

**ELECTION PETITION BEFORE THE NIGERIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION NATIONAL OFFICERS ELECTION APPEAL
COMMITTEE
HOLDEN AT ABUJA**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD ON
SATURDAY, 18TH JULY 2026.**

PETITION NO:

BETWEEN:

LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN

PETITIONER

AND

**1. INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE NIGERIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION**

2. ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN

3. BAR ASSOCIATION

RESPONDENTS

4. MRS. OYINKANSOLA BADEJO-OKUNSANYA, SAN

PETITION

**THE PETITION OF LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN OF 7TH,
FLOOR ST. NICHOLAS BUILDING, CATHOLIC MISSION STREET
LAGOS ISLAND WHOSE NAME IS SUBSCRIBED.**

Parties

1. The Petitioner is a legal practitioner and one of the candidates for the office of the president of the Nigerian Bar Association in the national elections of the Nigerian Bar Association (“**NBA**” or the “**Association**”) organised by the Electoral Committee of the NBA, the 2nd Respondent on 18th July 2026 (the “**Election**”).
2. The 1st Respondent is a body corporate duly incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and a professional association for legal practitioners in Nigeria, established to advance the legal profession in Nigeria.

3. The 2nd Respondent is the electoral body of the NBA created under of the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar association 2015 (as amended) (the “**Constitution**”). The 2nd Respondent is vested with the powers and functions assigned by the Constitution, which include the organisation and conduct of prescribed elections into the national offices of the NBA, including the office of the President of the NBA. It was in that capacity that 2nd Respondent organised and conducted the Election, the subject matter of this Petition.
4. The 3rd Respondent is my co-contestant for the office of the President of the Association, was declared the winner of the Election by the 2nd Respondent.

Candidates at the Election/Results of the Election

5. The Petitioner states that in the election for the office of the President of the NBA held on 18th July 2026, the following candidates participated, as endorsed by the 2nd Respondent in its document titled “*Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) 2026 Final List of Qualified Candidates for the 2026 NBA General Elections,*” dated 28th May 2026:
 - (i) Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN
 - (ii) Aare. Olumuyiwa Akinboro, SAN
 - (iii) Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN
6. The Petitioner states that the results of the Election as announced by the 2nd Respondents on 20th July 2026 are as follows:

Candidate	Result	Percentage
Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsaya, SAN	12,317	47.18 %
Mr. Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN	7,934	30.39%
Mr. Olumuyiwa Akinboro, SAN	5,855	22.43%

7. The Petitioner further states that the 3rd Respondent, Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN was proclaimed the winner of the Election by the 2nd Respondent on Sunday, 20th July 2026.
8. The Petitioner, being a candidate in the Election, hereby submits this Petition to challenge the results as declared by the 2nd Respondent. A copy of the election results as declared and issued by the 2nd Respondent on 20th July 2026, is hereby pleaded and will be relied upon during the hearing of this Petition.

Grounds for the Petition

9. The Petitioner contends that the ground for this Petition is that the election held on 18th July 2026 was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the

provisions of the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association 2015, as amended, and with the guidelines issued by the ECNBA regarding the conduct of the 2026 National Officers election.

Particulars

- (i) Malfunction of the Electronic Voting Platform
 - (a) The 2nd Respondent published in its revised guidelines of 16 July 2026 that elections will occur 12:00am of the 18th of July 2026 and to end on 11:59am on the 19th of July 2026 using the website: <https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/> —
 - (b) At the commencement of elections on 18th July 2026 and within 10 minutes of voting, the website went down and was down for more than seven hours, during which period, every voter was unable to vote.
 - (c) Upon becoming aware of the malfunction, the petitioner issued a statement calling for the suspension of the elections, which he addressed to the 2nd Respondent. The Petitioner gives the 2nd Respondent notice to produce the statement sent to it dated 18 July 2026 at 2:15am WAT.
 - (d) It was not until after the 2nd Respondent sent an email at 3:01am on the 18th of July 2026 informing the voters that there was a coordinated cyberattack of the website used for voting. The claim that there was a cyberattack has yet to be verified.
 - (e) By another email sent at 7:42am on the 18th of July 2026, the 2nd Respondent issued an apology and advised that voting would recommence at 7:35am of the same 18th July 2026, and that the election will last for 24 hours from that time.
 - (f) Following the malfunction, the 2nd Respondent did not indicate who had previously voted or for whom, before it sent another email advising that it was migrating the voting platform to a different website – www.ecnbaovs.org.ng – which had neither been agreed to nor ratified by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the NBA. Further, this migration had not been agreed to by the candidates. It had not been tested by the IT representatives of the candidates nor had the backend (the hidden part of a computer system, website, or app that users do not see) been verified by the

candidates to ascertain and ensure that it was free from any pre-programming in favour of any of the candidates.

- (g) Following the malfunction, the 2nd Respondent appeared to have deployed a number of websites for the purpose of conducting the election. These websites include:

<https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/> —
<https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/php.index>
<https://aqydz-zgph.mailist-manage.com/click/110a3f85c1c7780b5/11a3f85c1c766239>

The use of different websites confused a majority of the voting members, as details of different websites kept circulating on various social media platforms.

- (h) While the 2nd Respondent chose to allow live viewing of the election results which claimed to be refreshed every 10 minutes, this decision exposed a peculiar trend: the votes allocated to the 3rd Respondent, who was declared the Election winner by the 2nd Respondent, exhibited an almost precise geometric progression at the top of each hour throughout the majority of the Election. Screenshots of the Election results displayed on the www.ecnbaovs.org.ng, taken at various intervals during the election, are hereby pleaded.
- (i) Following an expert analysis and the fact that the Petitioner's IT personnel was deprived from accessing critical information, he verily believes that the pattern of consistent and predictable vote increases indicated the likely pre-programming of the system. This finding casts serious doubt on the integrity of the Election process.
- (j) The Petitioner's belief is premised on the fact that his IT expert was not allowed to observe, real-time, how the voting was progressing from the backend despite the 2nd Respondent's agreement to allow all candidates' IT expert to monitor how the votes were allotted.

(ii) Non-Receipt of One-Time Passwords (OTPs)

- a. The Petitioner states that by the 1st Respondent's revised guidelines, issued on 16 July 2026, it informed voters that to be able to vote they would require a One-Time Password (OTP) that would authenticates their Supreme Court Numbers and details that would be sent to them by the 1st Respondent's service provider.

- b. By 12:00am when the elections were slated to commence on 18th July 2026 voters all over the country were waiting to cast their votes. Initially voting commenced, about two hour into the election the website that the 1st Respondent used for conducting the election malfunctioned and stopped working.
- c. Before the website malfunctioned there were individuals who had already cast their votes. The 1st Respondent did not, transparently, indicate who had voted and for whom they voted.
- d. The Petitioner avers that he issued a statement requesting for the 1st Respondent to suspend the elections because the election service provider had demonstrated that he lacked the capacity to conduct the election.
- e. Despite the plea, the 1st Respondent resumed voting activities at 7:35am on 18th July 2026. In the process of the elections, the petitioner began receiving calls from his supporters all over the country, who were eager and ready to vote but to whom the 1st Respondent had failed to send OTPs to authenticate them to vote for him.
- f. At 5:35pm on the 18th of July 2026, the 2nd Respondent issued an email advisory of voters experiencing delays in receiving the SMS One-Time Password (OTP) required to participate in the ongoing 2026 NBA National Elections. The 2nd Respondent admitted to the delay and non-receipt of OTPs in the said email advisory.
- g. The Petitioner states that he had over twenty-five thousand voters who were prepared to vote for him but were unable to vote as a result of the failure of the 1st Respondent to send the OTPs to these eligible voters.
- h. The Petitioner states that the failure of the 1st Respondent to send the OTPs to the eligible voters resulted in the non-compliance by the 1st Respondent the revised guidelines it issued on 16 July 2026.
- i. The Petitioner states that, with over twenty-five thousand eligible and willing voters who were prevented from voting because of the non-compliance of the 1st Respondent, if these voters had been allowed to vote their voting would have substantially affected the eventual results declared by the 1st Respondent on 20th July 2026.
- j. The Petitioner states that members of the Nigerian Bar Association on various lawyer groups on social media openly expressed their frustration at not being able to vote as a result of not having received their OTPs from the 2nd Respondent.

- k. The Petitioner states that, even as a candidate for the election of the office of President of the Nigerian Bar Association, he was unable to vote for himself at the elections on 18th July 2026.
- l. The Petitioner states that on 10 July 2026, the 1st Respondent published the eligible voters list, and the list of eligible voters indicated that 82,213 members were eligible to vote.
- m. Out of the 82,213 eligible voters, only 26,106 were permitted by the 1st Respondent to cast their votes on 18th July 2026, leaving some 56,107 eligible voters disenfranchised.
- n. On the day of the election, the Petitioner received calls from various supporters who were unable to vote because of the failure of receiving OTPs. The Petitioner states that while he was complaining of the non-delivery of the OTPs, the votes for the 3rd Respondent steadily kept increasing as if to say the OTPs were deliberately being sent to only her supporters and thereby disenfranchising the Petitioner's supporters who at the time were willing to vote.
- o. The Petitioner state that if 56, 107 voters that were unable to vote were allowed to vote had they received their OTPs timeously in compliance with the 1st Respondent's revised guidelines of 16 July 2026, that number of votes would have substantially affected the outcome and results of the election one way or another.

(iii) Extension of Voting Period Beyond the Advertised Timeline

- (a) The Election was widely advertised to commence at 12:00 am and end at 11:59 pm on Saturday, 18th July 2026. The Petitioner pleads and shall at trial rely on the 2nd Respondent's Email of 16 July 2026 where the 2nd Respondent specified this timeline.
- (b) However, voting continued into the early hours of Sunday, 19th July 2026, with the number of votes continuing to increase.
- (c) This extension beyond the advertised timeline, without proper notice or explanation, further casts doubt on the fairness and transparency of the election process. Being an online voting method, the start and end time ought to have been programmed by 2nd Respondent and ought to have terminated automatically. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent admitted that the period allotted for the election was exceeded.

(iv) Non-Compliance with Constitutional Provisions/Withholding Evidence

- (a) The Constitution mandates that when electronic voting is adopted, the 2nd Respondent shall engage the services of competent and credible service providers to provide the electronic voting platform and shall conduct the elections in a transparent and fair manner in accordance with clearly published guidelines.
- (b) The anomalies and irregularities observed, as highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, demonstrate a failure to comply with these constitutional requirements. The use of unrelated platforms, unexplained vote tally discrepancies, and issues of pre-programming and data manipulation, indicate that the election was neither transparent nor fair.
- (c) Considering the anomalies and irregularities in the Election, the Petitioner by this paragraph gives notice to the 2nd Respondent to produce a redacted audit of the election to facilitate his right to appeal under the NBA Constitution 2015 as amended as well as to produce the following documents:

S/N	Critical Information
i.	A copy of the voters' list used for the Election together with all relevant details.
ii.	A copy of the final result sheet relied upon by the 2 nd Respondent in announcing Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN as the winner for the Election.
iii.	Full access to server and application log files used during the election.
iv.	Network traffic logs during the Election and all incident response documentation.
v.	Copies of all data backups taken before, during, and after the Election.
vi.	Data on system performance throughout the Election, including server response times and load statistics.
vii.	Complete database records, including voter information and voting transactions.
viii.	Detailed logs of all voter authentication attempts (whether successful or not).

ix.	A complete record of voting timestamps for all cast ballots.
x.	Information and documents relating to any changes or updates made to the voting system/platform during or immediately after the Election.
xi.	Detailed logs of any system errors, including timeouts and database update freezes.
xii.	Detailed logs of all Portable Network Graphics image uploads to the 2 nd Respondent portal during the Election including timestamps, file sizes, and the account or process responsible for these uploads.
xiii.	Documentation on the process and protocols used to transfer data from the primary election platform (electionbuddy.com) to the display portal (go.ecnba.org).
xiv.	All third-party service logs and reports from these services.
xv.	All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the Election.
xvi.	Information on the security measures and protocols implemented for the Election.
xvii.	Records of all individuals who had administrative access to the voting system/platform during the Election.
xviii.	Any other information or document used for the Election, and which may be relevant in carrying out the audit.
xix.	A copy of the final result sheet at the 2 nd Respondent's backend servers showing the winner of the Election.
xx.	The spool of the vote tallies.
xxi.	The metadata showing the IP and MAC addresses of the devices used in voting.
xxii.	Detailed logs of all authentic attempt to vote (whether authentic or not)
xxiii.	A complete record of voting time stamps for all casts ballots
xxiv.	Detailed logs of any system errors including timeouts and databases freezes
xxv.	All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the election
xxvi.	Information on the security measures and protocols implemented for the Election

xxvii.	Network traffic logs during the election and all incident response documentation
xxviii.	Full access to server and application log files used during the election.
xxix.	One Time Password submission and delivery status records
xxx.	Send, bounce, open and click records for the notices of 18 July 2026
xxxi.	Impact assessment, processing records, breach assessment and processor agreement.

(d) The Petitioner further avers that upon the failure to produce the documents mentioned above, the Petitioner shall subpoena the 2nd Respondent to provide redacted documents in accordance with the common law rules of evidence and the Nigerian Data Protection Act.

(d) The Petitioner avers that the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (“NDPA”) stipulates that:

- (i) Consent of data subjects, in this case, voters in the election, is not the sole legal basis for processing their personal data.
- (j) Data processing shall be lawful, where the processing is necessary for (i) compliance with a legal obligation to which the data controller or data processor is subject; (ii) the performance of a task carried out in the exercise of official authority vested in the data controller or data processor; and (iii) the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or data processor, or by a third party to whom the data is disclosed.
- (k) A data controller or data processor shall not process, or permit a data processor to process on its behalf, sensitive personal data, unless the processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities, with appropriate safeguards, by a foundation, association, or such other non-profit organisation with charitable, educational, literary, artistic, philosophical, religious, or trade union purposes, and the (i) processing relates solely to the members or former members of the entity, or to persons, who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes, and (ii) sensitive personal data is not disclosed outside of the entity without the explicit consent of the data subject.

10. The irregularities, breaches and non-compliance are substantial and systemic to such an extent that it affected the outcome of the election such that the

announced outcome cannot have been the result of a proper, regular and valid exercise.

11. The irregularities set out above robbed the entire process of legitimacy.

Reliefs

12. The Petitioner, therefore, seeks the following Reliefs from this Appeal Committee as follows:


- a) **A DECLARATION** that the election of the Nigerian Bar Association for the office of the President conducted on the 18th of July 2026 was marred by breaches and irregularities which affected the credibility and integrity of the Election.
- b) **A DECLARATION** that the results of the election to the office of the President of the Nigerian Bar Association held on 18th July 2026 are invalid, null, and void, due to the breaches and irregularities and non-compliance with the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association 2015 (as amended in 2021) detailed in the Petition.
- c) **AN ORDER** nullifying, cancelling the election and directing the 1st Respondent to conduct fresh election into the office of the President of the Nigerian Bar Association by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of the Revised Guidelines of the 1st Respondent made on 16 July 2026.
- d) **AN ORDER** reversing the declaration of the 3rd Respondent as the winner of the Election, considering the identified irregularities and breaches affecting the election's credibility.

DATED THIS 27 DAY OF JULY 2026



**LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN
SOFUNDE OSAKWE OGUNDIPE & BELGORE**

7th Floor, St. Nicholas House
Catholic Mission Street
Lagos, Nigeria
Tel.: (+234 1) 462 2502
sooblaw@sooblaw.com



ADDRESS FOR SERVICE WITHIN JURISDICTION

HANAFI & ASSOCIATES

1st Floor, Coscharis Plaza,
6 Faskari Street, Area 3 Garki
Abuja

FOR SERVICE ON:

1. **The 1st Respondent**
NBA House Plot 1101, Muhammadu Buhari Way,
Central Business District, FCT Abuja.
2. **The 2nd Respondent**
ECNBA Secretariat
NBA House 24 Oro Ago Street
Garki Abuja.
3. **The 3rd Respondent**
Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN
15 Military Street, Onikan, Lagos.

**ELECTION PETITION BEFORE THE NIGERIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION NATIONAL OFFICERS ELECTION APPEAL
COMMITTEE
HOLDEN AT ABUJA**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD ON
SATURDAY, 18TH JULY 2026.**

PETITION NO:

BETWEEN:

LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN

PETITIONER

AND

- | | | |
|----|--|--------------------|
| 1. | INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE NIGERIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION | |
| 2. | ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION | |
| 3. | MRS. OYINKANSOLA BADEJO-OKUNSANYA, SAN | RESPONDENTS |


LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. The Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association 2015 as amended.
2. The document of the 2nd Respondent dated 28th May 2026 announcing the final list of qualified candidates.
3. The 2nd Respondent Revised Guidelines of 16th July 2026.
4. The Petitioner's Statement of 18 July 2026 published at 2:15am WAT.
5. The 2nd Respondent's email of 18th July 2026 at 3:01 am.
6. Expert analysis of
7. 2nd Respondent's Final voters list.

DATED THIS 27 DAY OF JULY 2026



**LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN
SOFUNDE OSAKWE OGUNDIPE & BELGORE**



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Catholic Mission Street
Lagos, Nigeria
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ADDRESS FOR SERVICE WITHIN JURISDICTION
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1st Floor, Coscharis Plaza,
6 Faskari Street, Area 3 Garki
Abuja

FOR SERVICE ON:

4. **The 1st Respondent**
NBA House Plot 1101, Muhammadu Buhari Way,
Central Business District, FCT Abuja.
5. **The 2nd Respondent**
ECNBA Secretariat
NBA House 24 Oro Ago Street
Garki Abuja.
6. **The 3rd Respondent**
Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN
15 Military Street, Onikan, Lagos.

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1. **INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE NIGERIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION**
2. **ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION** **RESPONDENTS**
3. **MRS. OYINKANSOLA BADEJO-OKUNSANYA, SAN**

**WITNESS STATEMENT ON OATH OF LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE,
SAN**

1, **LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN**, Male, Nigerian Citizen of 7th Floor St. Nicholas Building, Catholic Mission Street, Lagos State of Nigeria, do hereby make an Oath and state as follows:

1. That I am the Petitioner herein.
2. That the information deposed to by me are facts within my personal knowledge, facts passed on to me by my said supporters, supervisors and agents on the field working during the election of 18th July 2026 and which facts I verily believe to be true.
3. That I was a candidate at the above election.

Parties

4. I am a legal practitioner and one of the candidates for the office of the president of the Nigerian Bar Association in the national elections of the Nigerian Bar Association (“**NBA**” or the “**Association**”) organised by the Electoral Committee of the NBA, the 2nd Respondent on 18th July 2026 (the “Election”).
5. The 1st Respondent is a body corporate duly incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and a professional association for legal practitioners in Nigeria, established to advance the legal profession in Nigeria.
6. The 2nd Respondent is the electoral body of the NBA created under of the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar association 2015 (as amended) (the “**Constitution**”). The 2nd Respondent is vested with the powers and functions assigned by the Constitution, which include the organisation and conduct of prescribed elections into the national offices of the NBA, including the office of the President of the NBA. It was in that capacity that 2nd Respondent organised and conducted the Election, the subject matter of this Petition.
7. The 3rd Respondent is my co-contestant for the office of the President of the Association, was declared the winner of the Election by the 2nd Respondent.

Candidates at the Election/Results of the Election

8. I am aware that in the election for the office of the President of the NBA held on 18th July 2026, the following candidates participated, as endorsed by the 2nd Respondent in its document titled “*Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) 2026 Final List of Qualified Candidates for the 2026 NBA General Elections,*” dated 28th May 2026:

- (iv) Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN
- (v) Aare. Olumuyiwa Akinboro, SAN
- (vi) Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN

9. I am aware that the results of the Election as announced by the 2nd Respondents on 20th July 2026 are as follows:

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10. I am aware that the 3rd Respondent, Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN was proclaimed the winner of the Election by the 2nd Respondent on Sunday, 20th July 2026.
11. I, being a candidate in the Election, hereby submits this Petition to challenge the results as declared by the 2nd Respondent. A copy of the election results as declared and issued by the 2nd Respondent on 20th July 2026, is hereby pleaded and will be relied upon during the hearing of this Petition.

Grounds for the Petition

12. I am aware that the ground for this Petition is that the election held on 18th July 2026 was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association 2015, as amended, and with the guidelines issued by the ECNBA regarding the conduct of the 2026 National Officers election.

Particulars

(v) Malfunction of the Electronic Voting Platform

- (a) The 2nd Respondent published in its revised guidelines of 16 July 2026 that elections will occur 12:00am of the 18th of July 2026 and to end on 11:59am on the 19th of July 2026 using the website: <https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/> —
- (b) At the commencement of elections on 18th July 2026 and within 10 minutes of voting, the website went down and was down for more than seven hours, during which period, every voter was unable to vote.
- (c) Upon becoming aware of the malfunction, I issued a statement dated 18 July 2026 at 2:15am WAT calling for the suspension of the elections, which he addressed to the 2nd Respondent.
- (d) It was not until after the 2nd Respondent sent an email at 3:01am on the 18th of July 2026 informing the voters that there was a coordinated cyberattack of the website used for voting. The claim that there was a cyberattack has yet to be verified.
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- (g) Following the malfunction, the 2nd Respondent appeared to have deployed a number of websites for the purpose of conducting the election. These websites include:

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The use of different websites confused a majority of the voting members, as details of different websites kept circulating on various social media platforms.

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- (j) My belief is premised on the fact that his IT expert was not allowed to observe, real-time, how the voting was progressing from the backend despite the 2nd Respondent's agreement to allow all candidates' IT expert to monitor how the votes were allotted.

(vi) Non-Receipt of One-Time Passwords (OTPs)

- a. I aware that by the 1st Respondent's revised guidelines, issued on 16 July 2026, it informed voters that to be able to vote they would require a One-Time Password (OTP) that would authenticates their Supreme Court Numbers and details that would be sent to them by the 1st Respondent's service provider.
- b. By 12:00am when the elections were slated to commence on 18th July 2026 voters all over the country were waiting to cast their votes. Initially voting commenced, about two hour into the election the website that the 1st Respondent used for conducting the election malfunctioned and stopped working.
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would have substantially affected the eventual results declared by the 1st Respondent on 20th July 2026.

- j. I aware that members of the Nigerian Bar Association on various lawyer groups on social media openly expressed their frustration at not being able to vote as a result of not having received their OTPs from the 2nd Respondent.
- k. I aware that, even as a candidate for the election of the office of President of the Nigerian Bar Association, he was unable to vote for himself at the elections on 18th July 2026.
- l. I aware that on 10 July 2026, the 1st Respondent published the eligible voters list, and the list of eligible voters indicated that 82,213 members were eligible to vote.
- m. Out of the 82,213 eligible voters, only 26,106 were permitted by the 1st Respondent to cast their votes on 18th July 2026, leaving some 56,107 eligible voters disenfranchised.
- n. On the day of the election, the Petitioner received calls from various supporters who were unable to vote because of the failure of receiving OTPs. The Petitioner states that while he was complaining of the non-delivery of the OTPs, the votes for the 3rd Respondent steadily kept increasing as if to say the OTPs were deliberately being sent to only her supporters and thereby disenfranchising the Petitioner's supporters who at the time were willing to vote.
- o. I aware that if 56, 107 voters that were unable to vote were allowed to vote had they received their OTPs timeously in compliance with the 1st Respondent's revised guidelines of 16 July 2026, that number of votes would have substantially affected the outcome and results of the election one way or another.

(vii) Extension of Voting Period Beyond the Advertised Timeline

- (a) The Election was widely advertised to commence at 12:00 am and end at 11:59 pm on Saturday, 18th July 2026 which the 2nd Respondent's email of 16 July 2026 where the 2nd Respondent specified this timeline.
- (b) However, voting continued into the early hours of Sunday, 19th July 2026, with the number of votes continuing to increase.
- (c) This extension beyond the advertised timeline, without proper notice or explanation, further casts doubt on the fairness and transparency of the election process. Being an online voting method, the start and end time

ought to have been programmed by 2nd Respondent and ought to have terminated automatically. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent admitted that the period allotted for the election was exceeded.

(viii) Non-Compliance with Constitutional Provisions/Withholding Evidence

- (a) The Constitution mandates that when electronic voting is adopted, the 2nd Respondent shall engage the services of competent and credible service providers to provide the electronic voting platform and shall conduct the elections in a transparent and fair manner in accordance with clearly published guidelines.
- (b) The anomalies and irregularities observed, as highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, demonstrate a failure to comply with these constitutional requirements. The use of unrelated platforms, unexplained vote tally discrepancies, and issues of pre-programming and data manipulation, indicate that the election was neither transparent nor fair.
- (c) Considering the anomalies and irregularities in the Election, I am requesting by this paragraph gives that the 2nd Respondent produces a redacted audit of the election to facilitate his right to appeal under the NBA Constitution 2015 as amended as well as to produce the following documents:

S/N	Critical Information
xxxii.	A copy of the voters' list used for the Election together with all relevant details.
xxxiii.	A copy of the final result sheet relied upon by the 2 nd Respondent in announcing Mrs. Oyinkansola Badejo-Okunsanya, SAN as the winner for the Election.
xxxiv.	Full access to server and application log files used during the election.
xxxv.	Network traffic logs during the Election and all incident response documentation.
xxxvi.	Copies of all data backups taken before, during, and after the Election.
xxxvii.	Data on system performance throughout the Election, including server response times and load statistics.
xxxviii.	Complete database records, including voter information and voting transactions.

xxxix.	Detailed logs of all voter authentication attempts (whether successful or not).
xl.	A complete record of voting timestamps for all cast ballots.
xli.	Information and documents relating to any changes or updates made to the voting system/platform during or immediately after the Election.
xlii.	Detailed logs of any system errors, including timeouts and database update freezes.
xliii.	Detailed logs of all Portable Network Graphics image uploads to the 2 nd Respondent portal during the Election including timestamps, file sizes, and the account or process responsible for these uploads.
xliv.	Documentation on the process and protocols used to transfer data from the primary election platform (electionbuddy.com) to the display portal (go.ecnba.org).
xlv.	All third-party service logs and reports from these services.
xlvi.	All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the Election.
xlvii.	Information on the security measures and protocols implemented for the Election.
xlviii.	Records of all individuals who had administrative access to the voting system/platform during the Election.
xlix.	Any other information or document used for the Election, and which may be relevant in carrying out the audit.
i.	A copy of the final result sheet at the 2 nd Respondent's backend servers showing the winner of the Election.
ii.	The spool of the vote tallies.
iii.	The metadata showing the IP and MAC addresses of the devices used in voting.
iiii.	Detailed logs of all authentic attempt to vote (whether authentic or not)
liv.	A complete record of voting time stamps for all casts ballots
lv.	Detailed logs of any system errors including timeouts and databases freezes
lvi.	All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the election

lvii.	Information on the security measures and protocols implemented for the Election
lviii.	Network traffic logs during the election and all incident response documentation
lix.	Full access to server and application log files used during the election.
lx.	One Time Password submission and delivery status records
lxi.	Send, bounce, open and click records for the notices of 18 July 2026
lxii.	Impact assessment, processing records, breach assessment and processor agreement.

- (d) I know that upon the failure to produce the documents mentioned above, I shall subpoena the 2nd Respondent to provide redacted documents in accordance with the common law rules of evidence and the Nigerian Data Protection Act.
- (e) The Petitioner avers that the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (“NDPA”) stipulates that:
- (l) Consent of data subjects, in this case, voters in the election, is not the sole legal basis for processing their personal data.
 - (m) Data processing shall be lawful, where the processing is necessary for (i) compliance with a legal obligation to which the data controller or data processor is subject; (ii) the performance of a task carried out in the exercise of official authority vested in the data controller or data processor; and (iii) the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or data processor, or by a third party to whom the data is disclosed.
 - (n) A data controller or data processor shall not process, or permit a data processor to process on its behalf, sensitive personal data, unless the processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities, with appropriate safeguards, by a foundation, association, or such other non-profit organisation with charitable, educational, literary, artistic, philosophical, religious, or trade union purposes, and the (i) processing relates solely to the members or former members of the entity, or to persons, who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes, and (ii) sensitive personal data is not disclosed outside of the entity without the explicit consent of the data subject.

13. The irregularities, breaches and non-compliance are substantial and systemic to such an extent that it affected the outcome of the election such that the announced outcome cannot have been the result of a proper, regular and valid exercise.
14. The irregularities set out above robbed the entire process of legitimacy.
15. I, therefore, seeks the following Reliefs from this Appeal Committee as follows:
- e) **A DECLARATION** that the election of the Nigerian Bar Association for the office of the President conducted on the 18th of July 2026 was marred by breaches and irregularities which affected the credibility and integrity of the Election.
 - f) **A DECLARATION** that the results of the election to the office of the President of the Nigerian Bar Association held on 18th July 2026 are invalid, null, and void, due to the breaches and irregularities and non-compliance with the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association 2015 (as amended in 2021) detailed in the Petition.
 - g) **AN ORDER** nullifying, cancelling the election and directing the 1st Respondent to conduct fresh election into the office of the President of the Nigerian Bar Association by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of the Revised Guidelines of the 1st Respondent made on 16 July 2026.
 - h) **AN ORDER** reversing the declaration of the 3rd Respondent as the winner of the Election, considering the identified irregularities and breaches affecting the election's credibility.
16. That I depose to this Statement on Oath in good faith and in accordance with the Oath Act, LFN 2004.


DEPONENT

SWORN to at the Office of the Notary Public Lagos.

THIS 27th DAY OF July 2026

BEFORE ME

NOTARY PUBLIC


YINKA AJANA, ESQ., LL.B., LL.M., BL, MCIARB (UK)
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR NIGERIA
08027382087, ajanamartin@yahoo.com
6, Moloney Street Onikan, Lagos



NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ECNBA)
NBA HOUSE, NO. 9 ORO-AGO STREET, GARKI, ABUJA, FCT

ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ECNBA) 2026
FINAL LIST OF QUALIFIED CANDIDATES FOR THE 2026 NBA GENERAL ELECTIONS

Distinguished Colleagues,

The Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) hereby publishes the Final List of Qualified Candidates for the 2026 NBA General Elections, following the conclusion of the screening process and the determination of all appeals by the National Officers Election Appeals Committee, pursuant to the NBA Constitution 2015 (as amended in 2025) and ECNBA Notice No. 2 of 9th February, 2026.

All qualified candidates are reminded that they remain bound by the provisions of ECNBA Notice No. 4 governing campaigns and all other applicable electoral rules and guidelines.

NATIONAL OFFICERS

S/N	NAME	POSITION
1.	AARE OLUMUYIWA AKINBORO SAN	President
2.	LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE SAN, FCI Arb	President
3.	OYINKANSOLA BADEJO-OKUNSANYA SAN	President
4.	OGHENERO OKORO, ESQ.	First Vice President
5.	LUQMAN ADEKUNLE LAOYE, ESQ.	First Vice President
6.	OBAJAJA ONIMISI STEPHEN ESQ.	First Vice President
7.	NUHU JOHN EGYA, ESQ.	Second Vice President
8.	INIOBONG IRENE PEPPLER, ESQ.	Third Vice President
9.	AFAM O. OKEKE, ESQ.	General Secretary
10.	BARTH OKOYE ANICHE, ESQ.	General Secretary
11.	CHIDI V. EZENWAFOR, ESQ.	General Secretary
12.	DR. RAPULU ERNEST NDUKA	General Secretary
13.	NNAEBUKA ONYEBUCHI NWAEZE, ESQ.	General Secretary
14.	OKEY LEO OHAGBA, ESQ.	General Secretary
15.	BENJAMIN EMEKA ENYIAGU, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary

S/N	NAME	POSITION
16.	CHIDUABO PRINCE HENRY MAMAH, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary
17.	AGHOGHO GLADYS OKPOMOR, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary
18.	TIJJANI MAGAJI, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary
19.	ONWUDINJO LUCKY ELOKA (UNCLE JEJE)	Assistant General Secretary
20.	OSATO UWAGBOE, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary
21.	OSARODION MICHAEL IGIEDE, ESQ.	Assistant General Secretary
22.	ESTHER IFEOMA JIMOH, ESQ.	Treasurer
23.	AKINWUNMI LALEYE, ESQ.	Welfare Secretary
24.	OAIKHENA OSAGIE, ESQ.	Welfare Secretary
25.	AUDREY CHINELO OFOEGBUNAM, ESQ.	Welfare Secretary
26.	CHIWENDU UGOCHUKWU, ESQ.	Welfare Secretary
27.	ERNEST EZINDU UWANAKA, ESQ.	Welfare Secretary
28.	AYEWA SHEGUN LAWRENCE, ESQ.	Publicity Secretary
29.	DR. PRINCE I. AZUBUIKE	Publicity Secretary
30.	LUKMAN OLADIMEJI JAIYEOLA, ESQ.	Assistant Publicity Secretary
31.	AKI UWOMANO ANTHONY JUNIOR, ESQ.	Assistant Publicity Secretary
32.	HADIZA NASIR AHMAD, ESQ.	Assistant Publicity Secretary
33.	METI MONDAY UKPEH, ESQ.	Assistant Publicity Secretary

NBA REPRESENTATIVES TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR

S/N	NAME	ZONE
1.	ARINZE CELESTINE CHUKWU, ESQ.	Eastern Zone
2.	ASSAM AKPAN ASSAM, ESQ.	Eastern Zone
3.	CHIDI BETSY NNAJI (MRS.)	Eastern Zone
4.	DR. CELESTINE NWAOKOMA NWANKWO	Eastern Zone
5.	DANIEL KIP, ESQ.	Eastern Zone
6.	JANE OMONOR APOLLOS-JAMES (MRS.)	Eastern Zone
7.	JOY OBIANUJU NNANI, ESQ.	Eastern Zone
8.	KINGSLEY C. EHUJUO, PhD, ACArb, KSJI	Eastern Zone
9.	DHIKRULLAH ADEWALE BALOGUN (DAB)	Western Zone
10.	PRECIOUS NDIDI NWADIMUYA, ESQ.	Western Zone

S/N	NAME	ZONE
11.	ROTIMI KOMOLAFE, ESQ.	Western Zone
12.	LEDAK D. DAFER, ESQ.	Northern Zone
13.	FRIDAY OWICHO ENEJO, ESQ.	Northern Zone
14.	MUHAMMAD HUWAILA IBRAHIM, ESQ.	Northern Zone
15.	KADIR TEMIM, ESQ.	Northern Zone
16.	DR. MICHAEL O. OLORUNMOLA	Northern Zone
17.	BULUS YOHANNA ATSEN, FSI	Northern Zone
18.	ONIMISI FRIDAY UMAR	Northern Zone

This list is final and represents the outcome of the full screening and appeal processes under the NBA Constitution 2015 (as amended in 2025). Aspirants whose names do not appear herein have been notified individually of the Committee's decision and had the opportunity to appeal to the National Officers Election Appeals Committee under Part VIII of the Second Schedule. All campaigns shall be conducted strictly in accordance with ECNBA Notice No. 4 dated 13th February, 2026 and further Guidelines to be issued which will include the commencement and closure dates of Campaigns respectively.

Dated this 28th day of May, 2026.



AHAM EJELAM, SAN

Chairman (ECNBA 2026)



IBRAHIM ALIYU NASSARAWA, ESQ

Secretary (ECNBA 2026)



ELECTRONIC VOTING GUIDELINES

**FOR THE 2026 NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (NBA)
NATIONAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE
BAR (GCB) ELECTIONS**

**Issued by the Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar
Association (ECNBA)**

1. PREAMBLE

The Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA), acting pursuant to the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association, 2015 (as amended in 2025), the Second Schedule governing the conduct of electronic elections, and the Revised Election Timetable issued on 3 July 2026, hereby publishes these Electronic Voting Guidelines for the conduct of the 2026 NBA National Officers and General Council of the Bar Elections.

These Guidelines provide the operational, technical and security framework governing the conduct of the electronic election scheduled for Saturday, 18 July 2026.

The objective of these Guidelines is to ensure that the election is conducted in a manner that is transparent, secure, credible, auditable, inclusive and consistent with international best practices in electronic voting while complying with the provisions of the Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) 2023 and other applicable laws.

The electronic voting platform has been designed, implemented and deployed by Mikrodigital Connect, the Election Voting Service Provider (EVSP), under the supervision of the Electoral Committee and Data Protection Officer (DPO).

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE ELECTRONIC VOTING PLATFORM

The electronic voting platform has been designed to achieve the following objectives:

- Provide a secure and transparent voting process.
- Ensure that only eligible voters participate.
- Enforce the principle of One Member, One Vote.
- Maintain complete secrecy of every ballot.
- Prevent voter impersonation.
- Prevent duplicate voting.
- Provide an accurate and verifiable counting process.
- Produce comprehensive audit logs.
- Enable real-time monitoring of election activities.
- Protect voters' personal information.
- Provide confidence in the integrity of the election process.

3. REVISED ELECTION TIMELINE

The electronic voting activities shall follow the revised ECNBA timetable:

ACTIVITY	DATE
PUBLICATION OF REVISED TIMETABLE	3 July 2026
VOTER SENSITISATION	3 – 5 July 2026
PRELIMINARY REGISTER PUBLICATION	6 July 2026
VERIFICATION WINDOW	7 – 8 July 2026
REGISTER CLEAN-UP	9 July 2026
FINAL REGISTER PUBLICATION & FREEZE	10 July 2026
PUBLICATION OF E-VOTING GUIDELINES	10 July 2026
MOCK VOTING EXERCISE	11 July 2026
FINAL SECURITY AUDIT	13 July 2026
PLATFORM LOCKDOWN	17 July 2026
ELECTION DAY	18 July 2026
DECLARATION OF RESULTS	19 July 2026

4. ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE

Only members whose names appear on the Final Voters Register published by ECNBA shall be eligible to vote.

To participate, a voter must:

- Be listed on the Final Register.
- Possess a valid Supreme Court Number (SCN).
- Have successfully completed the verification process.
- Have access to the registered email address for OTP delivery.
- Successfully authenticate before voting.

Once the Final Register is published on 10 July 2026, no additions, deletions or amendments shall be made except where expressly authorised by ECNBA.

5. VOTER VERIFICATION

The verification window is intended to enable members to confirm the accuracy of their details before the register is frozen.

Eligible voters should verify:

- Full Name
- Supreme Court Number (SCN)
- NBA Branch
- Registered Email Address

Any discrepancy should be reported during the verification period.

Following the publication of the Final Register, no further corrections shall be entertained except as authorised by ECNBA.

6. VOTER AUTHENTICATION

The platform adopts a two-stage authentication mechanism.

Stage One: Supreme Court Number Verification

The voter enters the registered Supreme Court Number (SCN).

The system validates the SCN against the Final Register.

Only verified SCNs proceed to the next stage.

Stage Two: One-Time Password (OTP)

A secure One-Time Password is generated and transmitted to the voter's registered email address.

The OTP is time-limited and can only be used once.

Failure to enter a valid OTP prevents access to the electronic ballot.

7. ONE MEMBER – ONE VOTE POLICY

The electronic voting platform strictly enforces the principle of One Member, One Vote.

Each authenticated voter may submit only one ballot.

Once a ballot has been successfully submitted:

- the vote is permanently recorded;
- the system marks the voter as having voted;

- any subsequent attempt to vote using the same SCN will automatically be rejected.

This control is implemented through secure database validation, transaction locking and audit logging.

8. VOTING PROCEDURE

The voting process consists of the following steps:

1. Visit the official ECNBA voting portal.
2. Read and accept the Privacy Notice.
3. Enter the registered Supreme Court Number.
4. Receive the OTP.
5. Enter the OTP.
6. Access the electronic ballot.
7. Select preferred candidates.
8. Review all selections.
9. Submit the ballot.
10. Receive a confirmation reference.

Once submitted, the ballot cannot be edited or withdrawn.

9. SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The platform incorporates multiple layers of security.

These include:

Identity Security

- SCN Verification
- OTP Authentication
- Secure Session Management

Application Security

- CSRF Protection
- SQL Injection Protection
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Protection
- Input Validation
- Output Encoding

Infrastructure Security

- TLS Encryption
- Secure Cookies
- Firewall Protection
- Database Encryption
- Secure Hosting Environment

Operational Security

- Role-Based Access Control
- Real-Time Monitoring
- Comprehensive Audit Logging
- Continuous Security Review

10. MOCK VOTING EXERCISE

A nationwide mock voting exercise shall be conducted on 11 July 2026.

The purpose of the exercise is to:

- familiarise voters with the platform;
- validate authentication;
- confirm ballot loading;
- test vote recording;
- verify audit logging.

Following completion of the exercise, all test data shall be removed before the production election.

11. PLATFORM LOCKDOWN

On 17 July 2026, the platform shall enter Production Lockdown.

During lockdown:

- candidate information becomes read-only;
- the voters register remains frozen;
- only voting transactions are permitted;
- system backups are completed;
- security validation is finalised.

12. BALLOT SECRECY

The platform maintains complete secrecy of every ballot.

No person, including:

- ECNBA Officials;
- Election Observers;
- Candidates;
- Mikrodigital Connect Personnel;
- Third Parties;

can determine how an individual voter voted.

The system separates voter authentication from vote recording, ensuring that ballots cannot be linked to individual voters.

13. AUDIT LOGGING

The platform automatically records:

- Login activities
- OTP requests
- Authentication attempts
- Ballot submission
- Administrative activities
- Logout events
- Security events
- Failed login attempts

These records support transparency, accountability and post-election review.

14. RESULTS MANAGEMENT

Vote counting is performed automatically by the platform.

Before declaration, the following validations shall be conducted:

- Registered voters
- Authenticated voters
- Votes cast
- Position totals

- Candidate totals
- Audit log consistency
- Database integrity

Only after successful validation shall ECNBA declare the official results.

15. DATA PROTECTION

The processing of personal information shall comply with the Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) 2023.

The platform implements:

- Data Minimisation
- Purpose Limitation
- Secure Processing
- Encryption
- Confidentiality Controls
- Access Control
- Audit Trails

Only information necessary for election administration shall be processed.

16. SUPPORTED PLATFORMS

The platform supports:

Browsers

- Google Chrome
- Microsoft Edge
- Mozilla Firefox
- Apple Safari

Operating Systems

- Windows
- macOS
- Android
- iOS

The platform has been designed to operate across desktop computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones.

17. INCIDENT RESPONSE

Any security incident identified during the election shall be investigated immediately.

Where necessary:

- audit logs shall be reviewed;
- system integrity shall be verified;
- appropriate corrective actions shall be implemented;
- ECNBA shall be notified.

ISSUED BY

ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ECNBA)

2026 NBA NATIONAL ELECTIONS

TECHNICAL OBSERVATION REPORT

PREPARED BY THE CANDIDATE'S ACCREDITED TECHNICAL CONSULTANT

Election Date: 18 July 2026

Prepared for	Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN
Prepared by	Collins Onyemaobi
Capacity	Accredited Technical Consultant to the Candidate
Report status	Final, based on the access and evidence available
Report date	19 July 2026
Classification	Confidential – Prepared for the Candidate and Legal Advisers

This report records technical observations and identifies matters requiring clarification. It is not a forensic audit, source-code review or certification of the election result.

Version 1.0 – Final, 19 July 2026

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Definitions and Abbreviations

- ECNBA – Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association
- OTP – One-Time Password
- SCN – Supreme Court Number
- ICT – Information and Communication Technology
- DNS – Domain Name System
- TLS – Transport Layer Security
- WAF – Web Application Firewall
- CDN – Content Delivery Network
- IDS/IPS – Intrusion Detection/Prevention System
- SIEM – Security Information and Event Management

1. Executive Summary

This report presents technical observations made during the 2026 Nigerian Bar Association National Elections while the undersigned served as an accredited technical consultant to a candidate. The assessment was limited to direct observations at the monitoring centre, contemporaneous records, visible dashboard information, official ECNBA communications and voting addresses observed during the election.

The election was scheduled to commence at 00:00 WAT. From the monitoring centre and through the access paths tested by the undersigned, the voting portal was briefly accessible but appeared inaccessible within approximately ten minutes. ECNBA later announced that voting would commence at 07:35 WAT following migration of the voting portal to a new domain. Voting activity was first observed on the monitoring dashboard at approximately 07:35 WAT.

After commencement, material technical observations included reports of delayed or undelivered OTPs, a monitoring dashboard that remained static for approximately 30 minutes, continued OTP-related support requests and the observation of two voting URL forms. ECNBA also publicly attributed the initial interruption to a cyberattack. No system logs, incident records, security telemetry, OTP delivery reports, domain-routing records or reconciliation data were made available to the undersigned for independent assessment.

No evidence available to the undersigned established unauthorised alteration of vote records. However, the information made available was insufficient to provide independent technical assurance regarding the cause and impact of the interruptions, the relationship between the voting addresses, the controls applied to OTP support requests or the completeness and integrity of the underlying election records.

The appropriate next steps are immediate preservation of relevant technical evidence, a signed post-election incident report, end-to-end reconciliation and an independent technical review conducted under controls that protect ballot secrecy and sensitive security information.

2. Mandate, Scope, Method and Limitations

The undersigned attended as an accredited technical consultant to a candidate to observe the operation of the electronic voting process, raise relevant technical questions and advise the candidate on matters affecting system availability, authentication, auditability and integrity.

No structured technical engagement was made available with the operational ICT personnel or the electronic voting service provider while troubleshooting was ongoing. The assessment was therefore limited to externally observable system behaviour, the projected monitoring dashboard, contemporaneous notes and communications, official ECNBA notices and voting links observed during the election.

The undersigned was not provided access to source code, deployment configuration, databases, cloud consoles, server or application logs, audit trails, DNS configuration, SMS gateway records, incident-management records or independent security reports. This report therefore does not certify the platform or reconstruct the incidents conclusively.

Evidence classification

Classification	Meaning	Examples
Directly observed	Personally seen or contemporaneously recorded at the monitoring centre.	Delayed commencement, static dashboard, visible URLs and limited technical access.
Officially stated	Published or communicated by ECNBA but not independently verified by the undersigned.	Cyberattack attribution, portal migration and announced commencement time.
Third-party report	Information communicated to the undersigned by a voter, representative or other person but not independently verified.	Reports of delayed or undelivered OTPs and unresolved voter-support requests.
Analytical inference	A technical interpretation derived from one or more observations but requiring supporting records for confirmation.	Possible implications of the domain migration, static dashboard or OTP-support process.
Not established	A matter requiring supporting technical evidence before a conclusion can be reached.	Root cause, attack path, data impact, backend relationship and database integrity.

This report does not determine whether the observed incidents affected the final result, altered any candidate's margin or prevented a material number of eligible voters from completing the voting process. Such an assessment would require affected-voter records, authentication logs and final reconciliation data.

The undersigned was retained by a candidate and did not act as an independent auditor appointed by ECNBA. The observations and conclusions in this report are nevertheless presented according to the available evidence and are not dependent on whether they favour or disadvantage any candidate.

3. Chronology of Material Technical Events

All times are West Africa Time and are approximate unless supported by a timestamped record.

The technical-significance column contains analytical interpretations based on the stated evidence and does not independently establish root cause or impact.

Time	Event	Evidence status	Technical significance
00:00–00:10	The election was scheduled to commence. From the monitoring centre and through the access paths tested by the undersigned, the voting portal was briefly accessible and then appeared inaccessible within approximately ten minutes.	Direct observation and contemporaneous notes.	Records brief voting-portal accessibility followed by an observed loss of access. The absence of a formal incident explanation prevented independent assessment of the cause, scope and possible effect of the interruption.

00:10–07:00	Following the initial interruption, the voting portal continued to appear inaccessible during the checks made from the monitoring centre while troubleshooting activity continued. No structured technical briefing, root-cause explanation or reliable restoration estimate was provided.	Direct observation and contemporaneous communications.	Indicates an extended period of observed difficulty accessing the voting portal before the announced commencement of voting.
Approximately 07:03	ECNBA published a notice stating that the voting portal had been migrated to ecnba.org.ng and that voting would commence at 07:35.	Official ECNBA notice.	The domain change requires review of DNS, TLS, redirects, routing and backend reconciliation.
Approximately 07:35	Voting activity was first observed on the monitoring dashboard.	Direct observation.	Marks the observed operational commencement of voting at the announced commencement time.
During voting	Two URL forms associated with the voting process were observed during voting: ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/ and ecnbaovs.org.ng/ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/ .	Direct access observation.	Requires clarification of domain ownership, redirect behaviour, session handling, backend connectivity and audit-trail reconciliation.
Around 11:00	The monitoring dashboard remained unchanged for approximately 30 minutes. During the same general period, OTP delivery difficulties were separately reported by voters or representatives.	Direct observation of the dashboard; third-party reports concerning OTP delivery.	The dashboard observation did not establish whether the issue affected only the display layer or the underlying voting service. The OTP reports were not independently verified through SMS-provider records.
Approximately 20:07	An ICT staff member advised voters who had not received an OTP to submit their SCN and a telephone number through the support channel.	Communication issued by an ICT staff member.	Requires clarification of identity verification, telephone-number validation, authorisation and audit logging.
Up to midnight	As at the end of the undersigned's observation period, reports of delayed or undelivered OTPs and unresolved support requests were still being received.	Reports received and direct observation of continuing support activity.	Requires quantification of affected voters, resolution times and whether affected eligible voters later completed voting.

4. Key Technical Observations

4.1 Initial availability and incident response

The observed interruption to voting-portal access through the tested access paths continued for several hours. Although personnel were observed working to restore service, no incident classification, root-cause explanation, recovery criteria or validation evidence was provided to the undersigned.

4.2 Official cyberattack statement

ECNBA publicly attributed the interruption to a cyberattack. The information available to the undersigned was insufficient to independently confirm or reject that attribution. However, no supporting evidence was made available to establish the attack type, affected services, duration, indicators of compromise, containment actions or effect on election data.

4.3 Domain migration and voting addresses

A change in the officially designated voting domain occurred during the election period and two URL forms were observed. Multiple URLs can arise from legitimate routing or migration arrangements. Independent assurance nevertheless requires confirmation that authorised links resolved to the same application, database and audit trail and that all activity was reconciled.

4.4 OTP authentication and support process

OTP delivery formed part of voter authentication. Delayed or undelivered OTPs were reported and a support process was introduced. The controls governing identity verification, telephone-number validation, authorisation, audit logging and the number of affected voters were not established from the information made available.

4.5 Monitoring dashboard and technical visibility

The projected dashboard displayed election information after commencement but did not independently establish the completeness, accuracy or integrity of the underlying application, database, authentication services or administrative actions. The period during which the dashboard remained static could not be attributed to a display-layer issue or an interruption in the underlying service without supporting records.

4.6 Communication and access

The absence of structured technical briefings and access to sanitised evidence limited the undersigned's ability to assess the incidents and provide a complete independent technical assessment to the candidate.

5. Integrity and Assurance Assessment

Dimension	Observation	Assessment based on available evidence	Evidence required
Availability	Observed multi-hour interruption to voting-portal access and later reported OTP-related difficulties.	Access to the voting portal was interrupted through the tested access paths.	Availability monitoring, incident timeline, service-health and recovery records.

Confidentiality	No unauthorised disclosure of voter data was established. The handling, access control and protection of personal data submitted through the OTP support process were not independently verified.	Not independently verified.	Access logs, security alerts, data-loss monitoring and an independent security report.
Integrity and accuracy	No direct evidence of altered vote records was made available or observed. Audit evidence was not provided.	Not independently verified.	Append-only, tamper-evident or otherwise integrity-protected vote audit records and documentation of the controls applied
Authentication	Delayed or undelivered OTPs were reported and an election-day support process was used.	Reportedly impaired for some voters; scope not established.	SMS delivery receipts, queue and API logs, support records and affected-voter analysis.
Transparency and auditability	The dashboard was visible but the underlying records and controls were not available for review.	Insufficient for independent assurance.	Read-only audit evidence, formal incident report and independent review.
Domain and routing	Multiple URL forms and a domain migration were observed.	Requires technical reconciliation.	DNS history, TLS records, redirect rules, reverse-proxy configuration and backend mapping.

Professional position: The evidence available to the undersigned does not establish that election records were accessed or altered without authorisation. Equally, because the relevant incident, authentication, routing, privileged-access, audit and reconciliation records were not made available, the undersigned cannot independently determine whether the platform and election records remained secure, complete and unaltered throughout the election period. This is a limitation-of-evidence conclusion and should not be interpreted either as proof of compromise or as confirmation that no compromise occurred.

6. Matters Requiring Clarification and Supporting Evidence

Matter requiring clarification	Supporting evidence required
Cause, scope and timeline of the initial interruption and the basis for the cyberattack attribution.	Signed incident report; where deployed or applicable, WAF, CDN, firewall, IDS/IPS, SIEM and cloud-provider records; server and application logs.
Changes made during troubleshooting and validation completed before service restoration.	Source-control, deployment, configuration and privileged-access records; restoration and testing records.
Relationship between the observed voting domains and URL paths.	DNS history, TLS certificates, redirect rules, reverse-proxy configuration, domain ownership and backend mapping.

Extent and effect of delayed or failed OTP delivery.	SMS gateway API logs, provider delivery receipts, failure codes, queue metrics, retries and affected-voter analysis.
Controls applied to OTP support requests.	Support tickets, identity-verification procedure, telephone-number validation rules, authorisation records and audit logs.
Reason for the static dashboard and whether underlying services continued to operate.	Dashboard, application, database and result-aggregation logs for the relevant period.
Completeness and consistency of the final election records.	Reconciliation of eligible voters, OTP requests, successful authentications, ballots initiated, ballots submitted, unique voters and vote records by office.
Preservation and integrity of relevant evidence.	Database snapshots, backups, checksums or hashes, time-synchronisation records and chain-of-custody documentation.

7. Recommendations

1. **Immediate evidence preservation:** Issue a formal preservation instruction covering logs, snapshots, backups, communications, tickets, SMS records and configuration changes. Records should be exported in original form, time-synchronised and protected with cryptographic hashes.
2. **Signed post-election incident report:** Require ECNBA and the electronic voting service provider to provide a signed report stating the incident timeline, root cause, systems affected, actions taken, validation performed and impact on voters and election data.
3. **Independent technical review:** Appoint a mutually acceptable independent technical team to review the incident evidence, domain migration, authentication performance, privileged activity, database integrity and result reconciliation while protecting ballot secrecy and sensitive security information.
4. **End-to-end reconciliation:** Reconcile eligible voters, OTP requests, successful authentications, ballots initiated, ballots submitted, unique voters and vote records by office, including OTP-related support cases and all authorised voting links.
5. **Future technical-access and communication protocol:** For future elections, provide accredited candidate technical consultants with controlled read-only access to sanitised monitoring evidence, scheduled incident briefings and a documented communication procedure during material technical events.

8. Final Professional Opinion

During the 2026 Nigerian Bar Association National Elections, the undersigned observed an initial interruption to voting-portal access, reported OTP delivery difficulties, a period of static dashboard reporting and a change in the officially designated voting domain. These events required clear technical explanation and supporting evidence.

No evidence available to the undersigned established unauthorised alteration of vote records. However, relevant logs, incident records, authentication evidence, domain-routing records and reconciliation data were

not made available. Independent technical assurance regarding the security, accuracy and completeness of the underlying election records could therefore not be provided.

The professionally defensible position is that a definitive assessment should follow immediate preservation of evidence, a signed incident report, end-to-end reconciliation and an independent review of the relevant technical records.

Prepared by:

Collins Onyemaobi

Accredited Technical Consultant to the Candidate

Signature:  _____

Date: 19 July 2026

Annex A: Selected Supporting Photographs and Screenshots

The photographs and screenshots in this annex are provided as contextual supporting material and do not constitute a complete forensic evidence register.

Figure A1: Monitoring centre photographed during the period in which the voting portal was reported and observed to be inaccessible.



Figure A2: Browser capture showing an attempted access to the voting portal and the message “System temporarily unavailable” at approximately 12:57 AM WAT.





Figure A3: ICT support personnel observed during the election period.



Figure A4: ECNBA communication announcing commencement of voting at 07:35 WAT.



LATEEF OMOYEMI AKANGBE, SAN, FCIArb

Legal Practitioner

Seventh Floor, St. Nicholas House, Catholic Mission Street, Lagos Island, Lagos
loakangbe@sooblaw.com | 0803 324 7080

BY EMAIL AND ALL AVAILABLE MEANS — EXTREMELY URGENT

18 July 2026

2:15 AM WAT

The Chairman and Members
Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA)
NBA House, 9 Oro Ago Street
Garki, Abuja

Dear Sir,

**EMERGENCY PROTEST AND DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION
OF THE 2026 NBA NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

I write in my capacity as a presidential candidate in the 2026 NBA National Elections, which were scheduled to commence at 12:00 AM WAT today, Saturday, 18 July 2026. It is now 02:15 AM WAT. One hundred and twenty minutes into the process, the election has suffered a catastrophic structural and technical collapse that renders its continuation, in any form, indefensible.

I set out below, in the order in which they have come to my attention since midnight, the specific grounds on which I demand the immediate suspension and postponement of this election. Each ground alone would be sufficient. Together, they present a picture of systemic failure so total that no result declared at the end of this process can carry the confidence of the profession or withstand the scrutiny of any reasonable individual.

1. Complete Portal Collapse and the Risk of Ballot Dumping

As of 2:09 AM WAT, the official e-voting portal was entirely inaccessible to the vast majority of the approximately 82,000 accredited voters. Reports from voters across the country confirm that the platform was returning errors, failing to load, or timing out on authentication. For all practical purposes, the election has not commenced. The portal has collapsed.

The ECNBA has reportedly indicated, through informal verbal channels, that because the portal was down, any votes cast so far will be “cancelled” and the process will “recommence.”

This statement, rather than reassuring, raises the gravest possible security concern. If the portal is inaccessible to the general membership, how were any votes cast at all? Who had access to the platform during a window in which the public could not enter? How can the

candidates, their agents, or the membership verify that back-end ballot dumping has not already taken place during this period of total opacity? What mechanism exists to distinguish a vote cast by a legitimate voter who managed to access the portal before it collapsed from a vote injected into the system by an actor with back-end access? And on what technical authority can the ECNBA guarantee that a “cancellation” of early votes will be complete, verifiable, and auditable, rather than a cosmetic reset that leaves compromised data in the system?

The ECNBA cannot answer these questions, because the infrastructure it has deployed is not capable of answering them. A portal that collapses within the first two hours of a national election and then proposes to “restart” is not a portal that can be trusted to deliver a credible result at any point thereafter. The integrity of the database has been compromised from the moment the system failed. No restart can cure that.

2. Breach of the Revised Voting Guidelines: Email OTPs in Violation of the SMS-Only Guarantee

Less than twenty-four hours ago, the ECNBA published its Revised Electronic Voting Guidelines, dated 16 July 2026, in which it announced, with prominent emphasis, a key revision to the voter authentication process. The previous position, under which OTPs were delivered to registered email addresses, was replaced with a revised position under which OTPs would be delivered “strictly via SMS to registered mobile number.” The ECNBA stated that this revision was adopted “to address perceptions, observed in previous NBA elections, that email-based OTP delivery was susceptible to manipulation.”

That was yesterday. Today, within the first one hundred and twenty minutes of the election, reports are already flooding in from voters across the country that they are receiving OTPs via email, not via SMS.

This is not a minor technical glitch. This is a complete and bad-faith breach of the security architecture that the ECNBA itself published, in its own name, to the entire membership, less than a day ago. The shift from email to SMS was not a cosmetic change. It was the single most important safeguard adopted for this election, introduced expressly because the email-based system had been compromised in previous elections, most notoriously in 2018 when the EFCC filed a 14-count charge against two individuals for altering the email addresses and phone numbers of over 1,000 voters and fraudulently using their Supreme Court Enrolment Numbers to cast votes.

If OTPs are being delivered via email, the entire authentication framework is compromised. Every vote authenticated by an email-delivered OTP is a vote that cannot be verified as legitimate under the ECNBA’s own published guidelines. The very vulnerability the revision was designed to eliminate has been reintroduced on the morning of the election. The membership is entitled to know whether this is incompetence or design. Either answer demands the immediate suspension of the process.

3. The Presidential Ballot Face-Defect: A Visual Disenfranchisement

Reports confirm that the live presidential ballot interface, as displayed to voters who have managed to access the platform, contains an unpardonable administrative and graphic defect. Of the three cleared presidential candidates, only one candidate's photograph is displayed on the ballot. The photographs of the remaining candidates, including mine, are either omitted, broken, or failing to render.

In an electronic election, the ballot interface is the ballot paper. Its design, layout, and visual presentation must be neutral, complete, and identical for every candidate. A ballot that displays one candidate's photograph while omitting the others is not a neutral instrument. It is a visual prompt. Whether by negligence or by design, it confers a presentation advantage on the candidate whose image appears and disadvantages every candidate whose image does not. In any jurisdiction, and before any reasonable individual, this would be grounds for the immediate invalidation of every ballot cast on that interface.

That this defect exists at all, on a platform that was supposedly subjected to end-to-end testing on 11 July, a mock voting exercise open to all verified voters, and a final systems and security audit on 13 July, raises the most serious questions about the competence and diligence of the Electronic Voting Service Provider and the ECNBA's oversight of the process. A defect of this nature should have been detected and corrected weeks ago. That it was not detected, or was detected and not corrected, is itself an indictment of the entire testing and audit framework.

4. The Demand: Immediate Suspension, Not Ad-Hoc Fixes

I have set out three independent grounds, each of which is sufficient on its own to invalidate this election. In combination, they present a picture of systemic failure so complete that no mid-election patch, no time extension, no informal assurance, and no verbal promise of a "restart" can restore the credibility of the process.

I therefore demand, formally, immediately, and on the record, that the ECNBA take the following steps:

- (a)** Suspend the election immediately. The portal must be taken offline, in its entirety, now. No further votes should be accepted, processed, or recorded until the matters set out in this letter have been fully addressed.
- (b)** Preserve and quarantine all data. Every vote cast, every authentication log, every OTP delivery record, and every access log from the period between 12:00 AM and the time of suspension must be preserved in its entirety, without alteration, deletion, or overwriting, and made available for independent audit.
- (c)** Commission an immediate, independent technical audit of the platform, the database, the OTP delivery mechanism, and the ballot interface, conducted by a reputable third-party firm with no prior relationship to the ECNBA or the appointed service providers, before any resumption of voting is contemplated.

(d) Explain to the membership, in writing and on the record, how a platform that was tested, audited, and certified for deployment collapsed within the first hour, how email OTPs were sent in direct violation of the published guidelines, and how a ballot interface with a candidate's photograph missing passed the final pre-election review.

(e) Postpone the election to a date within the life of this current NBA national executive that allows sufficient time for the audit, the rectification of the identified failures, and the restoration of confidence among the candidates and the membership. No ad-hoc fix applied under the pressure of a live, failed election can substitute for a properly constituted, independently verified, and transparently managed process.

I say this plainly and unequivocally: a flawed, rushed election carried out today under these chaotic conditions cannot yield a credible result. Whoever is declared the winner of an election conducted on a collapsed portal, with breached authentication, and on a visually defective ballot, will not lead the Bar with the confidence of the profession. They will inherit a crisis of legitimacy from which neither they nor the Association will easily recover. The Bar has been here before. It cannot afford to be here again.

The ECNBA has a choice. It can suspend the election now, investigate, fix, and rebuild, and conduct a credible process that the membership and reasonable individuals will respect. Or it can press on, declare a result that will be immediately and comprehensively challenged, and drag the Association into another cycle of litigation, recrimination, and public disgrace.

I urge the Committee, in the strongest terms, to choose the former. The profession is watching. History is watching. And reasonable individuals will be watching.

This letter is being delivered simultaneously to the Chairman and all members of the ECNBA, to the NBA President, to the General Secretary, Past Presidents of the NBA, to all presidential candidates, and to the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, by all available means.

Please treat this as the most urgent correspondence you will receive today.

Yours faithfully,

LOA

Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN, FCI Arb

Candidate, Office of the President

Nigerian Bar Association

cc:

The President, Nigerian Bar Association

The General Secretary, Nigerian Bar Association

All Presidential Candidates, 2026 NBA National Elections

The Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice Past

The Chairman, Body of Benchers

Past Presidents, Nigerian Bar Association



Dan Whisky <omenadan@gmail.com>

ECNBA: COMMENCEMENT OF VOTING

1 message

Electoral Committee of the NBA <info@nigerianbar.org.ng>
Reply-To: hello@nigerianbar.org.ng
To: omenadan@gmail.com

Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 7:42 AM



NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ELECTORAL COMMITTEE · NBA 2026

Notice of Apology for Delay in Commencement of Voting

2026 NBA National Elections — 18th July 2026

● **Voting Commencing Shortly — 24-Hour Window**

TO: All Candidates, Eligible Voters, Agents, and Observers

ECNBA Secretariat · NBA House, No. 9 Oro-Ago Street, Garki, Abuja, FCT · 18th July 2026

Apology

The Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) sincerely apologises for the delay in the commencement of the voting process for the 2026 NBA National Elections at the scheduled time of **12:00 AM WAT**.

● **Voting Commences Now!**

Voting will commence Now at 7:35 am. Once it commences, it will last for **24 hours** from the exact time of commencement. Members are advised to use the new voting url provided below.

⚠ Important: New Voting Domain (Heightened Security Measure)

Due to heightened security measures implemented to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process, the voting portal has been migrated to a new, secured domain. Members are hereby notified that the **official and only valid voting address** is:

OFFICIAL VOTING PORTAL

 **ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/**

<https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/>

Members are **strongly warned** to use only the address above. Disregard any other link, platform, or communication purporting to direct voters to any other website.

PLEASE TAKE NOTE

- 1** The **official voting portal** is now <https://ecnba.org.ng/vote/ecnba-ovs-main/> — use only this address to cast your vote.
- 2** Once voting commences, the window will be open for exactly **24 hours** from that time. No vote will be accepted after that window closes.
- 3** **Further updates will be communicated promptly** through official ECNBA channels as they become available.

The Committee sincerely appreciates the patience and understanding of all candidates, agents, consultants, observers, and eligible voters during this period and reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a free, fair, and credible electoral process.

Please accept the assurances of the Committee's highest regard.

Dated this 18th day of July, 2026.

Aham Ejelam, SAN
Chairman (ECNBA 2026)

Ibrahim Aliyu Nassarawa, Esq.
Secretary (ECNBA 2026)

ELECTORAL COMMITTEE • NBA 2026

NBA House, No. 9 Oro-Ago Street, Garki, Abuja, FCT.

[Visit our website](#) • [Contact us](#)

Free • Fair • Transparent

Election Day: 18 July 2026

This email was sent to you as a registered member of the Nigerian Bar Association.

This is an official communication from the ECNBA Electoral Committee.

If you no longer wish to receive these communications, [click here to unsubscribe](#).



Dan Whisky <omenadan@gmail.com>

ECNBA Issues Guidance on Delayed SMS OTP During 2026 NBA E-Voting

1 message

NBA ECNBA <info@nigerianbar.org.ng>

Sat, Jul 18, 2026 at 5:33 PM

Reply-To: info@nigerianbar.org.ng

To: omenadan@gmail.com



Distinguished colleagues,

The Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) has issued an advisory to voters experiencing delays in receiving the SMS One-Time Password (OTP) required to participate in the ongoing 2026 NBA National Elections.

In the notice, the Committee acknowledged that heavy traffic on the e-voting platform may result in delayed delivery of OTPs and urged members to remain patient while following the prescribed steps to complete the authentication process.

According to the ECNBA, voters who do not receive their OTP within five minutes of making a request should log out of the e-voting portal completely, wait for twenty minutes, then log in again and request a fresh OTP.

The Committee advised against repeatedly requesting OTPs, warning that multiple requests could further congest the system and prolong delays for all voters.



The Committee also encouraged voters to ensure they have adequate network coverage, check their SMS inbox as well as spam or blocked message folders, verify that their registered phone numbers are correct, ensure their phones are not in "Do Not Disturb" mode, and use the OTP immediately upon receipt, as it expires after a short period.

Reassuring members of the integrity of the electoral process, the ECNBA stated that the e-voting system is currently processing high traffic and emphasized that every validly cast vote will count. Voters were further advised to check their email after successfully voting to obtain their voting reference number.

For additional support, the Committee directed voters to contact its dedicated helpdesk via call or WhatsApp on **08144274159**, **09161044495**, or **08104510797**.

Signed:

Ahame Ejelam, SAN, Chairman

Ibrahim Aliyu Nassarawa, Esq., Secretary.



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