By Sylvester Udemezue, Esq
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Legal scholar Sylvester Udemezue has argued that seniority and order of precedence among lawyers appearing before Nigerian courts are not merely matters of tradition, courtesy or professional convenience, but form part of a legally established and ethically reinforced hierarchy governing professional relations at the Bar.
Udemezue made the argument in his article, “Law, Ethics, and Judicial Control of Court Proceedings: A Doctrinal Reappraisal of Equality, Seniority, and Precedence at the Nigerian Bar,” published in Volume 12, April 2026 of the Section on Legal Practice Law Journal, a publication of the Nigerian Bar Association Section on Legal Practice.
The article, which appears at pages 59 to 82 of the journal, examines the relationship among equality at the Bar, seniority, precedence, courtroom seating arrangements, the order in which cases are called, judicial discretion and the inherent authority of courts to regulate their proceedings.
The study was prompted by a controversy arising from proceedings at the High Court of Enugu State sitting at Oji River, where a lawyer publicly complained about courtroom seating arrangements and the decision to allow a Senior Advocate of Nigeria to have a matter called ahead of cases appearing earlier on the cause list.
According to Udemezue, the controversy exposed what he described as persistent uncertainties and misconceptions within the legal profession regarding equality among lawyers, professional hierarchy and the power of judges to control proceedings in their courts.
The incident involved objections by a junior lawyer to the practice of reserving front-row seats for senior members of the Bar and to the court permitting a Senior Advocate of Nigeria to mention a case outside the order in which matters appeared on the cause list.
In the account reproduced in the article, the lawyer complained that when he arrived in court, there was no indication that a SAN was present and that he had been asked to vacate a seat in the front row.
He further complained that when a SAN subsequently arrived, the Registrar allegedly vacated a front-row seat for him and the court later permitted the Senior Advocate to mention a matter which, according to the lawyer, was not listed for mention on the cause list.
The incident generated debate among lawyers over whether seniority should influence seating arrangements and the order in which matters are called, whether all lawyers should be treated identically before a court, and whether a judge may lawfully depart from the sequence on a cause list.
Udemezue, however, argues that much of the controversy resulted from a failure to distinguish professional equality from professional hierarchy.
According to him, equality at the Nigerian Bar does not mean that every lawyer enjoys identical status, privileges or procedural priority.
He maintains that lawyers are equal in professional dignity and ethical responsibility, but that the Legal Practitioners Act expressly establishes a hierarchy based on seniority and recognised professional status.
The article identifies the Legal Practitioners Act as the principal legislation governing seniority and order of precedence among legal practitioners in Nigeria.
Udemezue examines Sections 6 and 8 of the Act and the First Schedule, arguing that the provisions must be read together rather than in isolation.
According to the study, one of the misconceptions generated by the Oji River controversy was the assumption that Section 6 of the Legal Practitioners Act provides the general legal foundation for the precedence enjoyed by Senior Advocates of Nigeria.
The author disagrees.
He explains that Section 6 provides special privileges for specified law officers, including the right to sit in the Inner Bar or, where no Inner Bar exists, in the front row, and certain privileges regarding the mention or calling of matters.
The categories specifically recognised under that provision include the Attorney-General of the Federation, Attorneys-General of states, the Solicitor-General of the Federation and other law officers covered by the legislation.
Senior Advocates of Nigeria, Udemezue argues, do not derive their general right of precedence from Section 6.
Rather, he identifies Section 8(5) of the Legal Practitioners Act and the First Schedule to the Act as the principal statutory foundation for the general hierarchy and order of precedence among legal practitioners appearing before Nigerian courts.
Section 8(5), according to the article, provides in mandatory terms that legal practitioners appearing before any court, tribunal or person exercising jurisdiction conferred by law shall take precedence among themselves according to the table of precedence contained in the First Schedule to the Act.
Udemezue argues that the use of the word “shall” demonstrates that precedence is not merely voluntary professional etiquette.
The First Schedule, he explains, establishes an order beginning with the Attorney-General of the Federation, followed by Attorneys-General of states in order of seniority, Senior Advocates of Nigeria in order of seniority, other specified law officers, and other legal practitioners according to their dates of enrolment.
The author consequently maintains that seniority and precedence are built into the statutory structure of legal practice in Nigeria and cannot properly be dismissed as obsolete customs.
He further explains that Senior Advocates occupy a recognised position within this hierarchy.
However, the article cautions against confusing precedence with an absolute right to control court proceedings.
According to Udemezue, while a Senior Advocate may enjoy precedence over junior counsel, the exercise of that precedence remains subject to judicial discretion and the court’s ultimate authority to manage its own proceedings.
He therefore rejects the proposition that a senior lawyer may simply insist that a case be called whenever he chooses.
Rather, the court retains control over whether a matter should be called out of turn, having regard to the circumstances of the proceedings, convenience, efficiency, fairness and the orderly administration of justice.
The article also considers the traditional distinction between the Inner Bar and the Outer Bar.
Udemezue explains that certain legal practitioners are entitled by law or professional status to occupy the Inner Bar, while other practitioners sit in the Outer Bar.
He notes that although many Nigerian courtrooms no longer have physically demarcated Inner and Outer Bar sections, professional practice has preserved the distinction through seating arrangements.
In many courts, the front row effectively performs the function traditionally associated with the Inner Bar.
According to the author, reserving those seats for practitioners entitled to precedence is therefore not merely a matter of personal convenience or prestige.
He argues that it reflects the existing professional hierarchy and the statutory order of precedence.
Udemezue further maintains that a junior lawyer who occupies a seat ordinarily reserved for a senior lawyer should voluntarily vacate it when the senior lawyer arrives.
He describes this not as an admission of professional inferiority but as compliance with the established structure of the legal profession.
In his view, seniority at the Bar is institutional rather than personal.
It does not diminish the dignity or professional worth of junior lawyers, nor does it elevate senior lawyers beyond the limits imposed by law, ethics and professional responsibility.
The study stresses that professional equality and hierarchy are capable of operating simultaneously.
According to Udemezue, lawyers may be equal in dignity while remaining unequal in seniority and procedural precedence.
He argues that treating equality as requiring identical treatment in every professional circumstance misunderstands the structure of legal practice.
The article also extensively examines the inherent powers of courts to regulate their proceedings.
Udemezue maintains that courts possess inherent jurisdiction independent of their express statutory powers to control proceedings, prevent disorder and ensure the effective administration of justice.
He refers to judicial authorities recognising inherent jurisdiction as powers necessary for a court to regulate its own process and prevent its procedure from being abused.
According to the study, this inherent authority enables a judge to determine how proceedings should unfold, provided the discretion is exercised judicially and judiciously and within the limits of the law.
The author applies that principle to the controversy over cause lists.
He explains that a cause list is an official schedule prepared and published by a court indicating matters expected to come before the court on a particular day and, ordinarily, the sequence in which they appear.
However, Udemezue argues that a cause list should not be treated as an inflexible command compelling a judge to hear every case strictly according to its numerical position.
He describes the cause list principally as an administrative guide designed to communicate the business of the court and assist in the orderly organisation of proceedings.
According to him, while a court should not disregard its cause list arbitrarily, judicial discretion allows departure from the sequence where circumstances justify doing so.
Such circumstances may include convenience, efficiency, the status of counsel, the nature of the application before the court or other considerations relevant to the administration of justice.
The author therefore argues that calling a matter out of turn is not, without more, unlawful.
He further distinguishes the order in which cases appear on the cause list from the nature of the business for which each case is listed.
For example, a matter may be listed for mention, hearing, judgment or another specified purpose.
According to Udemezue, while a court possesses discretion regarding the sequence in which cases may be taken, the description of the business for which a matter is listed raises different considerations.
The article maintains that judicial discretion must operate within legal limits and cannot be used arbitrarily.
Udemezue consequently argues that precedence and judicial discretion should be understood as complementary rather than contradictory principles.
While the law establishes hierarchy and precedence, the judge remains the ultimate controller of proceedings.
The court may therefore permit a senior lawyer to mention or call a case ahead of junior counsel where circumstances justify it, but precedence does not remove the judge’s authority to refuse such a request.
The author identifies Section 8(5) and the First Schedule to the Legal Practitioners Act as the proper statutory basis for the general order of precedence, rather than attempts to rely on Section 6 as conferring special rights on Senior Advocates.
He argues that Section 6 and Section 8(5) operate in different but compatible spheres.
Section 6 provides particular privileges for designated law officers, while Section 8(5) establishes the general order of precedence applicable to legal practitioners appearing before courts.
Udemezue also rejects an interpretation that would allow Section 6 to override Section 8(5).
He notes that Section 6 itself is expressly made subject to Section 8(5) and the First Schedule.
According to him, the statutory language demonstrates an internal hierarchy within the Legal Practitioners Act and supports the conclusion that the general order of professional precedence remains governed by Section 8(5).
Beyond statutory interpretation, the study examines the ethical dimensions of seniority and courtroom conduct.
Udemezue refers to Rule 26 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2023, which requires lawyers to observe professional respect, fairness and established precedence in their dealings with one another.
He argues that this ethical obligation reinforces the statutory hierarchy.
According to him, disregarding legitimate precedence is therefore not merely a breach of courtroom convention but may also amount to a failure to observe professional ethical standards.
At the same time, he emphasises that professional hierarchy does not authorise humiliation, oppression or disrespect.
Senior lawyers, he argues, must exercise their privileges responsibly, while junior lawyers must understand and respect established professional structures.
The article also considers how lawyers should react when corrected in court.
Udemezue advocates what he describes as professional humility, restraint and respect for institutional authority.
According to him, correction by a judge, court official or professional colleague should not automatically be interpreted as humiliation or injustice.
Where a lawyer believes a ruling, practice or procedure is incorrect, he argues that the appropriate response is to pursue correction through lawful and professional channels rather than allow disagreement to degenerate into courtroom confrontation.
The study distinguishes constructive professional engagement from courtroom disruption.
It maintains that criticism and scholarly disagreement are legitimate and sometimes necessary to improve legal practice, but that courtrooms are regulated environments where discipline, order and respect for judicial authority remain essential to the administration of justice.
Udemezue argues that perceived defects in professional practice can be challenged through legal argument, scholarship and other appropriate mechanisms without undermining courtroom decorum.
In its conclusion, the study identifies three major lessons from the Oji River controversy.
First, it maintains that seniority and precedence at the Nigerian Bar are established by law and professional ethics and are not optional traditions dependent solely on individual courtesy.
Second, it argues that courts possess inherent and statutory authority to regulate proceedings, enforce courtroom order and give practical effect to legally established precedence.
The cause list, while important for organisation, is described as an administrative guide rather than a rigid command preventing a judge from exercising discretion over the sequence of cases.
Third, the study stresses that seating arrangements, professional precedence and courtroom priority should not be treated merely as questions of personal convenience or prestige.
They form part of the institutional organisation of the profession and, according to the author, should be observed voluntarily rather than enforced through confrontation.
The article concludes that harmony within the legal profession is best preserved when junior counsel respect established precedence and senior counsel exercise their privileges with restraint, dignity and respect for others.
Udemezue maintains that the controversy surrounding the Oji River incident ultimately demonstrates the need for a clearer understanding among practitioners of the statutory and ethical foundations of professional hierarchy.
He cautions that professional maturity is demonstrated not by resistance to every correction but by the capacity to understand, respect and work within legitimate institutional structures while using proper legal channels to challenge practices believed to be erroneous.
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