A Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Chief J. S. Okutepa, has argued that the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Independent National Electoral Commission v Zenith Labour Party cannot realistically be confined to political parties alone, and that the electoral fate of candidates sponsored by a party rendered ineligible to field candidates is inseparable from the legal fate of that party.
![](https://thenigerialawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-IDRI-Masterclass.png")
In a commentary titled “The INEC vs. Zenith Labour Party judgment: why its effect cannot be confined to political parties alone,” Okutepa said the judgment, delivered on 24 September 2026 in Appeal No. SC/CV/495/2026, had “generated an important constitutional and electoral question that needs to be carefully interrogated.”
The question, he said, is “can a judgment which declares a political party ineligible to field candidates realistically be said to affect only the political party and not the candidates whom that party seeks to sponsor to contest the said elections.”
Okutepa recorded that the Supreme Court “restored the validity of sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026,” and held that the statutory provisions governing party membership registers and candidate nomination are not inconsistent with the Constitution.
He noted the consequence the Act attaches to default. Section 84(2), he wrote, “provides a serious statutory consequence for a political party that fails to comply with the requirement to submit its membership register as prescribed by the Electoral Act 2026. It is to the effect that the party becomes ineligible to field a candidate for the election.”
He acknowledged the distinction the Court drew. “In the lead judgment of the Court, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished between the ineligibility of the political party to field candidates and the personal qualification of an individual candidate. On that interpretation, the statutory default does not, in itself, pronounce the individual candidate personally disqualified, their lordships reasoned.”
Okutepa then put his central objection.
“With respect, however, that distinction raises a further constitutional question which deserves serious consideration. A candidate cannot exist electorally in a vacuum. Nigeria does not presently operate a general system of independent candidacy.”
He grounded the point in the Constitution. “The Constitution makes party membership and sponsorship integral to qualification for several elective offices. For example, section 131(c) of the 1999 Constitution requires a presidential candidate to be a member of a political party and sponsored by that political party. Section 177(c) of the same Constitution contains the corresponding requirement for a governorship candidate. Similar constitutional provisions apply to membership of the National and State Houses of Assembly.”
He added that the Supreme Court “has previously recognised that Nigerian electoral law does not recognise independent candidacy under the constitutional framework in several of its decisions.”
“This produces an important legal relationship,” Okutepa wrote. “It is political parties that nominate and sponsor candidates to contest elections in Nigeria. The candidate’s legal capacity to participate in the election is therefore not completely independent of the legal capacity of the sponsoring political party.”
“If the law says that a political party ‘shall not be eligible to field a candidate,’ the immediate prohibition is undoubtedly imposed upon the party. But the practical and constitutional consequence is that the candidate cannot simply step outside the party structure and say: ‘Although my party cannot field me, I remain an independent candidate.’ There is presently no such general constitutional route.”
He concluded on that limb: “The apparent distinction between party ineligibility and candidate qualification is, with respect, a distinction without practical utilitarian value in law and constitution.”
Okutepa was careful to preserve the distinction even while criticising its utility.
“There is a legitimate distinction between whether a person possesses the personal qualifications prescribed by the Constitution; and whether the political party through which that person must contest is legally entitled to sponsor and field him,” he wrote.
“The first concerns the candidate personally. The second concerns the legal validity of the candidate’s electoral platform. The two questions should not be conflated. But neither should they be treated as completely unrelated.”
“A person may satisfy every personal qualification prescribed by the Constitution — age, citizenship, education and other requirements — and yet still be unable to contest a particular election if the constitutional requirement of party membership and sponsorship is not satisfied.”
He cited authority for treating sponsorship as part of the qualification framework, referring to Rt. Hon. Prince Terhemen Tarzoor v Ortom Samuel Ioraer & Ors, in which the Court considered section 177(c), and to Amaechi v INEC, in which, he said, the Court “observed that Nigerian law did not recognise independent candidacy and emphasised the centrality of the sponsoring political party to the electoral process.”
“Consequently,” he wrote, “party eligibility and candidate eligibility are analytically distinct but electorally interconnected.”
Okutepa set out the problem as a worked example.
“Suppose Party Zero fails to comply with section 77 and, by operation of section 77(7), becomes ineligible to field candidates. Candidate A has been nominated by Party Zero. Can Candidate A nevertheless contest the election? If the answer is yes, the immediate question is under whose sponsorship?”
“If the answer is that Candidate A can contest without Party Zero, the legal system would effectively have created independent candidacy by judicial interpretation. But the Constitution does not presently provide such a general mechanism.”
“If the answer is that Candidate A must continue to be sponsored by Party Zero, the next question becomes unavoidable: how can a party which the Electoral Act says is not eligible to field a candidate validly sponsor one? That is the constitutional tension which the present controversy exposes.”
Okutepa was explicit that he was not asserting that the Court had disqualified anyone.
“The proper argument is not that the Supreme Court expressly held that every affected candidate is automatically disqualified. The judgment says otherwise. The statutory sanction is directed at the party’s eligibility to field candidates and does not, by itself, pronounce every individual member personally disqualified.”
“Rather, the argument is that the legal consequence for the party necessarily has consequences for the electoral status of candidates who derive their right to contest from that party’s sponsorship.”
“That distinction is important. A candidate may not be personally disqualified in the abstract, yet may be incapable of lawfully contesting through a party that is itself legally incapable of fielding a candidate. That is not the same thing as saying that the Supreme Court has personally disqualified the candidate.”
He urged a holistic reading. “The Constitution must be read as a whole. The Constitution should not be interpreted in isolated compartments.”
Okutepa proposed that the decision be understood as having two dimensions.
“The first is the direct statutory consequence: a political party which falls within the sanction prescribed by section 77 may become ineligible to field candidates.”
“The second is the consequential constitutional question: what is the legal status of a candidate whose only constitutional route into the election is through the sponsorship of that very political party? That question cannot be answered simply by saying that the candidate has not been personally disqualified.”
He added the formulation on which his argument rests: “The absence of personal disqualification does not necessarily create a positive right to contest an election. Qualification to contest requires satisfaction of the constitutional conditions for candidacy, including, where applicable, party membership and sponsorship.”
“Thus, although the Supreme Court’s judgment may be said technically to operate directly against the political party, its consequences cannot, in practical and constitutional terms, be divorced from the candidates whose participation in the election depends upon the party’s lawful capacity to sponsor and field them.”
“Indeed, the present controversy demonstrates a fundamental feature of Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence: in a system without general independent candidacy, the legal fate of the political party and the electoral fate of its candidate are inevitably connected.”
Okutepa noted that the electoral commission had acknowledged that the judgment “has generated complaints from political parties, aspirants and others,” and was reviewing the certified true copy of the decision following its receipt on 6 October 2026.
“The ultimate issue, therefore, is not merely whether the party is disqualified,” he wrote. “It is whether, under a constitutional system in which party sponsorship is an essential component of candidacy, a candidate can lawfully contest an election where the sponsoring party itself is legally prohibited from fielding candidates. That is the deeper constitutional question which the judgment has brought into sharp focus.”
He closed with the practical consequence he foresees.
“For me, although the ground of disqualification to question election has been removed from the Electoral Act 2026, the constitutional ground of disqualification can be raised in election petitions against any candidate sponsored by political parties that are disqualified from fielding candidates. The last has not been heard on this matter.”
[A MUST HAVE] Evidence Act Demystified With Recent And Contemporary Cases And Materials
Available now for NGN 40,000 at ASC Publications, 10, Boyle Street, Onikan, Lagos. Beside High Court, TBS. Email publications@ayindesanni.com or WhatsApp +2347056667384. Purchase Link: https://paystack.com/buy/evidence-act-complete-annotation
______________________________________________________________________ “Enhance Legal Practice With Authoritative Reports” — Alexander Payne Offers Comprehensive Law Reports, Spanning Over A Century Of Nigerian Jurisprudence
Interested buyers are encouraged to place their orders and enquiries via:
0704 444 4777, 0704 444 4999, 0818 199 9888
Website: www.alexandernigeria.com
