice between centralisation and decentralisation. That framing is inadequate. The real choice before Nigeria is between institution-based policing and power-based policing.
Neither centralisation nor decentralisation guarantees effectiveness, accountability or public trust. Success depends on the quality of the institutions that govern policing power. State Police can strengthen public safety, improve local responsiveness and deepen federalism. It can also become vulnerable to political capture, identity-based exclusion and institutional fragmentation.
The outcome will depend on the constitutional safeguards, governance institutions and accountability mechanisms established today. The decentralisation of policing must not become the decentralisation of impunity. Rather, it should become an opportunity to build more responsive, professional and citizen-centred security institutions.
Nigeria’s objective should not be merely to create State Police. It should be to build a constitutional policing system that is professional in conduct, inclusive in composition, accountable in operation, restrained in the exercise of power and trusted by the people it serves.
That is the challenge before the Presidential Working Group. That is the opportunity presented by the National Policing Bill. And that is the legacy this reform should seek to leave behind: a policing system that strengthens security while deepening democracy, constitutional governance and public trust.
ADDENDUM
State policing or community policing has been a major plank of the present administration, following which it sponsored an executive bill to the National Assembly for consideration and approval. The report is that the National Assembly has passed the draft bill and forwarded it to the Houses of Assembly of the States for legislative action in line with section 9 of the Constitution. The challenge is the seeming secrecy surrounding the whole exercise, given that the primary purpose is to deploy the bill for the good of the people in order to enhance their security. At a minimum, we should be entitled to a summary of the major provisions of the bill for public consumption and participation. Generally speaking, achieving community-oriented state policing in Nigeria requires a two-pronged approach: a formal constitutional amendment to decentralise police powers and a comprehensive statutory framework to ensure local accountability. While Section 214 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) establishes a single, centralised Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the current security climate makes decentralisation a necessity rather than an option. To transition effectively without creating regional militias, Nigeria must balance state autonomy with strict federal oversight.
1. The Constitutional Hurdle and Legal Framework
The primary obstacle to state policing is the Exclusive Legislative List in Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, which places “Police and other government security services” under sole federal jurisdiction.
Constitutional Amendment: The National Assembly must amend Section 214 and move policing to the Concurrent Legislative List. This would empower both federal and state legislatures to enact laws establishing police services. This guarantees independence and regional autonomy.
Jurisdictional Delineation: The amendment must clearly define boundaries. State police should handle localised crimes (e.g., traffic, municipal bylaws, state infractions), while the Federal Police retain jurisdiction over interstate crimes, terrorism and national security where they concern federal territories or agencies.
Conflict Resolution: Laws must explicitly state that in the event of a jurisdictional conflict, federal law prevails, aligning with Section 4(5) of the Constitution. While not encouraging parallel entities, the mode of operation for the federal and state police must ensure efficiency and cohesion.
2. Operationalising the “Community” Aspect
True community policing is not merely about local deployment; it requires a structural integration of citizens into the security architecture. The focus must be people-oriented, leveraging existing structures to galvanise community involvement.
Community Police Boards: State laws must mandate the creation of local police boards comprising traditional rulers, youth leaders, civil society organisations and trade unions. These boards will co-manage local security priorities within defined legal frameworks.
Indigeneity and Language Requirements: Recruitment criteria should prioritise candidates who have resided in the community for a minimum period of five years and are fluent in the local dialect to foster trust and seamless intelligence gathering. They should constitute the rallying point between the authorities and the people.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): State police statutes should institutionalise ADR mechanisms for minor civil and criminal disputes, relying on community elders, traditional and religious leaders to reduce court congestion and punitive policing. In many communities across Nigeria, customary arbitration has been institutionalised to the satisfaction of the community. All that is required in such cases is the codification of the prevailing template in order to obliterate all forms of arbitrariness.
3. Safeguards Against Political Misuse and Abuse
The strongest argument against state policing in Nigeria is the fear that state governors will weaponise local forces against political opponents. While this is not totally unfounded, the existence of other institutions within the polity, such as the judiciary and, indeed, the legislature, should serve as moderating organs against any form of abuse or manipulation. This is why the legal framework must include robust checks and balances.
[Federal Oversight Body] (NPF / National Police Council)
¦ (Sets Minimum Standards & Training)
[State Police Force] — [Independent Police Complaints Commission]
(Human Rights Accountability)
[Community Police Boards] (Local Oversight & Trust)
Independent Appointment Mechanisms: The appointment and removal of a State Commissioner of Police must not rest solely with the Governor. It should require ratification by a two-thirds majority of the State House of Assembly, based on recommendations from an independent State Police Service Commission, whose membership must demonstrate sufficient autonomy.
Funding Insulation: To prevent financial strangulation or manipulation by state executives, funding should be drawn directly from the Federation Account via a statutory ring-fenced mechanism (a State Police Trust Fund). The independent State Police Service Commission should report directly to and be accountable to the State House of Assembly for the approval of its budgets and, indeed, its composition.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC): A legally backed, independent ombudsman must be established in each state to investigate human rights abuses and police brutality, ensuring accountability outside the police chain of command. The composition of the Commission should include the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, tested criminal law experts, activists and NGOs.
In all, the goal should be the engagement of all relevant stakeholders within the security architecture. There is no better time for the implementation of this agenda than now, provided that the ultimate beneficiaries are the people. This is where the Presidential Task Force set up to facilitate the implementation comes in handy. The ball is now in the court of the President and the National Assembly to match their vows with positive and meaningful actions that will improve the security situation across the nation.
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