*Warns That Such Interpretation Is Constitutionally Unsustainable And Would Leave Citizens Without Remedy
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Senior Advocate of Nigeria M.O. Ubani, a legal practitioner and policy analyst, has challenged the growing interpretation that Section 83 of the Electoral Act 2026 absolutely ousts the jurisdiction of courts over the internal affairs of political parties, arguing that such a reading is “overstretched and not constitutionally sustainable,” would leave party members who suffer exclusion, manipulation, or outright illegality without a remedy, and would create “an inevitable collision course” between the legislature and the judiciary.
In a detailed legal analysis published as a response to a position taken by fellow lawyer Festus Okoye Esq, who asserted that lawyers have become scapegoats in internal party conflicts owing to their recourse to the courts, Ubani marshalled constitutional provisions, Supreme Court precedents, and foundational legal principles to argue that while Section 83 may legitimately seek to curb frivolous litigation and forum shopping, it cannot extinguish the courts’ constitutional duty to do justice where legal rights are violated.
“In the final analysis, I reiterate that Section 83 of the Electoral Act does not, and cannot, silence the courts. So long as the Constitution of Nigeria endures, judicial power remains intact. Any contrary interpretation is not only legally flawed but also risks undermining the very foundation of the rule of law,” Ubani declared.
“That, surely, cannot have been the intention of the lawmakers,” the senior advocate added.
The analysis responds to the assertion by Okoye that lawyers have been made scapegoats in internal party conflicts because of their readiness to approach the courts on every party dispute, a position that implies Section 83(5) of the Electoral Act 2026 should be read as an absolute bar on judicial intervention in party internal affairs.
Ubani acknowledged the concern but argued that the broad interpretation being advanced by some lawyers goes too far.
“With the greatest respect to lawyers who are holding this view, that broad interpretation may appear overstretched and not constitutionally sustainable,” Ubani stated.
The debate is not merely academic. It has immediate practical implications for the ADC, whose leadership crisis is currently before the Supreme Court; the PDP, whose factional dispute has produced competing conventions; and every political party whose internal affairs may generate legal disputes in the run-up to the 2027 elections.
If Section 83 is interpreted as an absolute bar, no court in Nigeria can entertain any dispute arising from a party’s internal affairs, regardless of how egregious the violation of rights, how fraudulent the process, or how unconstitutional the conduct. If it is interpreted as Ubani argues, courts retain jurisdiction where legal rights, statutory compliance, or constitutional guarantees are at stake, while exercising restraint on purely internal matters of party management.
Ubani anchored his argument in the constitutional provisions that vest judicial power in the courts and that cannot be overridden by any Act of the National Assembly.
He cited Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which provides that the courts possess inherent jurisdiction to determine all questions relating to civil rights and obligations.
“This provision is broad, entrenched, and immune from legislative erosion,” Ubani stated. “Any statutory attempt, however artfully framed, to exclude judicial intervention where legal rights are violated, remains debatable due to the supremacy clause of Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.”
Section 1(3) of the Constitution provides that if any law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution prevails and the inconsistent law is void to the extent of the inconsistency. This supremacy clause means that even if the National Assembly intended Section 83 to absolutely bar courts from party disputes, such a bar would be unconstitutional if it conflicts with the judicial powers established by Section 6(6)(b).
Ubani drew on a rich body of Nigerian jurisprudence to demonstrate that the courts have consistently resisted attempts to oust their jurisdiction through statutory provisions.
He cited Lakanmi v. Attorney-General (Western State), one of the foundational cases on judicial power in Nigeria, where the courts affirmed their authority to review actions that affect legal rights regardless of statutory attempts to exclude them.
He cited Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar and Abaribe v. Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly, cases in which the courts reaffirmed that they “must be slow to hold that their jurisdiction has been ousted.”
These authorities, Ubani argued, “reinforced judicial hostility toward clauses that attempt to shield institutions or government from judicial scrutiny.”
The senior advocate acknowledged that courts have traditionally exercised restraint in interfering with the internal affairs of political parties, citing Okafor v. Onuoha as an example. However, he was emphatic that this restraint has always been qualified.
“This restraint has never been absolute. It is a rule of prudence, not a rule of absolute prohibition,” Ubani stated.
Ubani identified the critical distinction that determines when courts can and cannot intervene in party affairs.
“Once a dispute goes beyond internal issues such as membership, leadership, party management, discipline, etc., and involves violation of legal rights, statutory compliance, or constitutional guarantees, the jurisdiction of the court is activated,” Ubani stated.
This means matters that are purely internal to a party, such as how it organises its secretariat, whom it appoints to committees, how it manages its finances, or how it disciplines members for internal infractions, may properly be shielded from judicial intervention.
However, when a party’s actions violate the legal rights of its members, breach the provisions of the Electoral Act or the party’s own constitution, or infringe constitutional guarantees such as the right to fair hearing, freedom of association, or equal protection, the courts have not only the power but the duty to intervene.
“Even prior to the enactment of Section 83, the Supreme Court had clearly delineated exceptions to the doctrine of non-interference,” Ubani noted. “They have always held that where there is a breach of the Electoral Act, violation of a party’s constitution, or infraction of constitutional provisions, the courts will not hesitate to intervene.”
Ubani warned that interpreting Section 83 as an absolute bar on judicial intervention would have grave consequences.
“If the intention of the legislature is to elevate the political parties in Nigeria above judicial scrutiny, it will certainly lead to an inevitable collision course between the two arms of government,” Ubani stated.
He identified the practical impact on ordinary party members: “The consequences of such an interpretation would be grave. It would leave party members who suffer exclusion, manipulation of primaries, or outright illegality without a remedy.”
“That cannot represent the law, in my view,” Ubani stated.
He invoked the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, meaning “where there is a right, there is a remedy,” describing it as “a cornerstone of our legal system.”
If party members have a right not to be excluded from primaries through manipulation, a right to have their party’s constitution respected, and a right to participate in democratic processes within their party, then there must be a remedy when those rights are violated. A provision that removes all judicial remedies while leaving the rights nominally intact creates an absurdity: rights without remedies, which is to say, rights without substance.
Rather than reading Section 83 as an absolute ouster, Ubani proposed what he described as “a more rational and constitutionally compliant reading.”
“Section 83 seeks to discourage frivolous litigation on parties’ internal issues, curb forum shopping, and encourage internal dispute resolution within political parties,” Ubani stated.
“The Electoral Act of 2026 cannot extinguish the courts’ sacred duty to do justice where a legal wrong is established,” he added.
This reading preserves the legitimate purpose of Section 83, which is to prevent the kind of serial litigation, conflicting court orders, and forum shopping that have plagued Nigerian party politics in recent electoral cycles, while maintaining the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction to intervene when legal rights are genuinely at stake.
Ubani noted that the judiciary has “consistently resisted attempts to fetter its jurisdiction through ouster clauses,” and that “such provisions are construed narrowly and, where they are inconsistent with constitutionally guaranteed rights, they are rendered inoperative and invalid.”
Ubani raised what he described as a matter of “great concern”: the penal provisions of Section 83 that appear to target lawyers and litigants who approach the courts on party matters.
“It would be deeply troubling if legal practitioners were sanctioned for seeking judicial redress in appropriate cases,” Ubani stated.
He then posed a series of questions that expose the practical difficulties of penalising lawyers for filing cases that the provision deems inappropriate.
“The problem is, who defines and determines appropriate cases? Does losing a case by a lawyer in court amount to a grave error on his part that should attract penalty as prescribed by the Act? How does a lawyer know which case he will win or lose in matters involving political parties?” Ubani asked.
“These are critical questions begging for answers,” the senior advocate added.
The questions highlight a fundamental problem with punitive provisions that target legal practitioners for exercising their professional duty to represent clients before the courts. A lawyer who files a case on behalf of a party member challenging exclusion from primaries cannot know in advance whether the court will characterise the dispute as a justiciable legal wrong or as a non-justiciable internal party matter. If the lawyer faces sanctions for filing a case that the court ultimately declines to hear, the chilling effect on legal representation would be profound.
Ubani defended the role of lawyers in party disputes, stating: “Lawyers play a critical role in sustaining the rule of law by holding political actors accountable to legal standards. The greater danger lies not in judicial intervention through them but in legitimising impunity under the guise of party autonomy.”
In a balanced assessment, Ubani acknowledged that the concerns underlying Section 83 are not without foundation.
“Having said that, however, in clear cases of abuse, where litigants and counsel pursue matters that are purely internal and devoid of legal rationale for its initiation, the imposition of sanctions may be justified,” Ubani stated.
He acknowledged the practices that necessitated the legislative intervention: “We are not ignorant of incidents of abuse, forum shopping, conflicting ex parte orders being sought and granted which were becoming irritating and scandalous, necessitating the present amendment.”
The ADC leadership crisis, with its multiplicity of cases across different courts, competing orders from different judges, and the use of ex parte applications to obtain contradictory injunctions, provides a contemporary illustration of the very problems Section 83 was designed to address.
However, Ubani insisted that the solution to abuse cannot be the elimination of legitimate access to justice: “Two wrongs cannot make a right, as we say in Nigeria.”
Ubani’s analysis arrives at a moment when the interpretation of Section 83 is not merely theoretical but has direct bearing on live cases affecting the future of Nigerian democracy.
The ADC leadership dispute, currently before the Supreme Court, raises the question of whether courts have jurisdiction over the party’s internal leadership question. The Mark faction, led by Okutepa SAN, has argued that the Supreme Court itself held in March 2025 that “no court has jurisdiction to entertain cases bordering on internal affairs of political parties.” The Gombe faction argues the trial court was properly seized of the matter.
The PDP’s factional crisis involves competing claims about the validity of conventions, the legitimacy of caretaker committees, and the recognition of national officers, all of which straddle the line between internal party management and justiciable legal rights.
The opposition parties at the Ibadan summit called for the National Assembly to “immediately review the Electoral Act, 2026 to remove all sections that threaten the sanctity and integrity of elections,” a demand that implicitly targets Section 83 among other provisions.
The NDC has filed suit at the Federal High Court challenging Sections 138 and 77(5) of the Electoral Act as unconstitutional, and the same constitutional arguments Ubani raises about Section 83 apply with equal force to those provisions.
Ubani concluded his analysis with an invitation for further engagement, reflecting the collaborative tradition of legal discourse among senior practitioners.
“I will gladly welcome further rejoinders from learned minds in the continuing interrogation of this important constitutional question,” Ubani stated.
The invitation acknowledges that the question of how Section 83 interacts with constitutional judicial powers is not one that any single lawyer, however senior, can definitively resolve through commentary alone. It will ultimately be decided by the courts themselves, most likely the Supreme Court, when a case squarely raising the constitutionality of the provision reaches the apex court for determination.
In the meantime, Ubani’s analysis provides the most comprehensive public articulation of the case against an absolute reading of Section 83, drawing on constitutional text, judicial precedent, and practical consequences to argue that the provision must be read narrowly and in a manner consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial power and citizens’ access to justice.
As Ubani stated: “Section 83 of the Electoral Act does not, and cannot, silence the courts. So long as the Constitution of Nigeria endures, judicial power remains intact.”
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