“Leveraging Technology For Electoral Credibility In Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal Of The Electoral Act 2026”

A Paper Presented By Prof. Abiodun Amuda-Kannike SAN, FCArb, FCE, LFWLS, FCIAP, FIIHP, ACTI, ACSP, JP, Ag. DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES (DLSS), OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STUDIES (NILDS) ABUJA, AND PIONEER DEAN, FACULTY OF LAW, KWARA STATE UNIVERSITY MALETE, AT THE PUBLIC LECTURE / OPEN HOUSE TO MARK THE MAIDEN FOUNDER’S DAY OF ABDULRASAQ ABUBAKAR TOYIN UNIVERSITY, OKE-OGBA, GANMO, KWARA STATE HELD AT AATU AUDITORIUM ON THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF APRIL 2026 AT THE ABDULRASAQ ABUBAKAR TOYIN UNIVERSITY, OKE-OGBA, GANMO, KWARA STATE.

Abstract

The credibility of Nigeria’s electoral process has been persistently undermined by fraud, logistical failures, and a consequent erosion of public trust. The Electoral Act 2026 was enacted to institutionalise technology as a solution to these challenges. This paper critically appraises the Act’s technology-related provisions, employing a doctrinal legal research methodology that combines a detailed analysis of the Act with a review of legislative debates, judicial interpretations, and empirical data from past elections. The study’s objective is to examine the scope of these provisions, analyse the political-legal debate that shaped them, and assess their potential to enhance electoral credibility. The key finding reveals that while the Act mandates electronic result transmission via the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), it simultaneously subordinates the electronic record to the physical result sheet (Form EC8A) as the primary legal document for collation. This legislative design though a direct response to past judicial ambiguity, confers wide discretionary powers on INEC creating structural gaps through which transparency can be circumvented. To address this, the paper recommends amending the Act to grant presumptive legal weight to electronically transmitted results and to establish objective criteria to replace blanket discretionary provisions. Ultimately, it concludes that technology alone is insufficient, and its efficacy depends on the political will to implement the Act’s provisions.

Keywords: Electoral Credibility, Electoral Technology, Electronic Transmission, BVAS, IReV, Voter Confidence.

1.1 Introduction

The credibility of elections constitutes the bedrock of democratic governance.[1] In Nigeria, the journey toward conducting elections that genuinely reflect the will of the people has been fraught with persistent challenges such as allegations of electoral fraud, manipulation at collation centres, vote-buying, logistical failures, and a steady erosion of public trust in the electoral process.[2] These challenges have created a legitimacy deficit that threatens the foundations of Nigeria’s democracy.[3]

In response to these enduring difficulties, successive Nigerian governments have sought to leverage technology as a tool for enhancing electoral transparency and credibility. From the introduction of the Smart Card Reader (SCR) in 2015 to the deployment of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) in 2023, technology has progressively assumed a central role in Nigeria’s electoral governance architecture.[4] These innovations were designed to address specific vulnerabilities. Biometric authentication designed and adopted to curb multiple voting and impersonation, and electronic result transmission to prevent the manipulation of results during physical transportation and collation.

The culmination of this technological trajectory is the Electoral Act 2026, signed into law by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in February 2026 after two years of intensive consultation with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the Office of the Attorney-General, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and international development partners. I have also had the double honour of making a presentation before the National Assembly Joint Committee on Electoral Matters on behalf of the Director – General of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies as well as in my individual capacity. This legislation represents the most comprehensive attempt yet to institutionalise technology within Nigeria’s electoral legal framework.

1.2 The Two Sides of the Coin Debate

The passage of the Electoral Act 2026 was preceded by intense legislative and public debate, with the fiercest on the role of technology in election result transmission. Two competing arguments emerged. While both sides – of – the – coin are grounded in the concepts of electoral credibility and democratic accountability, they each hold a divergent conclusion.

Proponents of mandatory real-time electronic transmission argued that technology must be deployed as an uncompromising transparency mechanism. Their position rested on several foundational arguments.[5] They contended that the progressive evolution of technology in Nigeria’s electoral governance framework necessitates institutionalising mandatory electronic transmission of election result to close the legal loopholes exposed in the 2023 elections.[6]

The Supreme Court had held that the 2022 Electoral Act did not expressly mandate electronic transmission of results.[7] The Court held that IReV is merely a ‘viewing portal’ rather than a collation system.[8] This interpretation created the legal ambiguity that reform advocates sought to eliminate in the 2026 Act.

Reform advocates insisted that this judicial interpretation validating election results that were not uploaded unto IReV is a structural gap that enable electoral fraud which the provision itself is intended to cure.[9]  They argued that historically electoral fraud in Nigeria occurs during collation and that real-time public upload of polling unit results would make any subsequent manipulation immediately visible to citizens, parties, and observers.[10]

They also advanced arguments in refuting the inadequacy of technological infrastructure as a ground for not requiring mandatory electronic transmission citing the Association of Licensed Telecom Operators of Nigeria (ALTON) that even 2G networks are sufficient for election data transmission.[11] With broadband penetration exceeding 50% and over 109 million active telecommunications subscriptions nationwide, the proponents characterised infrastructure concerns as a pretext for delay rather than a genuine constraint.[12] In their consideration, electronic transmission of results is not merely a technological preference but a democratic accountability mechanism.[13] They warned that leaving transmission subject to connectivity availability rather than making it compulsory introduces ambiguity that could be exploited to manipulate results, weaken verification processes, and erode citizens’ confidence in electoral outcomes.

The opponents on the other side of the coin argued that technology must be deployed within the constraints of Nigeria’s infrastructure realities. They cited Nigerian Communications Commission data indicating that Nigeria remains underserved by almost 40% meaning that 40 per cent of territories in Nigeria lack internet coverage.[14] Therefore, introducing an electronic system without manual backup will disenfranchise about 40% of the country who will probably not be able to vote as they don’t have adequate internet services. They further argued that the signed, stamped, and countersigned physical Form EC8A constitutes the authentic record of voter intent, whereas digital files could be vulnerable to hacking, manipulation, or system failure.[15] Physical paper has been the primary source of documentation in election the world over. Relying on cross – jurisdictional comparison, USA, Canada, Australia, UK and Spain and other technologically advanced democracies all transmits election results manually.[16]

The debate over technology in Nigeria’s electoral process is animated by empirical data that reveals the scale of the challenges and the stakes involved. Available data from INEC shows a steady decline in voter turnout for presidential elections: 53.7% in 2011; 43.6% in 2015; 34.7% in 2019; and 26.7% in 2023.[17] Undoubtedly, elections with less than 50% turnout would always raise concern about legitimacy.

However, the final legislative process favour retaining manual backup provisions and 15 demonstrating the political dynamics that shaped the final legislation. Accordingly, this paper is structured to:

1. examine the technology-related provisions of the Electoral Act 2026, identifying their scope, mandates, and limitations;
2. analyse the competing arguments that shaped the legislative debate on electronic transmission, situating them within Nigeria’s democratic development trajectory; and
3. assess the potential of technology, as currently regulated, to enhance electoral credibility in Nigeria, considering both the promises and perils of technological deployment.

2.1 Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Framework

For the purposes of this paper, key terms are defined as follows:

2.1.1 Electoral Credibility

The degree to which elections are perceived by stakeholders including voters, political parties, election observers, the judiciary, and the international community as free, fair, transparent, and reflective of the genuine will of the people.[18] In this paper, electoral credibility encompasses both the actual integrity of the electoral process and public perception thereof.[19]

2.1.2 Electronic Transmission

The process of sending election results from polling units to a central portal using digital networks, without physical transportation of result sheets. Under the Electoral Act 2026, this refers specifically to transmission to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV).

A technological device used for voter accreditation through fingerprint and facial recognition. Section 47 of the Electoral Act 2026 makes the use of BVAS compulsory for accreditation.

2.2 Theoretical Framework: Institutional Theory of Electoral Governance

This paper adopts Institutional Theory as its analytical framework. Institutional theory, as applied to electoral governance, posits that the credibility of elections is not determined solely by the presence of technology but by the institutional framework that governs its deployment.[20] The framework rests on three foundational propositions which are that rules and procedures matter, enforcement mechanisms determine institutional effectiveness, and that transparency and accountability are institutional products. The theory demonstrates that institutionalized electoral commissions with clear mandates and operational autonomy are better positioned to produce legitimate election outcomes.[21] The conflict over electronic transmission in the Electoral Act 2026 exemplifies the core insights of institutional theory. The presence of BVAS and IReV does not automatically enhance credibility. What matters is whether the Act aerated an institutional design. The outcome of the 2027 elections will depend less on the technology deployed than on whether the institutions charged with implementing the Act such as INEC, the judiciary, and political parties operate with autonomy, capacity, and accountability. Whether electronic transmission is mandatory or conditional is fundamentally a debate about institutional design. Mandatory transmission creates a transparency regime while conditional transmission creates discretion that can be exploited.

2.3 An Overview of the Electoral Act 2026: Key Provisions on Technology

The Electoral Act 2026 (the Act) represents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date to regulate the use of technology in Nigeria’s electoral process. Signed into law by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in February 2026, the Act introduces several provisions that directly govern technological deployment across the electoral cycle.[22] Some of these provisions that determines how technology interfaces with electoral credibility are highlighted below:

1. Section 60(3): Electronic Transmission of Results

The most significant and hotly contested technology-related provision in the Act is the section which governs the transmission of election results from polling units to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). The section provides that:

“The presiding officer shall, after the counting of votes and the announcement of results at the polling unit, electronically transmit the results to the INEC Result Viewing Portal, and shall also deliver the physical result sheet (Form EC8A) to the collation officer at the ward collation centre.”[23]

However, the Act contains a critical proviso that fundamentally shapes the legal effect of this mandate. it provides:

“For the avoidance of doubt, the physical result sheet (Form EC8A) shall be the primary legal document for the collation of election results, and any discrepancy between the electronically transmitted result and the physical result sheet shall be resolved in favour of the physical result sheet.”[24]

This proviso subordinates electronic transmission to the physical Form EC8A, thereby establishing that the digital record is not the authoritative source for collation. It creates a hierarchy of evidence where inconsistencies arise between the electronic and physical records, the physical document prevails. This provision directly addresses the judicial ambiguity that emerged from the 2023 elections, where courts declined to invalidate elections despite non-upload of results to IReV, relying on the absence of express statutory language making electronic transmission mandatory.

The Act also introduces a deterrent mechanism when it provides:

“Any presiding officer who wilfully fails to transmit results electronically as required under subsection (3) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of ₦500,000 or both.”[25]

This penal provision represents an acknowledgment by the legislature that the mandatory language of subsection (3) contains significant limitations. The phrase ‘wilfully fails’ requires proof of intent, creating a high evidentiary threshold for prosecution. Moreover, the penalty is relatively modest compared to the scale of electoral manipulation that non-transmission may facilitate.

2. Digital Party Membership Registers

The Act introduces a significant technological mandate for political parties:

“Every political party shall maintain a digital register of its members, which shall include the full name, address, biometric data, and Permanent Voter Card (PVC) number of each member.”[26]

Also, the Act imposes a timeline for submitting the digital register to INEC within twenty-one days before the conduct of party primaries for any elective office.[27]

The consequence for non-compliance is severe as a political party that fails to submit its digital membership is ineligible to field candidates for any elective office in the election to which the primaries relate.[28] This provision is designed to address the manipulation of party primaries through inflated or fictitious membership lists. Worthy of note is that the House of Representatives is considering an amendment to the provisions of the Act on party membership registration to criminalise registering in more than a political party. The proposed amendment though being considered by the House of Representative must also be transmitted and considered by the Senate for passage before it is to be presented to the President for Assent. However, the Nigerian Senate has taken a cautious stance on the proposed amendment explaining that deliberations on it and formal position will be taken upon the transmission of the legislative proposal from the House of Representation.[29] Nonetheless, analysts have expressed reservation on the possibility of any amendment to the Act given that there is less than a year to the 2027 General elections.[30]

This provision will also serve to ensure that it is only party members that contest on the platform of the political party to which they belong to. In the 2023 elections, candidates that do not have their names in the membership register of a political party ended up representing the party in general elections. Justice Ayo Salami rightly observed that this should not be allowed and is a testament to the declining competency of the Bench.[31]

3. Section 47: Mandatory Use of BVAS

Section 47 of the Act mandates the use of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) for voter accreditation. It provides:

“The Commission shall deploy the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) for the accreditation of voters in all elections conducted under this Act.”[32]

The mandatory language of Section 47 addresses the legal ambiguity that arose in the 2023 elections, where some challenges to the use of BVAS were mounted on the ground that the 2022 Act did not expressly require its deployment.²³ By making BVAS deployment compulsory, the Act eliminates judicial discretion to invalidate elections based on the absence of statutory mandate for technological accreditation.

4. Digital Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs)

The Act introduces provisions for digital Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) designed to improve voter access and accreditation efficiency. It provides:

“The Commission may, by regulation, provide for the issuance of digital permanent voter cards that may be downloaded and stored on a mobile device, provided that such digital cards contain a QR code or other unique identifier that can be verified by the BVAS.”[33]

Although the provision is permissive rather than mandatory, it represents a significant innovation in voter registration technology. The digital PVC is designed to address persistent challenges of the loss or damage of physical PVCs, which historically disenfranchised registered voters and the logistical burden of PVC distribution, which has been a recurring source of operational failure in previous elections.

5. Cybersecurity and Data Protection

The Act includes provisions addressing cybersecurity concerns arising from the increased reliance on technology. The Act stipulates that:

“The Commission shall implement appropriate cybersecurity measures to protect the integrity of the electronic systems used for voter registration, accreditation, and result transmission.”[34]

Subsection (2) mandates:

“The Commission shall ensure that all personal data collected from voters and political party members is processed in accordance with the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023.[35]

These provisions recognize that technological deployment introduces new vulnerabilities that must be legally addressed. The reference to the Nigeria Data Protection Act incorporates existing data protection standards into electoral administration. However, the Act does not specify the content of “appropriate cybersecurity measures,” leaving INEC with significant discretion in implementation.

3.1 The Significance of Leveraging Technology to Enhance Electoral Credibility

The deployment of technology in electoral processes is predicated on the assumption that technological tools can address specific vulnerabilities that have historically undermined the credibility of elections in Nigeria. Technology, when properly deployed within a robust legal framework, offers substantial benefits across multiple dimensions of electoral integrity.[36] Below are some of the ways leveraging technology enhances electoral credibility:

1. Transparency and Public Accountability

The most significant contribution of technology to electoral credibility lies in its capacity to enhance transparency and create mechanisms for public accountability.[37] Transparency in electoral processes serves two critical functions. It deters manipulation by making malfeasance observable, and it builds public confidence by enabling citizens and stakeholders to verify electoral outcomes independently.[38] The introduction of the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) represented a paradigm shift in Nigeria’s electoral transparency architecture. Before IReV, election results were transmitted through a hierarchical collation system in which results moved from polling units to ward collation centres, then to local government collation centres, then to state collation centres, and finally to the national collation centre in Abuja.[39] At each stage, opportunities existed for manipulation, alteration, or substitution of result sheets. The physical transportation of result sheets created vulnerabilities that were exploited in previous elections.[40] Empirical evidence from the 2023 elections supports this assessment.

Furthermore, the transparency created by electronic result transmission operates as a deterrent mechanism. When electoral officials and political actors know that results are immediately visible to the public, the incentive to manipulate outcomes is substantially reduced. This deterrence function of transparency is particularly significant at the collation stage, which has historically been the most vulnerable point in Nigeria’s electoral process.[41]

2. Reduction of Specific Forms of Electoral Fraud

Technology addresses specific forms of electoral fraud that have historically undermined the credibility of Nigerian elections. By targeting particular vulnerabilities, technological interventions can reduce incidences of manipulation and create verifiable records of electoral transactions.[42] Electoral technologies such as the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) significantly addressed electoral fraud.[43] BVAS was introduced to address the persistent problem of multiple voting and impersonation. Multiple voting occurred when individuals voted at multiple polling units using different voter cards, or when individuals impersonated registered voters. Before BVAS, the manual verification of voter cards was vulnerable to manipulation such as multiple voting and voter impersonation.[44] The effectiveness of BVAS in reducing multiple voting has been documented in post-election audits. INEC’s internal assessment of the 2023 elections found that BVAS detected and prevented 1,284 attempts at multiple voting across the country. The system’s ability to create an indelible record of accreditation each BVAS machine records the time, location, and biometric data of every accreditation creating an audit trail that can be used to investigate allegations of accreditation fraud.[45]

In the same vein, electronic result transmission addresses the vulnerability of result manipulation during physical transportation and collation of electoral results. The physical transportation of result sheets created opportunities for manipulation at multiple points. Result sheets could be altered during transit as authentic result sheets are replaced with altered versions or collation officers could simply ignore polling unit results and announce fabricated figures.[46]

3. Efficiency and Timeliness of Results

The timely announcement of election results is a critical component of electoral credibility. Delays in results announcement create uncertainty, provide opportunities for manipulation, and can fuel post-election tensions.[47] Technology significantly accelerates the results collation and transmission process. Before the integration of electoral technologies, election results collation was a laborious manual process which could take days or weeks, prolonging the period of uncertainty while creating opportunities for manipulation and.

Electronic transmission could accelerate this process in two ways. Firstly, polling unit results become available immediately, eliminating the need for physical transportation to the ward collation centre for initial aggregation. Secondly, electronic collation systems enable faster aggregation of results across levels, reducing the time required to produce final results.

INEC’s experience in the 2023 elections demonstrated the efficiency gains from electronic transmission. Results from polling units began appearing on IReV within hours of the close of polls, and final presidential results were announced within five days of the election significantly faster than the 2019 election, where results took ten days to finalize.[48] The efficiency of electronic transmission reduces the window for post-election manipulation and speculation.

4. Deterrence Through Transparency

The transparency created by technology operates as a deterrent mechanism that extends beyond individual elections. When electoral actors know that their actions are observable and verifiable, the incentive to engage in manipulation is substantially reduced.[49] Electronic result transmission creates a credible threat of detection that shapes the behaviour of electoral officials and political actors. The knowledge that polling unit results are publicly visible creates accountability at the most granular level of electoral administration. Technology also creates audit trails that enable post-election investigation of irregularities. The digital records created by BVAS and IReV provide evidence that can be used in electoral litigation and criminal investigations.[50] This capacity for post-election accountability would not exist without the digital records created by technological systems.

5. Restoration of Voter Trust

Also, technology holds significant potential to restore voter trust in the electoral process. Voter turnout is a key indicator of trust, and Nigeria has experienced a steady decline in electoral participation that signals deepening voter scepticism.[51] Nigeria’s voter turnout has declined precipitously over the past four presidential elections. INEC data reveals a consistent downward trajectory from 53.7% voter turnout in 2011 to 43.6% in 2015. In 2023, the voter turnout is abysmal 26.7%.[52] In off-cycle elections, the figures are even more alarming. The 2022 Federal Capital Territory Area Council elections recorded turnout below 10% in urban councils, while the 2025 Anambra governorship election saw only 21.4% of registered voters participate.[53] This decline reflects a crisis of confidence in the electoral process. Voters who believe that elections are rigged, that their votes will not count, or that outcomes are predetermined have little incentive to participate.[54]

Technology offers a pathway to restore voter trust by addressing the specific concerns that drive non-participation. Voters who believe that multiple voting is prevalent may be reassured by biometric authentication. Voters who believe that results are manipulated at collation may be reassured by public result portals. Voters who believe that their votes will not be counted may be reassured by audit trails that enable verification.[55] A study established that technology can enhance trust.

6. Institutional Strengthening

Technology contributes to electoral credibility by strengthening the institutional capacity of electoral management bodies. When electoral commissions can demonstrate competence, transparency, and accountability, their institutional legitimacy is enhanced. Electoral technology can be leveraged to manage voter registration systems, results collation systems, and accreditation systems that are digitized and automated thereby reducing the operational burden on electoral officials and the margin for human error.[56] Technology also enables electoral commissions to make data-driven decisions about electoral administration. Digital systems generate data that can be analysed to identify vulnerabilities, assess performance, and target interventions.

4.1 Challenges to the Effective Use of Technology under the Electoral Act 2026

Despite the significant potential of technology to enhance electoral credibility, the Electoral Act 2026 contains provisions and leaves unresolved ambiguities that may undermine the effectiveness of technological deployment. Some of these legal, institutional, and practical challenges that may constrain the capacity of technology to deliver transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s electoral process include:

1. Permissive Electronic Transmission rather than Mandatory Requirement

The most significant challenge to effective technology deployment lies in the express wordings of section 60(3) of the Act. While the Act mandates electronic transmission of results to IReV, it simultaneously subordinates the electronic record to the physical Form EC8A, creating a hierarchy that can be exploited to undermine transparency. Additionally, the Act expressly states that the physical result sheet (Form EC8A) shall be the primary legal document for the collation of election results, and any discrepancy between the electronically transmitted result and the physical result sheet shall be resolved in favour of the physical result sheet.[57] This provision fundamentally alters the legal significance of electronic transmission. Rather than serving as an authoritative record of the polling unit result, the electronic transmission becomes a secondary document that can be disregarded if the physical form presents a different figure.

The practical implications of this provision are substantial. This provision gave statutory backing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oyetola v. INEC.[58] While holding that the wordings constitute a challenge, it is not a blanket endorsement of the opinion of the proponents of mandatory electronic transmission.

2. Failure to Define what Constitute ‘Communication Failure

The Act does not define what constitutes ‘proven communication failure’ that would justify non-transmission or reliance on physical forms. Section 60(3) mandates electronic transmission, but the practical enforcement of this mandate depends entirely on what counts as a failure of communication. The 2023 elections demonstrated how this ambiguity can be exploited. INEC’s post-election audit identified over 1,000 polling units where results were not uploaded to IReV.[59] In most of these cases, presiding officers cited network failure as the reason for non-transmission, but no independent verification mechanism existed to confirm whether network failure was genuine or fabricated. The failure to define, in exhaustive term what would amount to ‘communication failure’ along with the lack of an independent verification mechanism created opportunities for presiding officers to deliberately fail to transmit results without facing accountability.

The legal ambiguities in Clause 60 are likely to be resolved through judicial interpretation in post-election litigation. Based on the trajectory of judicial reasoning in previous election petitions, courts are likely to defer to INEC’s determination of what constitutes communication failure that justifies non-transmission. The Act does not establish objective criteria for communication failure, nor does it provide for independent verification. In the absence of clear statutory standards, courts are likely to adopt a deferential posture toward INEC’s operational decisions.

3. Institutional Weaknesses

The effectiveness of technology under the Electoral Act 2026 depends not only on legal provisions but also on the institutional capacity of INEC and other relevant agencies to implement those provisions. The Act contains penal provisions for electoral offenses, including Section 60(6) which prescribes penalties for wilful failure to transmit results. However, currently, prosecution of electoral offenses falls to the Nigeria Police Force and the Attorney-General’s office, neither of which has dedicated electoral prosecution units with specialized expertise. The result is that electoral offenses are rarely prosecuted, and when they are prosecuted, convictions are even rarer. Data from the 2023 elections illustrates this enforcement gap. INEC referred over 700 cases of electoral offenses to the Nigeria Police for investigation and prosecution.[60] By the end of 2024, fewer than 100 cases had resulted in charges, and convictions were secured in only 12 cases.[61] This enforcement gap undermines the deterrent effect of penal provisions and signals that electoral offenses carry little risk of accountability.

4. Reduced Funding Window

The Act mandates that election funds be released to INEC not later than six months before the date of the election.[62] This represents a reduction from the twelve-month window that had been the allowed provision under the repealed Act. This reduction in the funding window poses significant risks to effective technology deployment. Technology procurement requires substantial lead time for needs assessment, competitive bidding, contract negotiation, manufacturing, delivery, testing, and deployment. INEC’s experience with technology procurement has demonstrated that a six-month window is often insufficient.[63] The compressed timeline for the 2027 elections, mandated by the Act, creates risks of rushed procurement, inadequate testing, and insufficient contingency planning.

5. Infrastructure and Capacity Gaps

Despite significant improvements in telecommunications infrastructure, gaps remain that affect the feasibility of universal electronic transmission.[64] ALTON has confirmed that 2G networks, which are sufficient for election data transmission, cover approximately 86-89% of Nigeria’s territory.[65] The coverage gap is not evenly distributed with some States having significantly lower coverage rates than others.[66] This creates the risk of differential treatment with voters in well-covered areas benefitting from electronic transmission, while voters in poorly-covered areas are at a disadvantage. The Act does not address the coverage gap. It mandates electronic transmission but provides no mechanism for ensuring that voters in underserved areas are not disadvantaged. The communication failure provision may be invoked to justify manual transmission in areas that simply lack coverage, effectively creating a two-tier system of electoral transparency.

Also, reliable power supply is essential for technology deployment. BVAS machines require charging, and transmission requires functioning mobile networks that depend on base station power. Nigeria’s power supply challenges are well-documented, with the national grid experiencing multiple collapses recently. The 2023 elections revealed significant digital literacy gaps. Post-election assessments found that some presiding officers lacked basic familiarity with BVAS operation, leading to operational failures. Voter education efforts were insufficient to ensure that voters understood the role of technology in enhancing transparency.[67]

6. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

The increasing reliance on technology introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed through robust cybersecurity measures.[68] The Act mandates appropriate cybersecurity measures but provides no guidance on what such measures entail.[69] Electoral technology systems are potential targets for cyberattacks aimed at disrupting elections or manipulating outcomes. These risks include unauthorized access to voter registration databases, manipulation of result transmission systems, denial-of-service attacks that prevent access to IReV etc.

Also, the collection and processing of biometric data for voter registration and accreditation raise significant data protection concerns. The Act requires compliance with the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, but does not specify how this compliance is to be achieved in the electoral context. The storage and handling of biometric data create risks of unauthorized access or misuse.[70] INEC’s systems contain biometric data on over 90 million registered voters, making them an attractive target for cyberattacks.[71]

7. Political Will and Implementation Gaps

The most fundamental challenge to effective technology deployment is not legal or technical but political. The success of technology depends on the political will of those who control and implement the electoral process. The legislative debate leading to the Act, a highlight of which is offered in the introductory part of this paper, revealed deep political divisions over the role of technology. The final outcome retaining manual backup as primary reflected the prevailing of political convenience rather than a technical consensus on best practice. This outcome may suggests that the political appetite for fully transparent elections remains limited. When technology threatens to reduce opportunities for manipulation, political actors who benefit from opacity have incentives to constrain its effectiveness.

8. Implementation Discretion

The Act leaves significant discretion to INEC in implementing technology provisions. While this discretion is necessary for operational flexibility, it also creates opportunities for implementation that falls short of the Act’s intended purpose. Civil society organizations have expressed concern that INEC’s implementation of technology provisions will be shaped by political pressures rather than operational transparency and electoral integrity.[72] The Commission’s independence has been tested in previous elections, and its capacity to resist political interference remains a subject of debate.

5.1 Recommendations

The challenges identified in the preceding section require a comprehensive set of reforms to ensure that technology fulfils its potential to enhance electoral credibility.

1. Legislative Reform: The Electoral Act 2026 contains provisions that, as currently framed, undermine the transparency and accountability that technology is designed to deliver. Legislative reform should address these provisions directly. The most urgent legislative reform is the amendment of Section 60(4) to remove the primacy of physical Form EC8A over electronically transmitted results. The provision should be amended to provide that electronically transmitted results shall be presumptive evidenceof the results announced at the polling unit, with physical forms serving as backup verification. Also, the need for the legislative process to consider and align with the competing positions of all stakeholders particularly political parties is essential to the success of any legislative reform. The Inter – Party Advisory Council (IPAC) has distanced itself from some provisions of the Act including the procedure for results collation and fielding candidates for elective positions. The lack of the support of the umbrella body of political parties is a significant drawback to the Act.[73]
2. Define ‘Communication Failure’ with Objective Criteria: The Act should be amended to include a definition of communication failure with objectivity to means a demonstrable inability to transmit results that is confirmed by a failure of the telecommunications network that is documented by network logs from the relevant service provider, or a failure of the BVAS device that is documented by the device’s diagnostic log. Communication failure shall not include the absence of a presiding officer’s personal mobile device or the presiding officer’s failure to adequately prepare the device for transmission. Additionally, the Act should establish an independent verification mechanism for claims of communication failure.
3. Restore the Twelve-Month Funding Window: The Act should be amended to the effect that the sums appropriated for the conduct of general elections shall be released to the Commission not later than twelve months before the date of the election. The twelve-month window aligns with international best practice. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) recommends that electoral management bodies receive funding at least twelve months before elections to allow adequate time for technology procurement, testing, and contingency planning.
4. Institutional Strengthening by Establishing an Electoral Offences Commission: An Electoral Offences Commission should be established by statute as an independent body to be operational year-round, not merely during election periods, enabling continuous investigation and prosecution of electoral offenses. Furthermore enhancing voter education by establishing a dedicated fund for voter education will enhance voter digital literacy and knowledge of electoral technology.
5. Infrastructure Development: The infrastructure gaps that affect technology deployment, network coverage and power supply require coordinated investment from relevant government agencies. Universal network coverage should be facilitated to underserved areas. INEC should strengthen power supply redundancy for technology deployment.
6. Cybersecurity Enhancement: The cybersecurity vulnerabilities require systematic strengthening of INEC’s cybersecurity capacity through the amendment of the Act to mandate independent security audits of all electoral technology systems. Section 150(1) should be amended to mandate INEC to implement cybersecurity measures to protect the integrity of the electronic systems used for voter registration, accreditation, and result transmission and that an independent cybersecurity firm accredited by the National Information Technology Development Agency be engaged to conduct a security audit of all electoral technology systems. The audit report shall be published and submitted to the National Assembly.
7. Addressing Political Will: While legal and institutional reforms can create the framework for accountability, their effectiveness ultimately depends on political commitment. Strengthening the political will for effective leveraging of electoral technology requires an independent judiciary and a vigilant civil society. Also, international partners have a role in supporting electoral integrity through technical assistance, observation, and advocacy.
8. Curtailment of Broad Discretionary Powers: The Act should only allow discretionary power that is necessary for operational flexibility while eliminating opportunities for arbitrary decisions that may run counter to the intended objective.

5.2 Conclusion

The Electoral Act 2026 represents a significant but incomplete step toward leveraging technology for electoral credibility in Nigeria. While it mandates electronic transmission and introduces important provisions on digital party registers, INEC funding, and penalties for sabotage, the retention of manual Form EC8A as the primary legal source for collation undermines the transparency gains that technology promises. The debate leading to the Act revealed a fundamental tension: between those who see technology as a tool to close historical loopholes, and those who view physical documentation as the ultimate safeguard. The outcome shaped more by political calculations than technical constraints leaves critical ambiguities unresolved. Drawing on institutional theory, this paper argues that technology alone does not guarantee credible elections. The legal and institutional framework governing its deployment determines its impact. As Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections, the credibility of the electoral process will depend not on the presence of BVAS or IReV, but on whether the provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 are faithfully implemented, enforced, and, where necessary, reformed. Ultimately, the Nigerian experience offers a cautionary lesson that technology is a powerful enabler, but its ability to enhance electoral credibility is contingent on clear legal mandates, robust enforcement mechanisms, and the political will to prioritize transparency over expediency.

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6. JOURNAL ARTICLES
7. Felix Emeka Ukwu, Veronica Nkemdirim Ayaogu, Callistus Ifeanyichukwu Maman, and Peace Nwamaka Ojonta, ‘Electoral Reforms and Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria’ African Journal of Democracy and Election Research (2025) (5) (1).
8. Samson Odogu Nmor, and Anita Uchenna Onochie, ‘Electoral Integrity in Nigeria: Challenges, Strategies and Pathways to Reform’ Law and Social Justice Review (2024) (5) (1).
9. A. U Akah etal, ‘Elections Administration and Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) Technology’ International Journal of Public Administration in the Digital Age (2024) (11) (1).
10. Sanjay Kumar, and Ekta Walia, ‘Analysis of Electronic Voting System in Various Countries’ International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering (2011) (3) (5).
11. Temitope Olukunmi Akanmu, and Eyitayo Francis Adanlawo, ‘Election Administration in Nigeria: A Factor Leading to Declining Voter Turnout’ International Journal of Innovative Research and Scientific Studies (2025) (8) (10) 151 – 158.
12. Abdulrazaq Idowu Amao, and Abdulrauf Ambali, ‘Electoral Integrity, Voters’ Confidence and Good Governance in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of 2015 and 2019 Presidential Elections’ Journal of Administrative Science (2022) (19) (2) 39 – 65.
13. Oluwaseun Clement Ajayi, Abraham Musa Peter, and Margaret Apine, ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Technological Innovations on Electoral Credibility in Nigeria, 2015 to 2023’ International Journal of Education Culture and Society (2026) (4) (1) 146 – 165.
14. Mamoudou Gazibo, ‘The Forging of Institutional Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Electoral Management Commissions in Africa’ Canadian Journal of Political Science (2006) (39) (03) 611 – 633.
15. Temitope Nwambuko, Joy Nwakaego Chigozie, and R. A. Abraham, ‘Election Technology and Administrative Transformation in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the 2015, 2019, 2023, and Projected 2027 Elections’ European Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences (2026) (3) (2) 108 – 124.
16. Robinson Tombari Sibe, and Christian Kaunert, ‘Technology, Cybersecurity and the 2023 Elections in Nigeria: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities’ Journal of African Elections (2023) (22) (2) 68.
17. Amusan Tosin Bayonle, ‘The Impact of Electronic Transmission of Result on the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria: The Issue of Authenticating Polling Unit Results for Electoral Credibility’ (Thesis for Bachelor of Science submitted to Osun State University 2024).
18. Daniel Godwin, ‘Technology, Electoral Malpractice and the Crisis of Election Administration in Nigeria’ The Thinker (2025) (101) (4) 20 – 30.
19. Abubakar Abdurrahman, ‘Comparative Analysis of Electoral Technology Deployment and Voter Trust in the 2015, 2019, and 2023 General Elections in Nigeria’ Kashere Journal of Politics and International Relations (2025) (3) (4).
20. Kate M. Carter, ‘Technology, Elections, and Democracy in Africa: Evidence from Kenya’ (Phd Dissertation submitted to University of Wisconsin – Madison 2021).
21. Riccardo Barreli, Mario D’onghia, and Stefano Longari, ‘Toward Secure Electronic Voting: A Suvey on E – Voting Systems and Attacks’ IEEE ACCESS (2022) (1) 99.
22. Owonikoko Saheed, and Kelvin Ashindorbe, ‘Trend Analysis of Voter Turnout in Nigeria’s General Elections, 1999 – 2023’ The Round Table (2025) (114) (1) 18 – 33.
23. Ryan D. Williamson, Florian Justwan, and Shaniqua Williams, ‘Examining the Relationship Between Election Administration and Citizen Attitudes’ Journal of Election Administration, Research & Practice (2022) (1) (1).
24. NEWSPAPER ARTICLE AND ONLINE MATERIALS
25. Ademu Idakwo, ‘Between Reform and Skkepticism: INEC’s Struggle to Regain Public Trust’ Leadership Onlne News of 20 March 2026 accessed from https://leadership.ng/between-reform-and-skepticism-inecs-struggle-to-regain-public-trust/ on 23 March 2026 at 12:33AM.
26. Akindeji Aromaye, ‘Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2026: What Really Changed, and What Didn’t’ Premium Times Online Newspaper of 19 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/857968-nigerias-electoral-act-2026-what-really-changed-and-what-didnt.html> on 22 March 2026 at 10:43PM.
27. Mariam Ileyemi, ‘Anambra Voter Turnout Doubles but Still Reflects Low Participation in Nigeria’s Elections’ Premium Times Online News of 10 November 2025 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/834228-anambra-voter-turnout-doubles-but-still-reflects-low-participation-in-nigerias-elections.html> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 12PM.
28. Iniobong Iwok and Taofeek Oyedokun, ‘Anambra Guber: Why Poor Turnout Reflects Citizens’ Distrust in Electoral Process’ Buinessday Online of 23 November 2025 accessed from <https://businessday.ng/politics/article/anambra-guber-why-poor-turnout-reflects-citizens-distrust-in-electoral-process/> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 21PM.
29. Qosim Suleiman, ‘INEC Gives Details of IReV Failure During 2023 Presidential Election’ Premium Times Online of 23 February 2024 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/671063-inec-gives-details-of-irev-failure-during-2023-presidential-election.html?tztc=1> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 43PM.
30. Femi Falana, ‘Electoral Act Amendment: Appraising Real – Time Electronic Transmission’ Vanguard Online News 18 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/02/electoral-act-amendment-appraising-real-time-electronic-transmission/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:03PM.
31. Gift Habib and Ayoola Olasupo, ‘Govt Negins Prosecution of INEC Officials, Others for Electoral Fraud’ Punch Online News of 3 March 2024 accessed from <https://punchng.com/govt-begins-prosecution-of-inec-officials-others-for-electoral-fraud/> on 22 March 2026 at 11:51PM.
32. Omeiza Ajayi, ‘2023 Polls: INEC Prosecutes 774 Electoral Offenders’ Vanguard Online of February 2025 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/02/2023-polls-inec-prosecutes-774-electoral-offenders/#google_vignette> on 22 March 2026 at 11:13 PM.
33. Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, ‘Credibility Threshold for the 2027 Nigeria General Election: A Framework for Electoral Reforms in Nigeria’ (2025) accessed from <https://situationroomng.org/wp-content/uploads/formidable/6/Credibilty-Threshold-for-the-2027-Nigeria-General-Election.pdf> on 22 March 2026 at 11 :49 PM.
34. Oluwaseyi Kolawole Oladele, ‘Impact of Telecommunications on Global Economic Development’ (2024) accessed from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384964715_Impact_of_Telecommunications_on_Global_Economic_Development on 23 March 2026 at 12:02AM.
35. Adedeji D. Gbadebo, ‘The Role of BVAS in Safeguarding Electoral Integrity: An Evaluation of the 2023 General Elections in FCT Abuja’ Journal of Social Political Sciences (2025) (6) (1).
36. Osita Agbu, ‘Election Rigging and the Use of Technology: The Smart Card Reader as the Joker in Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Election’ Journal of African Elections (2016) (15) (2).
37. Augustine Nze, ‘Electronic Transmission: Telco Operators’ Refute Inadequate Infrastructure Claims’ accessed from <https://thejournalnigeria.com/electronic-transmission-telco-operators-refute-inadequate-infrastructure-claims/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:15PM.
38. Juliet Umeh, ‘Urban Nigerians Enjoy 40% Faster than Rural Users – NCC’ Vanguard Online Newspaper of 1 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/02/urban-nigerians-enjoy-40-faster-internet-than-rural-users-ncc/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:23PM.
39. Adeel Javaid, ‘Electronic Voting System Security’ SSRN Electronic Journal (2014) accessed from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272299109_Electronic_Voting_System_Security> 22 March 2026 at 10:33PM.
40. Lawrence Emma, ‘Cybersecurity in an Increasingly connected World: Threats and Solutions’ (2025) accessed from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390331588_Cybersecurity_in_an_Increasingly_Connected_World_Threats_and_Solutions> on 23 March 2026 at 12:13AM.

[1] Felix Emeka Ukwu, Veronica Nkemdirim Ayaogu, Callistus Ifeanyichukwu Maman, and Peace Nwamaka Ojonta, ‘Electoral Reforms and Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria’ African Journal of Democracy and Election Research (2025) (5) (1).

[2] Samson Odogu Nmor, and Anita Uchenna Onochie, ‘Electoral Integrity in Nigeria: Challenges, Strategies and Pathways to Reform’ Law and Social Justice Review (2024) (5) (1).

[3] Ibid.

[4] A. U Akah etal, ‘Elections Administration and Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) Technology’ International Journal of Public Administration in the Digital Age (2024) (11) (1).

[5] Femi Falana, ‘Electoral Act Amendment: Appraising Real – Time Electronic Transmission’ Vanguard Online News 18 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/02/electoral-act-amendment-appraising-real-time-electronic-transmission/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:03PM.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Oyetola v. INEC (2023) LPELR – 60392 (SC).

[8] Atiku v. INEC (2023) LPELR – 61556 (SC).

[9] Falana (n5).

[10] Osita Agbu, ‘Election Rigging and the Use of Technology: The Smart Card Reader as the Joker in Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Election’ Journal of African Elections (2016) (15) (2).

[11] Augustine Nze, ‘Electronic Transmission: Telco Operators’ Refute Inadequate Infrastructure Claims’ accessed from <https://thejournalnigeria.com/electronic-transmission-telco-operators-refute-inadequate-infrastructure-claims/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:15PM.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Juliet Umeh, ‘Urban Nigerians Enjoy 40% Faster than Rural Users – NCC’ Vanguard Online Newspaper of 1 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/02/urban-nigerians-enjoy-40-faster-internet-than-rural-users-ncc/> on 22 March 2026 at 10:23PM.

[15] Adeel Javaid, ‘Electronic Voting System Security’ SSRN Electronic Journal (2014) accessed from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272299109_Electronic_Voting_System_Security> 22 March 2026 at 10:33PM.

[16] Sanjay Kumar, and Ekta Walia, ‘Analysis of Electronic Voting System in Various Countries’ International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering (2011) (3) (5).

[17] Temitope Olukunmi Akanmu, and Eyitayo Francis Adanlawo, ‘Election Administration in Nigeria: A Factor Leading to Declining Voter Turnout’ International Journal of Innovative Research and Scientific Studies (2025) (8) (10) 151 – 158.

[18] Abdulrazaq Idowu Amao, and Abdulrauf Ambali, ‘Electoral Integrity, Voters’ Confidence and Good Governance in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of 2015 and 2019 Presidential Elections’ Journal of Administrative Science (2022) (19) (2) 39 – 65.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Oluwaseun Clement Ajayi, Abraham Musa Peter, and Margaret Apine, ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Technological Innovations on Electoral Credibility in Nigeria, 2015 to 2023’ International Journal of Education Culture and Society (2026) (4) (1) 146 – 165.

[21] Mamoudou Gazibo, ‘The Forging of Institutional Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Electoral Management Commissions in Africa’ Canadian Journal of Political Science (2006) (39) (03) 611 – 633.

[22] Akindeji Aromaye, ‘Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2026: What Really Changed, and What Didn’t’ Premium Times Online Newspaper of 19 February 2026 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/857968-nigerias-electoral-act-2026-what-really-changed-and-what-didnt.html> on 22 March 2026 at 10:43PM.

[23] Electoral Act 2026, Section 60 (3).

[24] Ibid, Section 60 (4).

[25] Ibid, Section 60 (6).

[26] Ibid, Section 77.

[27] Ibid, Section 77(4).

[28] Ibid, Section 77(7).

[29] Unini Chioma, ‘Senate Can’t Deliberate Until Transmission’ – Explains Position on Electoral Act Amendment Criminalising Dual Party Membership’ The Nigeria Lawyer Online News of 22 March 2026 accessed from <https://thenigerialawyer.com/senate-cant-deliberate-until-transmission-explains-position-on-electoral-act-amendment-criminalising-dual-party-membership/ >on 24 March 2026 at 3:41AM.

[30] Musa Luka Musa, and Datti Ahmad, ‘Parties Move Against Electoral Act’ Daily Trust Online of 25 March 2026 accessed from <https://dailytrust.com/parties-move-against-electoral-act/#google_vignette> on 25 March 2026 at 4:43PM

[31] Tunde Oyekola, ‘Peter Obi not Qualified to Contest 2023 Presidential Election – Justice Salami’ Punch Online News accessed from <https://punchng.com/peter-obi-not-qualified-to-contest-2023-presidential-election-justice-salami/> on 24 March 2026 at 3:32PM.

[32] Electoral Act 2026, Section 47 (1).

[33] Ibid, Section 46 (3).

[34] Ibid, Section 150 (1).

[35] Ibid, Section 150 (2).

[36] Temitope Nwambuko, Joy Nwakaego Chigozie, and R. A. Abraham, ‘Election Technology and Administrative Transformation in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the 2015, 2019, 2023, and Projected 2027 Elections’ European Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences (2026) (3) (2) 108 – 124.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Amusan Tosin Bayonle, ‘The Impact of Electronic Transmission of Result on the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria: The Issue of Authenticating Polling Unit Results for Electoral Credibility’ (Thesis for Bachelor of Science submitted to Osun State University 2024).

[42] Daniel Godwin, ‘Technology, Electoral Malpractice and the Crisis of Election Administration in Nigeria’ The Thinker (2025) (101) (4) 20 – 30.

[43] Abubakar Abdurrahman, ‘Comparative Analysis of Electoral Technology Deployment and Voter Trust in the 2015, 2019, and 2023 General Elections in Nigeria’ Kashere Journal of Politics and International Relations (2025) (3) (4).

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Godwin (n39).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Bayonle (n38).

[49] Kate M. Carter, ‘Technology, Elections, and Democracy in Africa: Evidence From Kenya’ (Phd Dissertation submitted to University of Wisconsin – Madison 2021).

[50] Riccardo Barreli, Mario D’onghia, and Stefano Longari, ‘Toward Secure Electronic Voting: A Suvey on E – Voting Systems and Attacks’ IEEE ACCESS (2022) (1) 99.

[51] Abdurrahman (n40).

[52] Owonikoko Saheed, and Kelvin Ashindorbe, ‘Trend Analysis of Voter Turnout in Nigeria’s General Elections, 1999 – 2023’ The Round Table (2025) (114) (1) 18 – 33.

[53] Mariam Ileyemi, ‘Anambra Voter Turnout Doubles but Still Reflects Low Participation in Nigeria’s Elections’ Premium Times Online News of 10 November 2025 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/834228-anambra-voter-turnout-doubles-but-still-reflects-low-participation-in-nigerias-elections.html> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 12PM.

[54] Iniobong Iwok and Taofeek Oyedokun, ‘Anambra Guber: Why Poor Turnout Reflects Citizens’ Distrust in Electoral Process’ Buinessday Online of 23 November 2025 accessed from <https://businessday.ng/politics/article/anambra-guber-why-poor-turnout-reflects-citizens-distrust-in-electoral-process/> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 21PM.

[55] Godwin (n39).

[56] Ryan D. Williamson, Florian Justwan, and Shaniqua Williams, ‘Examining the Relationship Between Election Administration and Citizen Attitudes’ Journal of Election Administration, Research & Practice (2022) (1) (1).

[57] Electoral Act 2026, Section 60(4).

[58] Oyetola v. INEC (2023) LPELR – 60392 (SC).

[59] Qosim Suleiman, ‘INEC Gives Details of IReV Failure During 2023 Presidential Election’ Premium Times Online of 23 February 2024 accessed from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/671063-inec-gives-details-of-irev-failure-during-2023-presidential-election.html?tztc=1> on 22 March 2026 at 11: 43PM.

[60] Gift Habib and Ayoola Olasupo, ‘Govt Negins Prosecution of INEC Officials, Others for Electoral Fraud’ Punch Online News of 3 March 2024 accessed from <https://punchng.com/govt-begins-prosecution-of-inec-officials-others-for-electoral-fraud/> on 22 March 2026 at 11:51PM.

[61] Omeiza Ajayi, ‘2023 Polls: INEC Prosecutes 774 Electoral Offenders’ Vanguard Online of February 2025 accessed from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/02/2023-polls-inec-prosecutes-774-electoral-offenders/#google_vignette> on 22 March 2026 at 11:13 PM.

[62] Electoral Act 2026, Section 3 (4).

[63] Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, ‘Credibility Threshold for the 2027 Nigeria General Election: A Framework for Electoral Reforms in Nigeria’ (2025) accessed from <https://situationroomng.org/wp-content/uploads/formidable/6/Credibilty-Threshold-for-the-2027-Nigeria-General-Election.pdf> on 22 March 2026 at 11 :49 PM.

[64] Oluwaseyi Kolawole Oladele, ‘Impact of Telecommunications on Global Economic Development’ (2024) accessed from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384964715_Impact_of_Telecommunications_on_Global_Economic_Development on 23 March 2026 at 12:02AM.

[65] Nze (n11).

[66] Ibid.

[67] Adedeji D. Gbadebo, ‘The Role of BVAS in Safeguarding Electoral Integrity: An Evaluation of the 2023 General Elections in FCT Abuja’ Journal of Social Political Sciences (2025) (6) (1).

[68] Lawrence Emma, ‘Cybersecurity in an Increasingly connected World: Threats and Solutions’ (2025) accessed from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390331588_Cybersecurity_in_an_Increasingly_Connected_World_Threats_and_Solutions> on 23 March 2026 at 12:13AM,

[69] Section 150(1)

[70] Emma (n65).

[71] Robinson Tombari Sibe, and Christian Kaunert, ‘Technology, Cybersecurity and the 2023 Elections in Nigeria: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities’ Journal of African Elections (2023) (22) (2) 68.

[72] Ademu Idakwo, ‘Between Reform and Skkepticism: INEC’s Struggle to Regain Public Trust’ Leadership Onlne News of 20 March 2026 accessed from https://leadership.ng/between-reform-and-skepticism-inecs-struggle-to-regain-public-trust/ on 23 March 2026 at 12:33AM.

[73] Musa, and Ahmad (n30).

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