By M.J. Eze, Ll.M., B.C. Obiako, Ll.M., Amb. J.K. Mgbemena, Ll.M., C.K. Anyanwu, Ll.M., P.N. Vitalis, Esq., C.K. Ezeaku, Esq., Precious Chidiadi, Eti Esq., M.C Ndụbuisi Esq.
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ABSTRACT
The Freedom of Information Act 2011 establishes a statutory framework for promoting transparency, accountability and public access to information held by public institutions in Nigeria. Although the Act confers a broad right of access to information and does not generally require an applicant to demonstrate a personal or special interest, that right is subject to statutory limitations, procedural requirements and exemptions. This article examines the scope of the right to access information under the Act and the circumstances in which such access may lawfully be restricted. It considers recent judicial decisions concerning the application of the Act to States of the Federation, the status of public institutions, existing procedures for obtaining public records, the transfer of applications, conditions precedent to litigation, judicial review, the 30-day limitation period and the extension of time by the Court. The article further examines statutory exemptions relating to defence and international affairs, ongoing investigations, personal information, commercial and third-party interests, procurement matters, professional privileges, academic and research materials, examination records, architectural plans and library records. It also considers the public interest override and the statutory duty of partial disclosure or severability. The analysis demonstrates that the Freedom of Information Act provides an important legal mechanism for public accountability while recognising legitimate circumstances in which information may be withheld. The article concludes that the effective exercise of the right to information depends not only on the broad entitlement created by the Act but also on compliance with its procedural requirements and careful consideration of the statutory exemptions and competing interests recognised by Nigerian courts.
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act 2011 was enacted to promote openness, transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs in Nigeria. The Act gives members of the public the right to request information in the custody or possession of public institutions. Importantly, an applicant does not generally have to show a personal or special interest in the information requested. However, the right of access to information is not unlimited. The FOI Act recognises that some information must remain protected. These exemptions cover areas such as ongoing investigations, personal information, confidential commercial information, third-party interests, procurement processes and legally privileged communications. The Nigerian courts have considered several important questions concerning the scope of the Act, including what information may be withheld, who qualifies to make a request, which bodies are subject to the Act, the proper procedure for enforcing the right, and the time within which an action must be commenced. This article examines these issues through the decisions of the Nigerian courts.
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND WHO CAN REQUEST INFORMATION
Under traditional legal rules, you often had to prove a personal connection or direct harm to file a case in court, a requirement known as locus standi. The FOI Act intentionally throws out this requirement.
Section 1 of the Act allows any member of the public to request information from a government body without needing to explain why they want it or how it affects them personally.
In OSAKWE & ORS v. EDOSACA (2025) LPELR-81156(SC), the Supreme Court emphasized that the FOI Act gives every person an inherent right to access public records to hold institutions accountable.
This principle was similarly upheld in ALO v. SPEAKER, ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ANOR (2018) LPELR-45143(CA) and NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ONORI (2023) LPELR-60235(CA), where the Court of Appeal confirmed that promoting transparency in governance is automatically in the public interest.
THE PURPOSE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Supreme Court considered the broader purpose of the Freedom of Information Act in OSAKWE & ORS v. EDOSACA (2025) LPELR-81156(SC).
The Court stated that the purpose of the Act is to make public records and information accessible to members of the public and to provide a means through which the public can hold governments and public institutions accountable.
The Court relied on Section 1 of the Act, which establishes the right of any person to access or request information in the custody or possession of a public official, agency or institution.
The Court emphasised that an applicant does not need to demonstrate a special connection or sufficient interest in the information requested.
per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JSC (Pp. 51–52, Paras. C–E).
APPLICATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TO THE STATES
A particularly important issue considered by the Supreme Court in OSAKWE & ORS v. EDOSACA (2025) LPELR-81156(SC), was whether the FOI Act applies to State governments.
The Supreme Court held that the Act applies to all States of the Federation.
The Court considered Part II, Items 4, 5 and 6 of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. Item 4 gives the National Assembly power to legislate for the Federation or any part thereof concerning archives and public records, while Item 5 permits a State House of Assembly to legislate concerning archives and public records of that State, subject to Item 4.
The Court explained that the expression ‘subject to’ indicates limitation and means that the provision referred to takes precedence. The court also reasoned that public records fall under the Concurrent Legislative List in the Constitution, federal law covers the field and overrides any conflicting or missing state legislation.
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION
The relationship between the Freedom of Information Act and the 1999 Constitution was considered in NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ONORI (2023) LPELR-60235(CA).
The Court considered Sections 1(2) and 1(3) of the FOI Act alongside Sections 6(6)(a), 36(1) and 46(1) of the Constitution.
Section 1(2) provides that an applicant does not need to demonstrate a specific interest in the information requested.
Section 1(3) gives a person entitled to information the right to institute proceedings to compel a public institution to comply with the Act.
The Court held that these provisions do not conflict with the Constitution. The Court explained that the purpose of freedom of information is to reduce secrecy in government and make public institutions accountable to the people.
The Court held that the FOI Act gives a person, group or organisation the necessary right and interest to request information without having to establish a special or personal interest.
DOES THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUIRE AN APPLICANT TO SHOW PERSONAL INTEREST
The question of whether an applicant must demonstrate a specific interest in the information was considered in ALO v. SPEAKER, ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ANOR (2018) LPELR-45143(CA).
Section 1(2) of the Freedom of Information Act expressly provides:
‘An Applicant under this Act needs not demonstrate specific interest in the information being applied for.’
The Court also held that the Act applies to the States and that the audited account of Ondo State requested by the applicant was a public document within Section 102 of the Evidence Act.
The Court considered the applicant’s stated purpose of promoting transparency and accountability in governance to be a public-interest purpose.
WHO IS A PUBLIC INSTITUTION UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act applies to government bodies, agencies, state-owned enterprises, and private companies performing public functions or utilizing public funds. However, it does not cover every prominent professional association.
In OJUKWU v. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION & ORS (2022) LPELR-57895(CA), a lawyer attempted to use the Freedom of Information Act to demand internal financial accounts and committee budgets from the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA).
The Court of Appeal held that the NBA is a private corporate body incorporated with Registered Trustees, not a government agency or public institution under Section 2(7) or Section 31 of the Act.
Furthermore, the Court noted that existing corporate mechanisms, such as obtaining certified annual returns filed at the Corporate Affairs Commission under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, should be used to access such organizational records rather than the Freedom of Information Act.
EXISTING PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION
The Court also considered Section 30(1) of the FOI Act, which provides that the Act is intended to complement, and not replace, existing procedures for accessing public records.
The Court referred to Sections 845–848 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, which require registered trustees of associations to keep accounting records and submit relevant statements, returns and audited accounts to the Corporate Affairs Commission.
The Court held that documents filed with the Corporate Affairs Commission become public documents within the meaning of Section 102(b) of the Evidence Act, and certified copies can be obtained under Section 104 of the Evidence Act.
The Court’s conclusion was that where an existing statutory procedure already provides a means of obtaining the information, that procedure should be followed rather than using the FOI Act to replace it.
See: OLOJEDE v. OLALEYE (2012) LPELR-9845 C.A. at 81–82; KAWU v. MINISTER, FCT (2016) LPELR-41142 C.A. at 8–9; LERE v. LAWAL (2019) LPELR-51313 C.A. at 10;TABIK INVESTMENT LTD v. GTB (2011) LPELR-3131 C.A. at 17–18; ADEYEFA v. BAMGBOYE (2013) LPELR-19891 C.A. at 29–30; and NWABUOKU v. ONWORDI (2006) LPELR-2082 C.A. at 21.
TRANSFER OF APPLICATION FOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Where an applicant submits a request for information to a public institution, that institution may not always be the primary custodian or the body with the primary interest in the subject matter. Section 5(1) of the FOI Act establishes a statutory mechanism allowing public institutions to transfer requests to the appropriate body. It provides:
‘Where a public institution receives an application for access to information, and the institution is of the view that another public institution has greater interest in the information, the institution to which the application is made may within 3 days but not later than 7 days after the application is received, transfer the application, and if necessary, the information to the other public institution in which case, the institution transferring the application shall give written notice of the transfer to the applicant, which notice shall contain a statement informing the applicant that such decision to transfer the application can be reviewed by the Court.’
The statutory scope and legal effect of Section 5(1) were judicially interpreted in the Federal High Court decision of OGBE v. PARRADANG & ORS (Suit No: FHC/L/CS/336/14, Lagos Division).
In that case, the 3rd and 6th Respondents relied on Section 5(1) to forward the Applicant’s request to another Respondent. The Federal High Court held that Section 5(1) provides a clear, lawful alternative mode of responding to an application rather than issuing an outright refusal under Section 7(1). The Court held:
The language of S.5[1] is unambiguous. It is an alternative mode of response to an application for access to information. It provides an alternative to refusal under S.7[1] of the FOI Act. It allows discretion to the public institution to which the application is made, to forward it to another public institution that the former believes has greater interest in the information sought. The first instance public institution can forward the application, irrespective of it being in possession of the information sought, without the necessity of disclosing the information to the Applicant. That is the clear language and import of S.5[1] of the FOI Act and is improper to seek to add anything to it that is not contemplated.’
This decision clarifies that a public institution acts strictly within its statutory rights when it transfers a request to another public body with greater interest. Crucially, the transferring institution may do so even if it physically possesses the requested records, without being required to disclose them directly to the applicant at that stage, provided the transfer is executed within 3 to 7 days with proper written notice given to the applicant.
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO INSTITUTING AN ACTION UNDER THE FOI ACT
While Section 1 of the FOI Act dispenses with the traditional requirement of demonstrating a personal interest or harm to establish locus standi, an applicant must nonetheless strictly comply with the statutory condition precedent before instituting court proceedings under Section 20.
The crucial issue of compliance with conditions precedent was considered in NJOKU v. CCB & ORS (2022) LPELR-58432(CA). In that case, the Appellant, describing himself as an anti-corruption crusader, approached the Court below to compel the Code of Conduct Bureau (1st Respondent) to release the Asset Declaration Forms submitted by a public officer (3rd Respondent). However, the Appellant had neither formally requested the forms from the 1st Respondent nor suffered a refusal prior to filing the suit.
The Court of Appeal held that submitting an actual application for information to the public institution and being denied (or deemed denied) is a mandatory condition precedent to instituting court proceedings under Section 20 of the FOI Act. Per Rita Nosakhare Pemu, JCA (Pp. 7–10, Paras. F–A):
The Appellant has submitted that because he is an anti-corruption crusader, he has the locus standi to institute the action as he did. But the Appellant has not shown by his affidavit any of his right that had been infringed. To be an anti-corruption crusader does not necessarily vest him with the requisite interest… There is nothing to show that the Appellant wielded, or attempted to wield this provision. The condition precedent for bringing the action, the subject matter of this appeal was not complied with. There is nothing to show that the Appellant applied for the Asset Declaration Form of the 3rd Respondent, neither had he applied for a review of the matter within 30 days after he was denied… It is apparent that the Appellant by operation of law did not possess the necessary locus standi; as he failed to comply with the condition precedent to assuming locus standi.’
This decision establishes that self-described status as an anti-corruption crusader or public interest advocate does not exempt a litigant from fulfilling statutory conditions precedent. Without evidence of a prior formal request for information and a subsequent denial by the public institution, any court action filed to compel disclosure is premature and legally incompetent.
REMEDY WHERE INFORMATION IS REFUSED
The remedy available where a public institution refuses to release information was restated in SAMSUNG HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD v. OWUBOKIRI & ORS (2025) LPELR-82419(CA).
The Court held simply that:
‘A refusal to release information has a remedy provided for under Section 20 of FOI Act, which lies in an action in judicial review.’
The decision therefore reinforces the position that judicial review is the appropriate mechanism for challenging a refusal under the Freedom of Information Act.
IS LEAVE OF COURT REQUIRED BEFORE COMMENCING AN ACTION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW?
The procedure for enforcing the right to information was considered in LAWYERS NETWORK AGAINST CORRUPTION LTD/GTE v. CBN (2025) LPELR-81220(CA).
The issue was whether an applicant must first obtain the leave of Court before commencing an action for judicial review under the FOI Act.
The Court of Appeal held that prior leave is not required.
The Court relied on Section 21 of the FOI Act, which provides that an application made under Section 20 shall be heard and determined summarily.
According to the Court, the requirement of summary hearing means that the applicant should not be subjected to procedural hurdles that could delay access to the Court.
Section 20 gives an applicant whose request has been refused 30 days within which to apply to Court for a review. Requiring the applicant to first obtain leave could create a situation where the 30-day period expires before the application for leave is determined.
The Court therefore held that the normal procedure under Order 34 Rule 3(1) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019, which ordinarily requires leave before an application for judicial review, does not apply to an application brought under Sections 20 and 21 of the FOI Act.
The Court also stressed the principle that Rules of Court cannot override an Act of the National Assembly.
The decision was that an applicant under the FOI Act does not need to obtain leave before approaching the Court for judicial review.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS PROPER PROCEDURE
The proper method of commencing an FOI action was considered in REVENUE TRANSPARENCY PROJECT & ORS v. EDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ANOR (2022) LPELR-57774(CA).
Section 20 of the FOI Act provides that an applicant who has been denied access to information may apply to Court for a review within 30 days of the refusal or deemed refusal.
The marginal note to Section 20 is ‘Judicial Review.’
The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in SKYE BANK v. IWU (2017) LPELR-42595(SC), where KEKERE-EKUN, JSC explained that although a marginal note does not form part of an enactment, it may be helpful in determining the purpose of a provision and the mischief it is intended to address.
The Court also relied on IDEHEN v. IDEHEN (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 198) 382 and O.S.I.E.C v. A.C. (2010) 12 SC (Pt. IV) 108
The Court explained that judicial review is the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court over the decisions and actions of inferior Courts, tribunals and governmental bodies. It is concerned primarily with the legality of the decision or action rather than substituting the Court’s own decision for that of the public authority.
The Court held that judicial review is the appropriate procedure for enforcing the FOI Act.
It nevertheless recognised that a party should not necessarily lose a properly claimed relief merely because it was brought under the wrong procedural law. In that regard, it referred to.
See: FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA v. GOLD (2007) LPELR-1287(SC).
THE 30-DAY TIME LIMIT
Section 20 of the FOI Act provides that an applicant who has been denied information may apply to Court within 30 days of the refusal or deemed refusal, subject to any further time allowed by the Court.
The importance of this deadline was emphasised in ONORI v. NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (2023) LPELR-60229(CA).
The Court held that the applicant had 30 days from the date the information was deemed refused to approach the Court.
The Court rejected the argument that the limitation period under the Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2006 applied instead. The Court explained that the action arose from the alleged denial of access under the Freedom of Information Act and was brought under that Act.
The Court therefore applied the 30-day period in Section 20.
The same position was stated in SAMSUNG HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD v. OWUBOKIRI & ORS (2025) LPELR-82419(CA), where the Court held:
‘An action for Freedom of Information must be filed within 30 days of the refusal.’
An earlier decision, GOVERNOR OF DELTA STATE v. OLUKUNLE (2020) LPELR-51263(CA), similarly treated the 30-day period as applicable. In that case, the application was filed five days outside the prescribed period.
The Court held that the action was instituted out of time.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ENLARGE/EXTEND TIME
While the 30-day timeframe is strict, Section 20 of the Act expressly grants the Court discretionary power to extend the period. The statute provides that an applicant may apply to Court within 30 days “or within such further time as the Court may either before or after the expiration of the 30 days fix or allow.”
The scope of this judicial discretion was comprehensively addressed in INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE CITIZENS ASSISTANCE CENTRE v. IKUFORIJI & ANOR (2026) LPELR-83710(CA), where Uwabunkeonye Onwosi, JCA (Pp. 22–23, Paras. C–A) stated:
Section 20 Freedom of Information Act, 2011 provides thus: ‘Any applicant who has been denied access to information, or a part thereof, may apply to the Court for a review of the matter within 30 days after the public institution denies or is deemed to have denied the application, or within such further time as the Court may either before or after the expiration of the 30 days fix or allow.” Indeed, under Section 20 of the Freedom of Information Act, 2011, where an Applicant is denied access to the information, the Trial Court is empowered to extend the time within which he can bring application to review such denial of access to the information by the public institution. However, by the wording and in the last limb of the above provision, it is entirely at the discretion of the Court.”
Consequently, where an applicant fails to file within the initial 30 days, the delay is not automatically fatal to the suit, provided the applicant formally applies to the Court for an enlargement/extension of time and the Court exercises its discretion to grant it.
WHEN THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT WILL NOT AVAIL AN APPLICANT
The limits of the FOI Act were again considered in COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION v. AMU & ORS (2025) LPELR-81751(CA).
The Court held that the refusal to release information fell within the exemptions under Section 12(1)(a)(iii) and (v).
The information concerned persons who were not parties to the proceedings. The Court relied on the principle that a Court cannot make an order affecting the rights or interests of a person who is not a party to the action.
The Court also relied extensively on CBN & ANOR v. PPDC LTD/GTE (2018) LPELR-45856(CA) and held that information concerning third parties may be protected where disclosure would interfere with administrative proceedings, deprive a person of a fair hearing or otherwise fall within the statutory exemptions.
The Court concluded that the trial Court was wrong to grant the requested reliefs because the information fell within the exemptions in Section 12(1)(a)(ii), (iii) and (iv).
STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
While the Freedom of Information Act was enacted with the primary intention of making public records accessible, that right is not absolute. To protect national security, professional confidentiality, individual privacy, commercial integrity, academic independence, and administrative efficiency, the Act outlines specific statutory exemptions under which public institutions may lawfully deny an application for information.
1) Defence and International Affairs
Under Section 11(1) of the Act, a public institution may deny an application for any information if its disclosure may be injurious to:
The conduct of international affairs; or
The defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2)Ongoing Administrative or Criminal Investigations
Public institutions can legally deny requests if releasing records would interfere with law enforcement, criminal prosecutions, or ongoing administrative proceedings.
In CBN & ANOR v. PPDC LTD/GTE (2018) LPELR-45856(CA), the Central Bank of Nigeria refused to disclose contract details for the Treasury Single Account (TSA) platform because the contract was actively under investigation by the House of Representatives, EFCC, and the Ministry of Finance. The Court of Appeal agreed that disclosing records under active investigation falls squarely under Section 12(1)(a).
3) Commercial, Third-Party Rights, and Procurement Integrity
Where requested records involve private entities or commercial transactions, public authorities are bound to protect trade secrets and proprietary data.
Section 15(1)(a) protects trade secrets and commercial or financial information where the information is proprietary, privileged, or confidential, or where disclosure could harm third-party interests.
Section 15(1)(b) protects information where disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual obligations.
Section 15(1)(c) protects contract proposals and bids where disclosure could frustrate procurement or grant an unfair advantage.
In CBN & ANOR v. PPDC LTD/GTE (2018) LPELR-45856(CA), the Court held that fee details belonging to Systemspecs Nigeria Limited were protected under Section 15(1)(a). The Court emphasised that where an order would affect a third party’s legal or financial interests, that third party must be joined to the suit, citing Sheriff & Anor v. PDP & Ors (2017) LPELR-41805(CA).
4) Statutory Professional Privileges
Section 16 explicitly expands the scope of privileged communications that a public institution may rely upon to deny access to records. Under Section 16, a public institution may deny an application for information that is subject to:
(a) Legal practitioner-client privilege;
(b) Health workers-client privilege;
(c) Journalism confidentiality privileges; and
(d) Any other professional privileges conferred by an Act of the National Assembly.
In INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF PAACA v. A-G. FEDERATION (2025) LPELR-80300(CA), the Court considered whether legal communications were protected under Section 16 of the Act. The Court confirmed that Section 16 protects attorney-client communications, holding that communications between the Minister of Justice and external counsel hired to recover looted Abacha assets were privileged and exempt from disclosure. Per Okon Efreti Abang, JCA (Pp. 43–43, Paras. A–D).
5) Course and Research Materials
To preserve academic freedom, intellectual property, and institutional independence in higher education and research, Section 17 provides:
‘A public institution may deny an application for information which contains course or research materials prepared by faculty members.’
6) Examinations, Architectural Plans, and Library Records
Section 19(1) addresses specific operational and administrative records, empowering a public institution to deny applications containing:
(a) Academic and Licensing Examination Data:
Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to administer academic examinations or determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or employment;
(b) Architectural and Engineering Plans:
Plans for buildings not constructed in whole or in part with public funds, as well as plans for buildings constructed with public funds to the extent that disclosure would compromise public safety or security; and
(c) Library User Records:
Library circulation records and other identifying records that connect specific library users with specific borrowing materials.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST OVERRIDE TEST
A critical feature of the Freedom of Information Act is that statutory exemptions do not operate as an absolute shield against disclosure. Even where information falls within certain exempt categories, the legislature has built in a balancing mechanism known as the Public Interest Override.
Specifically, under Section 11(2) (governing Defence and International Affairs) and Section 19(2) (governing Examination Data, Architectural Plans, and Library Records), the Act explicitly provides:
‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, an application for information shall not be denied where the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs whatever injury that disclosure would cause.’
This statutory test mandates a judicial or administrative balancing exercise:
Identify the Injury: Assess the potential harm or injury disclosure might cause to international relations, national defence, building security, or examination integrity.
Weigh the Public Interest: Evaluate the public benefit derived from transparency, accountability, exposure of wrongdoing, or public oversight.
Apply the Override: Where the public interest in disclosure is greater than the anticipated injury, the exemption collapses, and the public institution is legally bound to release the information.
DUTY OF PARTIAL DISCLOSURE AND SEVERABILITY
Public institutions frequently issue blanket refusals whenever a requested document or file contains sensitive or exempt material. Section 18 of the FOI Act explicitly prohibits blanket denials by establishing the rule of Severability / Partial Disclosure.
Section 18 provides:
‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where an application is made to a public institution for information which is exempted from disclosure by virtue of this Act, the institution shall disclose any part of the information that does not contain such exempted information.’
Under Section 18:
Public institutions are under a statutory duty to redact or sever only the specific portions of a record that fall under a statutory exemption (e.g., personal identifiers, trade secrets, or defence secrets).
The remainder of the document containing non-exempt, public-interest information must be disclosed to the applicant.
An outright denial of an entire document or file where non-exempt portions can be severed constitutes an unlawful breach of the Act.
PUBLIC FUNDS AND OVERHEAD COST
A more recent decision dealing with financial information is INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE CITIZENS ASSISTANCE CENTRE v. IKUFORIJI & ANOR (2026) LPELR-83710(CA).
The information requested in that case concerned “overhead cost releases”.
The Court explained that overhead costs generally refer to routine administrative and operational expenses necessary for the day-to-day running of a public institution. They may include utilities, maintenance, stationery, logistics and other operational expenses.
The Court distinguished such information from personal information relating to employees or public officials.
Section 14(1) of the FOI Act protects personal information, including personnel files and personal information maintained in respect of employees, appointees or elected officials.
The lower Court had treated the requested information as exempt under Section 14(1)(b).
The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that information concerning overhead cost releases relates to the allocation and use of public funds by a public institution. It does not constitute personnel files or personal information merely because employees may be involved in the institution’s operations.
The Court stated that the purpose of Section 14 is to protect individual privacy and not to shield public institutions from legitimate scrutiny concerning the expenditure of public funds.
CONCLUSION
The decisions considered above show that the Freedom of Information Act 2011 creates a broad right of access to public information, but that right operates within clearly defined legal limits.
The courts have consistently recognised several important principles. First, an applicant generally does not need to demonstrate a personal or special interest before requesting information. Secondly, the Act applies to public institutions and extends to the States of the Federation. Thirdly, where access is refused, the applicant may seek judicial review under Section 20 of the Act, for which leave is not required. Fourthly, the right to information is subject to statutory exemptions. Information relating to ongoing investigations, administrative enforcement proceedings, personal information, confidential commercial information, third-party interests, procurement matters and legally privileged communications may be protected from disclosure. Fifthly, the 30-day period in Section 20 is significant. An applicant challenging a refusal must ordinarily approach the Court within 30 days of the refusal or deemed refusal, subject to any extension permitted by the Court. Finally, the cases show that the FOI Act should not be understood simply as a general right to obtain every document held by every organisation. The identity of the institution, the nature of the information requested, the existence of statutory exemptions, the interests of third parties and the procedure used to obtain the information can all affect whether disclosure can properly be ordered. The overall approach of the courts therefore reflects a balance between two important interests: the public’s right to know and the legitimate need to protect information whose disclosure could prejudice investigations, privacy, commercial interests, legal privilege or the rights of third parties. The Freedom of Information Act remains an important legal tool for transparency and accountability, but its use must be consistent with the limits and procedures established by the Act and interpreted by the courts.
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