Sentencing Guidelines: Practice And Procedure.

By Hon. Justice Peter Chudi Obiorah, FCArb

A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE INDUCTION COURSE FOR NEWLY APPOINTED JUDICIAL OFFICERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF RECORDS IN NIGERIA ORGANISED BY THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, ABUJA HOLDING ON THE 16^TH – 20^TH MAY, 2022 UNDER THE THEME – NURTURING HIGH STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE.

PREFATORY REMARKS

I wish to start by appreciating the Almighty God who has sustained us to see this day. I consider it an honour and great privilege to receive the invitation of the Administrator of the National Judicial Institute, Hon. Justice Salisu Garba Abdulahi to deliver a paper at this Induction Course. It is a privilege which I deeply appreciate and I am grateful. In the same vein, I thank my Lord the Chief Judge of Anambra State, Hon. Justice O. M. Anyachebelu, FCArb, for granting me leave to positively respond to this invitation from the NJI.

For my Lords, the participants at this programme, I sincerely congratulate you on your well deserved elevation as a Judge and Kadi of our superior courts of record in Nigeria. I have no doubt that your elevation is answer to your quiet prayers to God and I encourage you to fear God and listen to your conscience as you perform the onerous task of sitting as a judge over your fellow human beings, with knowledge that in the fullness of time you will stand before your Creator to render account of your stewardship. The temptation will surely come. But remember that your good reputation is invaluable in monetary terms. I wish you well.

WHAT IS A SENTENCE?

Criminal trial is the means the State enforces sanctions on erring citizens. The end of every successful criminal trial is the imposition of a sentence which is the punishment for the offence/crime. Sentencing can be defined as the judicial determination of a legal sanction to be imposed on a person found guilty of an offence.[1] In the case of Obazee v. State[2], it was held that:

“Sentencing is a very serious business and the future of a human being at that moment is dependent on the sentencing. Sentencing should therefore be very clear, unambiguous and very specific. We who sit in judgment over others should therefore take sentencing very serious and give it maximum attention which it deserves.”

By law, the sentence to be imposed for any transgression cannot come as a surprise to any offender because from the beginning of his trial the charge or information will carry a statement of the offence committed and the punishment section of the law violated. This is in accord with Section 36(12) of the Constitution which prescribes that:

“Subject as otherwise provided by this Constitution a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law; and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a Law of a State, and subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law.”

(underlining mine for emphasis)

The above constitutional provision presupposes that not only will the offence be known but also the punishment shall be known. It means that once a person is charged with any criminal offence the punishment that may be imposed if he is found guilty is known to all from the beginning of the trial. It follows that no person shall be subjected to trial in respect of an offence not known to law and thus not a creation of any statute or subsidiary legislation.

For example, in the case of Chief Olabode George v. Federal Republic of Nigeria[3], the Supreme Court clearly held that:

“Any conduct that must be sanctioned must be expressly stated in a written law to wit: an Act by the National Assembly. That is what Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution provides. Such conduct should not be left to conjecture. As well, it cannot be inferred by the Court. It occurs to me that Section 203 of the Criminal Code is not in tune with the dictate of Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution. That being the position, the charges filed under Section 203 of the said Code ostensibly for splitting contract in disobedience of lawful order by constituted authority cannot stand.”

Following the above authority, the Court of Appeal in the case of Raymond Omatseye v. Federal Republic of Nigeria[4] where the appellant was charged for the offence of “Exceeding Monetary Threshold”, per Georgewill, JCA, succinctly expressed the law in these words:

“In law, a citizen of this country can only be tried, convicted and sentenced for an offence created and known to law. Thus no citizen ought to be subjected to trial, conviction and sentence for any alleged offence not created by law. Happily, this issue had frontally confronted the Supreme Court, as recent as 2014, which rose to the occasion to put the law in relation thereto on an impeccable foothold to the understanding and appreciation of both prosecuting authorities and the Courts. The Supreme Court has spoken on that occasion and I have heard and I hold that the alleged offence, “Exceeding Monetary Threshold” with which the Appellant was charged by the Respondent and so wrongfully found guilty by the Court below, is not an offence known to law at all. See Olabode George v. FRN (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 718) 879.[5]

Furthermore, in Adamu v. FRN[6], the Court of Appeal held that:

“It is settled law that no person should be charged and convicted over an act which is not defined as a crime with any punishment attached therein. What is a crime should not be left at the whims and caprice of any individual as a person cannot be held liable for an action which was not criminalised at the time the offence was committed.”

This position of being tried under an unknown law must be distinguished from a situation where an offence known to law is disclosed in a charge and the penalty for the offence is prescribed in a written existing law but the charge is erroneously brought under a wrong section of an existing law or under a repealed law. In this situation, the offence and penalty is known but for the error in stating the enabling law in the charge. If the defendant/accused person and his counsel are not misled and no objection is raised to the defective charge, then a conviction for the offence disclosed in the charge will not be set aside. See Yabugbe v. C.O.P. (1992) LPELR-3505(SC); Section 220 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 and Sections 272 and 273 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Anambra State, 2010.

MANDATORY SENTENCE

There are certain offences which carry mandatory sentences and admit of no exercise of discretion by the trial court. The most common of these offences is capital offence which prescribes death penalty on conviction.[7] In the case of State v. John[8] the respondent was convicted by the trial court for the offence of culpable homicide and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court in clear terms stated the law succinctly that:

“Once a Judge finds an accused person guilty of culpable homicide under section 221 of the Penal Code, the only sentence he can pronounce is death. A Judge has no jurisdiction to listen to allocutus and no discretion to reduce death sentence to a term of years once the accused person has been found guilty under section 221 of the Penal Code. The sentence of 14 years imprisonment after finding the accused/respondent guilty of culpable homicide contrary to section 221 of the Penal Code was wrong.”[9]

In Amoshima v. State[10], the Supreme Court, per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) held that:

“It is settled law also that where a statute prescribes a mandatory sentence in clear terms as in the instant case, the courts are without jurisdiction to impose anything less than the mandatory sentence as no discretion exists to be exercised in the matter. It is a duty imposed by law.”[11]

Apart from cases where the penalty is death, the difficulty may be how you will know an offence with mandatory sentence. The easiest way to find out is by looking at the words used in the statute. In certain offences, the statute prescribes the minimum sentence and in such instance a court is bound not to go below the minimum. For example, Section 1(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Cap. 398, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, provides that:

“Any person who commits the offence of robbery shall upon trial and conviction under this Act, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 21 years.”

Interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court in Amoshima v. State[12] held that:

“An accused person convicted of an offence of robbery simplicita is liable to a term of imprisonment for not less than twenty one years as provided under section 1(1) of the said Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act. The above provision provides for the minimum term of imprisonment not the maximum as it confers the discretion on the court to impose a term of imprisonment of twenty one years and above or more. The court in the circumstances may impose 21, 22, 23 – 100 years terms of imprisonment.”

Furthermore, there are situations where the statute prescribes a range of imprisonment by stating both the minimum and the maximum term of years. In this situation, the trial can exercise discretion within the range but is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence below the minimum.

In Yusuf v. FRN[13] the appellant was charged for offences relating to fraud and Section 1(3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 prescribed penalty of imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years and not less than seven years without option of a fine. The appellant on conviction was sentenced to six months imprisonment. The appellant appealed against his conviction and the respondent filed a cross-appeal challenging the sentence of six months. The appeal was dismissed while the Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal and reviewed the sentence to the minimum of seven years. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bage, JSC held that:

“It is my considered view that, in view of the above provisions, the lower court was right to have invoked the provisions of section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act in revisiting the issue of the punishment imposed with a view to effecting the appropriate punishment envisaged under the law. It is for this reason that I re-affirm the imposition of seven (7) years imprisonment imposed by the lower court as against the six (6) months imprisonment imposed by the trial court.”[14]

This should be contrasted with the case of Omokuwajo v. FRN[15]  where the Court of Appeal on hearing appeal against the conviction of the appellant on a charge relating to human trafficking and sentence of two years, suo motu increased the sentence from two years to five and seven years. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal with respect to the increased sentence and held, per Mahmud Mohammed, JSC that:

“… it would appear that the converse was the case at the Court of Appeal where in the absence of any appeal by the appellant or a cross-appeal by the respondent on the adequacy or inadequacy of the sentence passed on the appellant by the trial court, the Court of Appeal suo motu went into the issue to increase the sentence without affording the parties a hearing. The order of the court in this respect being in breach of section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, cannot be allowed to stand.

In his own contribution, Mary Peter-Odili, JSC[16] stated thus –

“Before an appellate court could increase the sentence of an accused/appellant before it, the issue must have been part of the grounds of appeal or failing that, a hearing from the parties is of essence and cannot be by-passed. This is not one of the instances where it could be said that a miscarriage of justice had not been occasioned. The reason is that the pivotal principle of fair hearing would have been jettisoned… The point has to be made that in this regard of the increase of the sentence on the appellant, the Court of Appeal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or said differently it acted without jurisdiction and so the increase is a nullity.”

The distinguishing factor in the case of Yusuf v. FRN and Omokuwajo v. FRN is that in the Yusuf case the inadequate sentence was made a subject of appeal which enabled the appellate court to review it, unlike the Omokuwajo case where the Court of Appeal raised the issue suo motu without giving the parties the opportunity to address the court on it.

SENTENCE THAT ADMITS DISCRETION AND SENTENCING GUIDEINES.

Generally speaking where a statute does not prescribe a mandatory sentence, the court is imbued with the discretion to consider certain factors to arrive at a sentence which will be just and fair. This is so where the sentence prescribed upon conviction in a criminal charge is imprisonment for a term of years. Some extenuating factors as the age of the convict and whether he is a first offender can be taken into consideration by the trial Judge in passing the sentence on the convict[17]. In most cases, the exercise of the discretion will result in the court not imposing the maximum sentence prescribed in the statute.

In Usen Ekpo v. The State[18] the offence was against the Counterfeit Currency (Special Provisions) Act which prescribed that an offender upon conviction shall be liable to imprisonment for 21 years. The trial court sentenced the appellant to the 21 years term. Lamenting the harshness of the sentence but unable to intervene because there was no appeal against the sentence, the Supreme Court[19], per Aniagolu, JSC said:

“While saying so as a matter of law, I wish to place it on record that I have much sympathy for the appellant on the severity of sentence passed on him. He is a young man of eighteen years of age and a first offender, and if the principle of reformation of criminals has any place in the sentencing policy of our courts, the salvaging of this young man from the direction of crime to the path of rectitude should be our paramount preoccupation.”[20]

In his own contribution, Uwais, JSC (as he then was) said:

“However, this notwithstanding it seems to me that the sentence was clearly excessive… Having been a first offender and quite young, as the plea in mitigation revealed, and takin into consideration the fact that the trial court was not bound to pass the maximum sentence but free to exercise its discretion in that regard; I am, with respect, of the view that the learned trial Judge ought not in principle to have passed the maximum sentence on the appellant: Udoye v. The State (1967) NMLR 197.”

It is now the requirement of Section 416(2)(d) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 that a trial court shall not pass the maximum sentence on a first offender. Though there is room for exercise of discretion when it comes to sentencing as certain factors may be considered by the court but the way and manner the discretion is exercised may have the effect of rekindling confidence and faith in the criminal justice system or make people to lose faith in the system. The sentence of a court on a convicted person cannot be ridiculous as to make a mockery of the trial bearing in mind the punishment prescribed by the legislature and the time, energy and resources deployed to prosecute the case.

One of the objectives of sentencing is to serve as deterrence to others not to commit offence by making an example of the convict. Where the sentence imposed on a convict is ridiculously low, then that element of deterrence is defeated as such low sentence may embolden others to commit crime with the erroneous assumption that the sentence is light. For example, where a law prescribes a sentence of 21 years for an offence and a convict is sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, there is a huge disconnection between the sentence prescribed by the enabling statute and the actual sentence imposed by the court. Sometimes it raises disaffection and uproar against the court as an institution as people conjecture reasons which go to the integrity of the court on why such low sentence was imposed.

A few examples of such sentences may suffice.

In Boniface Adonike v. The State[21], the appellant defiled a girl of 5 years and was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment and 6 strokes of cane for an offence that carries life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, per Inyang Okoro, JSC held:

“The appellant herein was sentenced to six years imprisonment with hard labour and six strokes of the cane. I wish it was more than this and unfortunately, there is no appeal against the sentence. This type of case should be an opportunity for sentencing authorities to really come out vehemently to show that society abhors the type of conduct exhibited by the appellant on this innocent young girl of just five (5) years. Imagine the trauma (both physical and mental) the young girl was subjected to as a result of the insatiable urge of the appellant for mischief which he has invoked from the pit of hell. Violating a girl of just five years by the ppellant in the manner he did is condemnable,   barbaric, immoral and is devoid of any reasoning whatsoever. I wish I have the power to increase his punishment. I could have done it in order to serve as a deterrence to would-be rapists. Be that as it may, if he does not repent, he may not be as lucky as he was in this case.”

Also in Afor Lucky v. The State[22]  the appellant charged with rape of an 11 years old girl, was convicted and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with hard labour or fine of N300,000.00, an offence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, per Ngwuta JSC –

“With respect to His Lordship, the sham of prison term he imposed on the appellant is an attack on law and moral basis for prison term. The young and old, who have a miserable sum of three hundred thousand naira to throw about can ravage young mothers at will. Not only that the brute violently, as in armed robbery, took away the pride of that innocent girl, the act of rape is a major dent on her psyche and will so remain for life …. I was tempted to revisit the sentence in this case but that would have violated the principle that appellate Court cannot disturb a sentence imposed unless there is an appeal against the sentence.”[23]

See also Nafiu Rabiu v. The State[24]  the man who strangled his own wife to death was sentenced for 4 years imprisonment.

Whereas Boniface Adonike and Afor Lucky were lucky to escape a review of their sentence but it was not so for the appellant in Mohammed v. AGF[25]  the appellant was charged and convicted for trafficking of some persons to Libya where they were sexually molested, sold and forced into prostitution. The Act prescribed a imprisonment for 10 years or fine not exceeding N200,000.00 or both. The trial court sentenced her to 3 years imprisonment. She appealed to the Court of Appeal and lost and then approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that where a statute prescribes a mandatory sentence in clear terms, the courts are without jurisdiction to impose anything less than the mandatory sentence as no discretion exists to be exercised. The Supreme Court, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC held:

“I am therefore of the considered view that the learned trial Judge erred in imposing a term of three years. He had no discretion to do so and the court below erred in affirming the sentence in count 3. The said sentence is hereby set aside. I affirm the appellant’s conviction on count 3 and sentence her to a term of ten years imprisonment. All the sentences are to run concurrently.”

One thing is clear from the above three cases and it is that the sentences imposed by the trial courts did not impress the Supreme Court, being the policy court and judicial conscience of the land. It invariably shows that the manner of exercise of discretion by trial courts require some application of standard principles in order to achieve a fair and acceptable result that will not be scandalous to the administration of justice. It is this concern that gave rise to the codification of Sentencing Guidelines in Anambra State[26] and some other States[27] in Nigeria.

SENTENCING  GUIDELINES

Imagine a scenario where two persons who are in custody in one correctional centre are charged before different trial courts for the same offence which carries a sentence of 14 years imprisonment and at the end of their respective trials they are convicted, and one convict is sentenced to 10 years imprisonment while the other is sentenced to one year imprisonment under the guise of exercise of discretion by the two trial courts. How will both convicts perceive the justice system? Will they see it as fair and just or unfair and biased/discriminatory?

There should be a measure of certainty of what range the sentence for a crime will attract after a successful trial. It is should not be a situation where a discretion is exercised in vacuo. The sentencing guidelines of Anambra State which applies to all courts exercising criminal jurisdiction in the Anambra State proclaims its objective in the following words –

“The objective of this Practice Direction is to set out the appropriate standards and guideline for the sentencing process in offences against the State, person, public order, morality, homicide, property and corruption related offences, for the purpose of ensuring reasonable uniformity and fairness in sentencing in Anambra State.”

(underlining mine for emphasis)

The guidelines mandate a court when determining the sentence to impose on a convict to consider the principles and objectives[28] of sentencing such as prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education of the public, retribution, restitution, appropriateness of non-custodial sentence, necessary aggravating and mitigating evidence or information. Just like pronounced in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015[29], the guideline[30] prohibits a trial court from passing the maximum sentence on a first offender except in a mandatory sentence.

The Guidelines provided procedural steps to be embarked by a court in sentencing which involves the conduct of a sentencing hearing where the convict and prosecution are free to call witnesses as to character of the convict or in rebuttal of any fact or evidence adduced by or on behalf of the convict. The witnesses are subject to the general rules of evidence relating to examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination.

Thereafter, in determining what sentence to impose on the convict, the trial will now be guided by Category 1 (High culpability) and Category 2 (Low culpability). Where the offence is against a person, then harm is determined under three categories of Serious harm, Substantial harm and Limited harm. Each of these categories has clearly stipulated ingredients which the trial court will tick to apply to the facts of the case. Finally, each category has a corresponding starting point for calculating percentages of sentence.

Example of table of category:

Table 1 – Starting point and category range for offences against the State:

Note: Two examples for calculating percentages of sentences:

90% of 10 years sentence is 0.9 x 10 years = 9 years

60% of 7 years sentence is 0.6 x 7 years = 4.2. The 4.2 years can be rounded up.

Table 2 – Starting point and category range for offences against person:

Where different trial courts trying different offenders for the same offence apply the guidelines faithfully the sentences imposed by the courts would be reasonably uniform. The sentences may not be exact but the disparity would not be much. The ACJA has similarly made provision for steps a trial court shall take in exercising its discretion of sentencing[31].

In addition, under the ACJA where a woman who is found guilty of a capital offence is pregnant, the sentence of death shall be passed on her but its execution shall be suspended until the baby is delivered and weaned.[32] Where the convict in a capital offence is in the opinion of the court not up to 18 years when the offence was committed sentence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded but in lieu of it the court shall sentence the child to life imprisonment or to such other term as the court deems appropriate.[33]

NON-CUSTODIAL SENTENCE

The world has moved away from the concept and mentality that every criminal infraction must be punished with imprisonment. Nigeria is not an exception. The ACJA in sections 453, 460 and 468 introduced some alternatives to imprisonment like probation, suspended sentence, community service and parole. A court in exercising its power in deciding what is appropriate punishment have regard to the need to:

• reduce congestion in prisons;
• rehabilitate prisoners by making them to undertake productive work; and
• prevent convicts who commit simple offences from mixing with hardened criminals.[34]

To say that the correctional centres in Nigeria holds more inmates than their capacity is merely stating the obvious. A proper application of non-custodial sentence will drastically reduce congestion in the correctional centres as some of the inmates are in custody for minor offences in respect of which bail may have been granted but they were unable to fulfil the conditions of bail. The dumping of all manner of offenders in one correctional centre has negatively affected the objective of rehabilitation as some of the inmates after mixing with hardened convicts return back to the society as worse criminals. Ideally, except there are cogent reasons to act otherwise, persons convicted of simple offences and misdemeanour should be sentenced to non-custodial sentence.

The provision of ACJA in Part 44[35] relating to probation and non-custodial measures would complement the provisions of the Nigerian Correctional Service Act, 2019 which has divided the Correctional Service into Custodial Service and Non-Custodial Service[36]. The Non-Custodial Service[37] is responsible for the administration of non-custodial measures, including:

(a)     community service;

(b)     probation;

(c)     parole;

(d)     restorative justice measures; and

(e)     any other non-custodial measure assigned to the  Correctional Service by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Controller-General of the Correctional Service shall make regulations, appoint supervisors and administer the non-custodial measures.[38]

Despite the elaborate provisions of ACJA and ACJL of some States coupled with Sentencing Guidelines to ensure a smooth and efficient administration of criminal justice in Nigeria, there is one major area proper attention has not been paid. This concerns children in conflict with the law or child offenders. Section 467(3) ACJA provides that a court may make an order directing that a child standing criminal trial be remanded at a Rehabilitation and Correctional Centre. Similar provision is contained in most of the ACJL of States.

The question that begs for answer, is, how many States in Nigeria have a Children Rehabilitation Centre or Borstal home? In the South East zone where I am conversant with, there is none. Anambra State recently in 2021 acquired a site for the Children Correctional Centre at Umunze and work is still going on at the site and hopefully the centre may become operational this year.

The reality is that we are still paying lip service to making adequate provision for child offenders. What obtains in some places is that the police who charge these child offenders to court inflate their ages so that the courts can remand them to custody. And even where they correctly state the age of the child, what options does the trial court have? The trial court has only one option which is to remand him to the same and only correctional centres in the State which hold adults and other inmates accused of capital offences of violent nature like armed robbery, kidnapping and murder. The result is that the child offender who is remanded in custody instead of being reformed and rehabilitated undergoes training at the hands of tough criminals in custody and comes out more equipped to wreck devastating havoc on the society. I can only wish that each State of Nigeria will have a Children Correctional Centre.

CONCLUSION

The court (judiciary) is a major stakeholder in the administration of criminal justice. In fact, the other stakeholders like the Police and other law enforcement agencies, Ministry of Justice and Correctional Service are subservient to the powers of the court. Sentencing is the end of a successful criminal trial. How the discretion to impose sentence is handled by the trial court has the effect of either inspiring confidence in the system or questioning the value and worth of the judiciary as an institution to check crime. There is no gainsaying the fact that the performance of the courts has a bearing on the security and general stability of the nation. This is why a conscious effort must be made by us, who sit primarily as trial courts in criminal cases, to imbibe the correct principles of sentencing and avoid emotions/sentiments which may affect the exercise of our discretion to impose appropriate sentences as situations demand.

I thank you for your attention.

[1] Yakubu v. The State (2015) LPELR-40867(CA)

[2] (2019) LPELR-48288(CA)

[3] (2013) LPELR-21895(SC)

[4] (2017) LPELR-42719(CA)

[5] Sele v. State (1993) LPELR-3030(SC)

[6] (2021) LPELR-54598(CA)

[7] Audu v. State (2020) LPELR-51096(CA)

[8] (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 337 at 364, per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC

[9] See also State v. Ali (2020) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1755) 69 – where the respondent was found guilty of culpable homicide but the trail court sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour. The Court of Appeal held that the “trial court had no further discretion in the matter aside from passing the mandatory sentence of death as prescribed by Section 221 of the Penal Code.”

[10] (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 530 at 553.

[11] See also Afolabi v. State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 292.

[12] (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 530 at 552 C – D per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was). See also Afolabi v. State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 292.

[13] (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1622) 502 at 518.

[14] See also Otti v. State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 207) 103; Ezeani v. FRN (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1686) 221.

[15] (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 300 at 330 G-H

[16] Ibid at page 339 H – D

[17] Tanko v. The State (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) 430; Amoshima v. State (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 530; – Oyewumi v. State (2019) LPELR-47892(CA); Ajiboye v. State (2019) LPELR-47876(CA)

[18] (1982) 6 S.C. 10

[19] “My learned brothers on the panel with me on this appeal have been equally disturbed as I am with the sentence meted to the appellant.” – per Idigbe, JSC at page 14.

[20] At page 20

[21] (2015) LPELR-24281(SC) at 32

[22] (2016) LPELR-40541(SC)

[23] See also Posu v. State (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1234) 393 where the Supreme Court frowned again at the light sentence of 3 years for the offence of rape.

[24] (1990) 11 SC 130 at 177

[25] (2021) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1764) 397

[26] Anambra State Courts (Sentencing Guidelines for Offences against the State, Person, Public officer, Morality, Homicide, Property and Corruption) Practice Directions, 2019.

[27] Lagos, Edo, Kano and FCT.

[28] Similar to Section 401 of ACJA 2015

[29] Section 416(2)(d)

[30] Order 1 Rule 3(e) Anambra State Sentencing Guidelines, 2019.

[31] Section 416 ACJA, 2015

[32] Section 404 ACJA, 2015

[33] Section 405 ACJA, 2015

[34] Section 460(4) ACJA, 2015.

[35] Sections 453 – 467

[36] Section 1(2) Nigerian Correctional Service Act, 2019

[37] Ibid Section 37(1)

[38] Ibid Sections 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.