MOGAJI V ODOFIN (1978) 4S. C. 91, is that apart from the interplay of the application of legal principles, cases are essentially decided on the quantum or quality of evidence adduced and admitted by the Court. This rubric or treatment does not however pretend to be exhaustive. Before delving into the pith of this enquiry, it is expedient for us to briefly examine the meaning of public documents. By the provision of section 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the following documents are public documents: (a) documents forming the official acts or records of official acts of (I) sovereign authority (II) official bodies and tribunals or (III) public officers; legislative, judicial and executive whether of Nigeria or elsewhere and (b) public records kept in Nigeria of private documents. A Our first enquiry centers on the position of the law where the original of a public document is irrecoverably lost or destroyed so that it is impracticable to tender a certified copy of the original. The question here is what course the court should adopt in doing substantial justice to the parties. The arguments here polarize along two distinct routes. The first argument is erected on the premise that the Evidence Act is explicit on the fact that the only type of evidence admissible to prove the content of a public document is the certified copy of the document but no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. See section 90(1) (c) of the Act. This reasoning connotes that where the original of a public document is irrecoverably lost the party who seeks to rely on the said document is left without remedy. It is pertinent to state that this position has been adopted and applied by our courts to throw out a number of claims in a slew of decided cases. For instance in ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) 17 NWLR (pt 8481) this question fell for determination by the Court. Niki Tobi JSC after a painstaking appraisal of a legion of the apex court’s decisions, in his usual stylistic erudition penned thus: Exhibit 1 being a public document, the applicable provision in the first instance is section 97(1) (e ) and 2 (c ) of the Act… It is clear from section 97 (2 ) (c ) that the only acceptable secondary evidence of a public document is certified copy of the document. The section has put the position precisely, concisely and beyond speculation or conjecture by the words “but no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. See ONOBRUCHERE V ESEGINE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 19 ) 799 ; NZEKWU V. NZEKWU (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 104 ) 373. The question begging for answer here is whether it can be rightly argued that upon a sober or clinical examination of the above section, there is to be found such legislative intent? Herein does the second prong of the argument on this issue sprouts. It is an axiomatic principle of our jurisprudence that remedies and rights are correlative. This is often captured in the latin maxim ubi Jus ubi remedium. What is discernible from this principle is that the court must not render itself helpless and hapless where a person’s right has been violated or infringed upon. In the light of this principle, can it be rightly contended that the intent of the framers of the enunciated provisions of the Evidence Act in the cases already cited is to shut the door of justice against a party who for no fault of his, was unable to obtain a certified copy of a public document? Especially where there exists a photocopy of the said document, the authenticity of which can be verified by the officer who ordinarily has custody of the original? I think not. While I agree that the courts must kowtow to the clear intent of the framers of the law, it is my humble view that the courts would be doing extreme violence to the provisions of the Evidence Act to deny a party who has a reasonable cause of action, access to the portals of justice as done in the cases cited supra on the ground that the original of a document cannot be found. Thus where a public document forms the epicenter or the nucleus around which other issues pivots such that a rejection of same pulls the bottom off a party’s case, the court must search for ways of remedying the situation instead of denying such a party access to justice outright. My contention in the main is that where a public document forms the nucleus of a party’s case, the court should with due respect adopt a liberal interpretation of the applicable sections of the Act and in fact admit a secondary evidence of same tendered through the officer who ordinarily has custody of the original. The court must astutely and at all times strain every nerve to ensure that the hallowed or magisterial prescriptions embedded in the maxim referenced ante is not struck down. B The next limb of our enquiry concentrates on whether the original of a public document is admissible without certification. This enquiry shall also polarize along two distinct paths. We proceed on this voyage by the examination of relevant provision of the Evidence Act. By the tenor of section 88 of the Evidence Act, documents (not excluding public documents) shall be proved by primary evidence except in cases mentioned in the Act. The first argument which our courts have given continuous espousal is to the effect that the content of a public document is required by section 90 of the Act to be proved by a certified copy of the document but no other secondary evidence is admissible See LAWSON V AFANI CONT. CO. NIG. LTD. (2002) 2 NWLR (pt. 752); PHILIP ANATOGU V. IGWE IWEKA 11 (1995) 8NWLR (pt. 415) 547; OBADINA FAMILY & EXECUTORS OF CHIEF J. A AJAO Coker JSC held that the combined effect of the subsection is that in the case of public documents the only type of secondary evidence permissible is a certified true copy of the document and none other. It is contended along this line of reasoning that one of the reasons for requiring the tendering of the certified copy is to preserve the original. Thus the original of a public document is inadmissible without certification. However, it is hard to distil this rigid position taken by our courts from a marriage of the relevant provisions of the Act. I would like to contend on the footing of section 88 of the Act that it cannot either expressly or by inference, be rightly distilled from the Act that original of a public document is inadmissible per se. The phrase “the only type of secondary evidence and none other” which the courts have relied on to hold that the original of a public document is inadmissible, cannot in my humble view be construed to exclude the original of a public document. This is because the emphasis in the phrase is not on the noun “evidence” but on the adjective “secondary” The point being made here is that a true construction of the sentence reveals that it is only where a secondary evidence of a public document is sought to be put in evidence, that only a certified copy of same and none other is admissible. The law is settled that the court must not read into an enactment meanings not decipherable from it. This position was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in the case of DAGASH V. BULAMA (2004) 14 NWLR (pt. 892) .144. The court posited thus: “the only type of secondary evidence” does not seem to me to exclude primary evidence from being admissible. Section 93 of the Evidence Act provides that the content of a document may be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. Section 94 defines primary evidence as the document itself. Section 96 of the Evidence Act provides that documents must be proved by primary evidence except… “The law which needs no authority is that the best form of evidence is primary evidence. Again when one understands that the original of a document in most cases is more than one, it makes mincemeat of the argument that the original if tendered will be lost. It is therefore my humble view as can be gleaned from the marriage of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act that the original of a public document is not excluded either expressly or by implication. This position was endorsed in the recent case of GAMBO IDI V. THE STATE. OGUNBIYI JSC where he referred to a similar decision in KWARA STATE MIN OF AGRIC V. SGP NIG LTD. (1998) 11 NWLR (pt. 575) @ 583 where it was stated that a public document is admissible as primary evidence without certification. It may be added that where the original of a public document is sought to be tendered, the question should not be about certification or custody but it should be about the maker. C. We shall now pithily examine whether the photocopy of a certified true copy of a public document is admissible. This issue has also thrown up tons of conflicting judicial opinions. In INTERNATIONAL BANK NIG. LTD. V. DABIRI & 2 ORS (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 583). 284 It was held that the photocopy of a certified true copy of a public document needs no further certification under section 111 (1) of the Evidence Act. Per OGBUAGU JSC. See also DAILY TIMES OF NIG LTD. V. CHIEF F R A WILLIAM (1988) 4 NWLR. (pt. 36) .526 .However, in SHELL CO. LTD. V NWAOLU (1991) 3 NWLR (pt. 491) the court of Appeal held that photocopies of certified true copy of a public document are inadmissible. The point must be made that the reason de’tre for requiring certification of a public document is to establish its authenticity. It is argued that it would therefore be otiose to require further certification of a photocopy of a public document which has been certified and which still retains evidence of certification. This reasoning is valid in the sense that it saves a lawyer’s professional time and cost. On the other hand, the reasoning of the Court requiring certification is premised on the high level of fraud and forgery prevalent in today’s transactions. Thus in OGBORU V. UDUAGHAN (2012) 11 NWLR (pt 1211) . 357 the court rejected the photocopy of a certified true copy of a public document on the ground that a photocopy of a certified copy of a public document must be re-certified because in this age of sophisticated technology, photo tricks manipulation cannot be ruled out and evidence produced in the context of section 97 (2) of the Evidence Act could be tutored and therefore not authentic. In the process of copying the original document it could be manipulated with the result that the copy which is in evidence does not completely and totally reflect the original and therefore not a carbon copy of the original. In most cases, the court is not in a position to detect such manipulation. It is safe to posit therefore that the photocopy of a certified true copy of a public document is inadmissible. However, some courts would most likely admit such photocopy where it is satisfied that there is no manipulation of same for as it is said, it would depend on whether the court is in a position to detect such manipulation. D. We shall concisely consider the question of whether a private document which emanates from the custody of a public officer becomes a public document. Section 102 (b) of the evidence Act, provides that public document includes public records kept in Nigeria of private documents. In TABIK INVESTMENT LTD. V GTB (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 602) 1592 @ 1607 this court held that a private petition sent to the police forms part of the records of the police and consequently a public document within the provision of section 109 (now 102) of the evidence Act. In AROMOLARAN V. AGORO (2014) 18 NWLR. (Pt. 1438) 153 the court held that a letter written to the Governor of a State in his official capacity by a person who is not a government official is a public document because it is a public record kept in Nigeria of private document. That despite being a private document, it acquires the status of a public document by virtue of forming part of official record and thus require certification for it to be admissible. It is safe to posit therefore that a private document which has gone into public records automatically acquires the status of a public document. By Philips M. Oyanna, Esq ]]>

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