The Federal High Court sitting in Abuja has held that the enforcement of a Direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, at a time when no effective appellate mechanism exists, is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of fair hearing and of judicial power, and has restrained the respondents from giving effect to the Direction until an avenue of appeal is provided.
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Judgment was delivered on Monday, 28 September 2026 by Honourable Justice Obiora Atuegwu Egwuatu in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1954/2026, Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN v The Body of Benchers & 4 Ors.
The respondents are the Body of Benchers, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court, Mr. Chris Alashi and Mr. Ocha P. Ulegede. The certified true copy of the judgment was issued on 30 September 2026.
How The Suit Was Brought
The suit was initiated by a motion ex parte dated 18 August and filed on 19 August 2026, seeking leave to apply for judicial review and an order of certiorari removing into the court and quashing the Direction of the second respondent in Complaint No. BB/LPDC/1314/2024, delivered on 29 July 2026.
Pursuant to leave granted on 20 August 2026, the applicant filed an originating summons dated and filed on 21 August 2026, posing three questions and seeking five principal reliefs together with an omnibus relief.
The application was supported by an affidavit of 45 paragraphs deposed to by the applicant, with documents marked Exhibits JKG-OS1 to JKG-OS5, an affidavit of non-multiplicity of suit and a written address. In opposition, the first and second respondents filed a joint counter-affidavit of 16 paragraphs deposed to by Mr. Abiodun Shogbola on 28 August 2026, with a written address.
The Questions
The first question was whether the Direction is liable to judicial review and liable to be quashed by an order of certiorari in the circumstances of the case.
The second was whether the implementation or enforcement of the Direction, in circumstances where the applicant alleges that no effective appellate mechanism presently exists, is compatible with sections 36(1), 36(2) and 6(6)(b) of the Constitution.
The third was whether the court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, ought to grant certiorari together with such declaratory and consequential reliefs as are necessary to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the impugned Direction.
The Reliefs Sought
The applicant sought a declaration that the implementation or enforcement of the Direction, as it affects him, in the absence of an effective appellate mechanism, is inconsistent with sections 36(1), 36(2) and 6(6)(b) of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional, unlawful and liable to judicial review.
He sought an order of certiorari removing into the court and quashing the Direction as it affects him, for violation of the principle of natural justice and contravention of section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution.
He sought an order restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, privies or otherwise howsoever, from implementing, publishing, transmitting, enforcing or otherwise giving effect to the Direction as it affects him; an order restraining the third respondent from making or causing to be made any disciplinary notation against him pursuant to the Direction; and an order restraining the publication or dissemination of the Direction as a final disciplinary determination as it affects him.
Jurisdiction
On jurisdiction, the court held that the Body of Benchers is an agency of the Federal Government, being federally funded and enjoying appropriation and release of funds from the National Judicial Council.
“It could not therefore be argued as was done by the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ counsel that the 1st Respondent is not an agency of the Federal Government,” the court held.
“In the circumstances of this case, the facts considered, the 1st Respondent being an Agency of the Federal Government, the High Court of the States or of the FCT will not have jurisdiction. The LPA is a federal legislation applicable throughout the Federation; the 1st and 2nd Respondents are statutory creations under the LPA. Of note is the statutory and institutional character of the 1st Respondent and the nature of the public power exercised under the LPA.”
The court relied on Ndukwe v LPDC & Anor (2007) LPELR-1978(SC), in which the Supreme Court agreed that the Committee is an administrative tribunal or body exercising quasi-judicial functions; on LPDC v Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 300, in which the Committee was treated as a tribunal whose exercise of disciplinary authority is subject to the requirements of natural justice and fair hearing; and on Ben Mene-Ejegi v Nigerian Bar Association & Anor, in which the apex court reiterated that the Committee is a quasi-adjudicatory body performing adjudicatory functions.
Abuse Of Process
The fourth respondent argued that the suit was an abuse of court process because the applicant had filed a notice of appeal against the Direction to the Supreme Court seeking the same reliefs.
Examining the exhibit, the court held that while the notice of appeal was filed before the second respondent and the appeal was therefore deemed to have been brought, it had not been entered before the Supreme Court.
It relied on Ezomo v Attorney-General, Bendel State (1986) LPELR-1215(SC), in which the Supreme Court held that an appeal is brought when the notice has been properly filed in the court below, and is only entered when the appellate court has received the record of appeal.
The Appellate Vacuum
The core of the judgment concerns the absence of any route of appeal.
The court recorded that it was not contested that by section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act, a person against whom a Direction has been issued may, within 28 days from the date of service of notice of the Direction, appeal to the Supreme Court.
A Direction was issued against the applicant on 29 July 2026 in Complaint No. BB/LPDC/1314/2024. Dissatisfied, and in exercise of his right of appeal, he caused a letter dated 4 August 2026 to be written to the Body of Benchers requesting the constitution or operationalisation of its Appeal Committee and facilitation of his notice of appeal, with a copy of the notice attached.
By letter dated 13 August 2026, the Body of Benchers informed him, relying on Ben Mene-Ejegi, that there is presently no statutory provision establishing an Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers with jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the decisions or Directions of the Committee, and that the Revised Act does not provide for an Appeal Committee.
The court then set out the chronology.
“Judgment in Ben Mene-Ejegi’s case was delivered on the 26th of June, 2026,” it noted. “Meanwhile, on the 1st of July, 2026, the 2nd Respondent, despite the Supreme Court decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi’s case, sat and heard the case against the Applicant and delivered her Direction on the 29th of July, 2026.”
“At the time of the delivery of the Direction, the 2nd Respondent was fully aware of the Supreme Court decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi’s case wherein the Supreme Court struck down section 12(7) of the LPA thus effectively removing a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the Direction of the LPDC, and the 1st Respondent knew that the Body of Benchers had no Appeal Committee in place.”
“As it stands now, there is no appellate remedy for the Applicant because the Appeal Committee of the 1st Respondent was abolished by the 1994 Decree and replaced with the direct appeals to the Supreme Court vide section 12(7) of the LPA which the Supreme Court in her decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi’s case struck down, thus leaving no statutory route for appeal.”
Section 36(2)(b)
The court set out section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution, under which a law shall not be invalidated by reason only that it confers on any government or authority power to determine questions arising in the administration of a law affecting the civil rights and obligations of any person, if such law contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive.
“The above provision is a constitutional protection against the Direction of an Administering authority being final and conclusive,” the court held. “In other words, a Direction or decision of an Administering Authority cannot be final but admits of an appeal to a higher body. In the circumstances where the Direction of the 2nd Respondent becomes final, it is against or contrary to the provision of section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution.”
It then posed the practical question: “In the circumstances of this case, will it be justice to allow the Direction to be implemented? What happens if eventually an Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers is put in place and the Applicant succeeds in his appeal and by which time, the Applicant would have served the punishment contained in the Direction? Wherein lies his remedy?”
Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium
“The law has always been that where there is a right there is a remedy,” the court held, invoking the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium, “one of the oldest principles of law and the fulcrum of justice.”
It cited Baba-Yusuf v Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc (2025) LPELR-80393(CA) and Lau v PDP & Ors (2017) LPELR-42800(SC), in which the Supreme Court held that the maxim “is a principle of justice of universal validity couched in Latin and available to all legal systems involved in the impartial administration of justice. It enjoins the Courts to provide a remedy whenever the Plaintiff has established a right. The Court obviously cannot do otherwise.”
It also cited INEC v APC & Ors (2023) LPELR-59769(CA), Orianzi v Attorney-General, Rivers State (2017) LPELR 41737, BFI Group Corporation v BPE (2012) LPELR 9339 and Eze v Governor of Abia State (2014) LPELR 23276.
What The Applicant Did Not Ask For
The court was careful to record the limits of the case before it.
“I agree with the Applicant, that the implementation of the Direction issued by the 2nd Respondent in the circumstances where no effective statutory appellate mechanism is available to the Applicant raises a serious question of constitutional fair hearing and the legality of the disciplinary process.”
“However, I note that the Applicant did not approach this Court to relitigate the disciplinary complaint or to challenge the correctness of the findings of fact made by the 2nd Respondent or as an appeal against the Direction of the 2nd Respondent. In fact, the Applicant admitted that he fully participated in the proceedings giving rise to the Direction. His case is anchored on the apparent and effective denial of the right of appeal because there exists no effective avenue for an appeal.”
“It will work injustice on the Applicant in the circumstances of this case to allow the implementation of the Direction against the Applicant while denying him his constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal against the Direction issued by the 2nd Respondent due to no fault of the Applicant.”
The Holdings
“It is on the basis of the above that I find some merit in this Application,” the court held, making three holdings.
First, that the Direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee dated 29 July 2026 is liable to judicial review.
Second, that the implementation or enforcement of the Direction, in circumstances where no effective appellate mechanism presently exists, is not compatible with sections 36(1), 36(2) and 6(6)(b) of the Constitution.
Third, that the court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, ought to grant certiorari together with such declaratory and consequential reliefs as are necessary to prevent unconstitutional implementation of the Direction.
The Orders
The court made four orders.
A declaration that the implementation or enforcement of the Direction, as it affects the applicant, in the absence of an effective appellate mechanism, is inconsistent with sections 36(1), 36(2) and 6(6)(b) of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, unlawful and liable to judicial review.
An order restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, privies or otherwise howsoever, from implementing, publishing, transmitting, enforcing or otherwise giving effect to the Direction as it affects the applicant, “until such a time that the Appeal Committee of the 1st Respondent is put in place or such other avenue for appeal is set up to enable the Applicant exercise his constitutional right of appeal.”
An order restraining the third respondent from making or causing to be made any disciplinary notation against the applicant pursuant to the Direction, until such a time as the applicant has been provided an avenue to exercise his constitutional right of appeal within the time allowed for such an appeal.
An order restraining the publication or dissemination of the Direction as a final disciplinary determination, as it affects the applicant, until such a time as he has been provided an avenue to exercise that right.
“The other reliefs are refused,” the court held. “I make no order as to cost.”
Appearances
The applicant and the fifth respondent were present; the others were absent.
Professor Maxwell Gidado, SAN, Professor Paul Idornigie, SAN, Mr. Fredick E. Itula, SAN, Mr. Clement Onwuenwunor, SAN, Mr. Johnny Agim, SAN, and Mr. Uche Njoku, SAN, appeared with a large team including Mr. Mohammed Monguno, Mr. Emmanuel S. Oluwabiyi, Mr. Gabriel Tsenyen, Mr. Oluniyi Adediji, Mr. Ezenwa Ibegbunam, Mr. Chidera Mgbe, Mr. Darlington Onyekwere, Mr. Mark Agbo, Mr. Kingdom Okeke, Mr. Jerry Mbugadu, Mr. Madu Joe-Kyari Gadzama, Ms. Sarah Jeta Atumga, Mr. Onyekachi Eluwa, Mr. Gideon Ohiani Agbedo, Ms. Hajara Mohammed Sorondinki, Ms. Lois Belema Bamson, Ms. Mercy Alabi, Ms. Idara Umoh, Ms. Isabel-Crystal Bologi, Mr. Jiro Ominimini, Ms. Safiya Auwal, Mr. A. A. Owurung and Mr. F. E. Iwok for the applicant.
Dr. A. Amin appeared with Mr. A. A. Shogbola, Mr. F. O. Eje and Mr. O. A. Ogiemudia for the first and second respondents; Mr. K. A. Daodu with Mr. B. S. Tabji and Mr. M. Shuaibu for the third respondent; Mr. I. J. Mbatsavdue with Mr. Onyechi Egwuonwu and Mr. M. P. Anaukyaa for the fourth respondent; and Mr. O. D. Ulegede with Mr. S. A. Odiba for the fifth respondent.
The certified judgment is narrower than the account of it that circulated on the day of delivery, and the difference matters.
The court did not quash the Direction. Certiorari, which was the second relief sought, falls within the words “the other reliefs are refused.” The Direction therefore stands. What the court did was declare its enforcement unconstitutional while no appeal lies, and restrain the respondents from giving effect to it until an Appeal Committee is constituted or another avenue of appeal is set up. The suspension is conditional and temporary by design: once a route of appeal exists, the restraint by its own terms falls away and the applicant must use that route within the time allowed. Nor did the court hold that the Committee lacked jurisdiction. It held the opposite in substance, confirming that the Committee is a quasi-judicial body properly exercising disciplinary authority, and the applicant himself did not challenge its findings or the correctness of the Direction.
The sharpest passage in the judgment is the chronology, and it is a direct criticism of the Committee. The Supreme Court decided Ben Mene-Ejegi on 26 June 2026. On 1 July, five days later, the Committee sat on this complaint, and on 29 July it delivered a Direction suspending the applicant from practice. The court found that at the time it did so the Committee was fully aware that the only statutory route of appeal had been struck down, and that the Body of Benchers knew it had no Appeal Committee in place. A disciplinary body which proceeds to sanction a practitioner knowing that he has nowhere to appeal is the mischief the judgment addresses, and the finding is stated as a matter of fact rather than as inference.
The constitutional reasoning rests on a provision that is rarely litigated and deserves attention. Section 36(2)(b) does not confer a right of appeal in terms; it provides that a law conferring determining power on an administering authority is not invalidated so long as it contains no provision making that determination final and conclusive. The court read that as a constitutional guarantee against finality in administrative adjudication, so that where a Direction becomes in practice unappealable, the position offends the section. That reading, if followed, reaches well beyond the legal profession, to every statutory body whose determinations affect civil rights and whose appeal machinery has lapsed or was never constituted.
The practical question the court posed is the one the profession must now answer. If an Appeal Committee is eventually constituted and a practitioner succeeds on appeal after serving a suspension, where is his remedy? That question has no good answer, which is why the court declined to let the punishment run first. But it also means that every Direction made since 26 June 2026 is in the same position as this one, and that practitioners in that position now have a template. The judgment does not say so, but its logic is not confined to this applicant.
The remedy lies with the National Assembly, and the terms of the second order identify it precisely: either the Body of Benchers constitutes an Appeal Committee, or “such other avenue for appeal is set up.” An amendment to the Legal Practitioners Act directing appeals from the Committee to the Court of Appeal would do it in a single provision. Until then, the disciplinary machinery of the Nigerian Bar can determine complaints but cannot enforce the consequences, which is an untenable position for a self-regulating profession and an urgent one for the many petitions now pending, including the public-interest complaint recently filed against a former Attorney-General of the Federation.
Two final matters of record. The court held that the Body of Benchers is an agency of the Federal Government, which settles the venue question for future challenges: the Federal High Court, and not a State or FCT High Court. And the abuse of process objection failed on a point of practice worth noting, namely that an appeal is “brought” when the notice is filed below but “entered” only when the appellate court receives the record, so a notice of appeal filed before the Committee did not create a pending appeal.
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