Fresh and harrowing accounts have emerged from surviving soldiers and residents about the circumstances surrounding the killing of the Commander of the 29 Task Force Brigade, Brigadier General Oseni Braimah, during a devastating midnight assault on a military base in Benisheikh, Borno State an attack described by survivors as one of the most intense and coordinated insurgent offensives in recent months.
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While the Nigerian Army has insisted that the attack was successfully repelled and disputed claims of heavy casualties and equipment failure, accounts from soldiers who survived the engagement and civilians who witnessed the aftermath paint a picture of a coordinated offensive that overwhelmed troops from multiple directions, triggered panic and breakdown in coordination, left significant destruction of military and civilian property, and forced soldiers to temporarily withdraw into the town — creating a security gap that insurgents exploited to loot military facilities and burn civilian property.
The assault occurred around 12:30 a.m. on Thursday, carried out by suspected Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province fighters who launched simultaneous attacks on multiple military positions in Benisheikh, a strategic town in Kaga Local Government Area along the critical Maiduguri-Damaturu highway.
According to multiple eyewitnesses, the insurgents advanced in large numbers, attacking at least three military formations before pushing into civilian areas.
The gun battle lasted over one hour and 30 minutes, with multiple explosions forcing both military personnel and civilians to flee for safety.
A soldier who survived the attack described the scale and coordination as unprecedented.
“We are used to coordinated attacks, but this was different. They came in large numbers from different directions at the same time. It felt like they had studied our positions for weeks,” he said, speaking anonymously because he was not authorised to speak to the press.
Another survivor admitted that the attackers had a decisive numerical advantage.
“We stood our ground at first, but they were too many. They attacked from different angles. It was like an ambush,” he said.
The surviving soldiers described a cascading psychological collapse as news of losses spread during the battle.
“When we started hearing that our colleagues in other locations had been overrun, it shook us. Then someone shouted that the Brigade Commander was dead. That was when fear fully set in,” one soldier recounted.
The confusion and psychological impact contributed to a breakdown in coordination among troops, forcing some to retreat towards the town rather than holding their defensive positions.
In the aftermath of the attack, claims emerged that Brigadier General Braimah was killed because of a malfunctioning Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle that prevented him from escaping the assault. However, military sources and individuals familiar with the late general disputed this account.
A highly placed source within the brigade described the claim as misleading.
“The insurgents actually set the MRAP on fire during the attack. Saying he died because the vehicle didn’t start is not accurate. The situation was far more complex,” the source said.
Another insider noted that only those who were with the general at the exact moment of the attack could provide a definitive account — and many of them also died in the encounter.
“I am aware that the insurgents closed in from various angles at the same time. It was like an ambush plan. But when the gun battle became intense, the terrorist formation scattered. What helped them was their numbers; there were too many of them,” the source stated.
The official military position, conveyed by Lt.-Col. Sani Uba, Media Information Officer of Operation Hadin Kai, stated that “the commander was mounted on a high-grade Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, which was temporarily immobilised in the heat of combat while he was actively coordinating the counter-assault.”
The military described this as reflecting “the intensity of the engagement and the presence of leadership at the decisive point, not any equipment failure.”
A former frontline driver to the late general, who identified himself simply as Blacky, defended Braimah’s record on vehicle maintenance.
“If you talk about maintenance, General Braimah doesn’t play with repairs. Ask anyone under the 29 Task Force,” Blacky said.
He recounted his personal experience: “I was General Braimah’s driver. One day, he asked me, ‘Blacky, have you not spent two years already?’ I told him I had done four years and six months. He was shocked and asked why I had not applied for rotation. That was how he put my name forward. It is not up to one week that I left the North-East.”
“If you met him with a complaint about money, pass, or anything, he would listen. I am not covering him because I was his former driver. What I am saying is fact,” Blacky added.
However, another source within the formation pointed to possible systemic lapses, alleging weaknesses in vehicle maintenance culture within the unit. “If there was any failure, attention should go to those responsible for maintaining operational vehicles. There have been complaints before,” the source claimed.
The temporary withdrawal of troops into the town created a security gap that allowed insurgents to inflict significant damage on both military facilities and civilian property.
Resident Mustapha Abu described the terror that engulfed the town.
“We heard loud explosions and continuous gunshots. It was terrifying. People were running in all directions. Even soldiers ran into the town for cover,” Abu said.
He said soldiers who retreated into the town stayed with civilians, offering protection and directing movements — but this created space for the insurgents to burn military facilities and loot available military resources.
“Many of them came to town, and they stayed with us, offering protection and directing our movements. I think that space gave the terrorists enough time to burn the facilities and loot available military resources. When I got to the camp after the attack, it was an eyesore,” Abu stated.
“Shops and vehicles close to the major roads belonging to civilians were set ablaze. Travellers who were resting in the community near the Benisheikh secretariat due to the routine closure of the Maiduguri-Damaturu road in the evening were also affected, as both drivers and passengers abandoned their vehicles and fled for safety,” he added.
Another resident confirmed the devastation: “When I got to the camp after the attack, it was devastating. Vehicles were burned, buildings destroyed. Even civilian shops were not spared.”
The Headquarters of Operation Hadin Kai pushed back strongly against the accounts, dismissing reports of 17 soldiers killed as false.
Lt.-Col. Uba stated: “The official and verified report clearly stated that two officers and two soldiers paid the supreme price in the course of the engagement. Any contrary figure being circulated is entirely false, misleading, and devoid of credibility.”
He said narratives being amplified with “unrelated pictures and videos” constituted a deliberate attempt to distort facts and undermine ongoing military operations.
Uba maintained that troops of Operation Hadin Kai successfully repelled the attack, maintained control of their location, and forced the terrorists into a disorganised retreat.
The killing of Brigadier General Braimah adds to a growing and disturbing list of senior Nigerian military officers who have lost their lives in the ongoing insurgency in the North-East.
Brigadier General Musa Uba, Commander of the 25 Brigade, was killed in 2025. Brigadier General Dzarma Zirkusu died alongside three other soldiers when ISWAP fighters ambushed them in Askira-Uba in November 2021. Colonel Dahiru Chiroma Bako was killed near Wajiroko town in September 2020 after a Boko Haram ambush. Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Abu Ali died in November 2016. Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Sakaba, Commander of the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele, was killed in November 2018 during an attack on a military base in northern Borno.
Security analysts say the pattern raises critical questions about operational strategy, intelligence gathering, and force protection in the war against Boko Haram and ISWAP.
President Bola Tinubu expressed sorrow over the killing of the military officers, commending the bravery and resilience of the troops.
“From the reports I have received, our armed forces have been conducting sustained and intense land and air offensives against insurgents, neutralising many of their fighters and commanders. The insurgents’ counterattack is a sign of desperation,” Tinubu stated through his Special Adviser on Information and Strategy, Bayo Onanuga.
He urged the military not to be discouraged by Braimah’s death and called on Nigerians and the media to rally behind the Armed Forces.
The President assured that the Federal Government would honour the fallen soldiers and remained committed to defeating terrorism and restoring peace across the country.
The conflicting accounts between the military’s official narrative of a successful repulsion with four casualties and survivors’ descriptions of an overwhelming assault that killed the brigade commander and caused widespread destruction leave fundamental questions unanswered.
How did insurgents amass such a large force and coordinate simultaneous attacks on multiple positions without detection? Why were troops apparently surprised despite the strategic importance of Benisheikh on the Maiduguri-Damaturu highway? What is the true casualty figure? What happened to the military equipment and resources that residents say were looted? And what changes to strategy and force protection will be made to prevent similar attacks?
These questions come at a time when Senator Ali Ndume has publicly stated that soldiers are being outgunned by insurgents due to inadequate equipment — a claim the Presidency has cautioned him against making on television, urging him instead to share intelligence confidentially with security chiefs.
The gap between the official narrative and the accounts from those who were present continues to widen — and with it, the questions about the true state of the war against insurgency in Nigeria’s North-East.
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